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The world economy is going through major economic and 
geopolitical shifts, fostering tensions in the global economic 
governance structure centered on the IMF, the World Bank and 
the WTO. The impacts of globalization are being questioned 
while disruptive technologies continue to change the economic 
landscape. This collection of papers focuses on one of the pillars 
of global governance: the multilateral trade system, anchored by 
the WTO.  
Membership of the WTO is now close to universal, with the 
accession of China in 2001 representing a landmark achievement. 
While the organization plays a major role in enhancing the 
transparency of trade policies and enforcing the rules of the game 
that have been agreed by Members, it has not been successful 
at negotiating new rules. The private sector is frustrated 
with the WTO, as are civil society groups seeking to address 
issues of interest to them. There is a general perception that 
WTO disciplines and modus operandi are outdated and have 
not kept pace with globalization. Governments have increasingly 
turned to preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that are better 
attuned to the changing dynamics of international trade and 
investment flows.
The papers in this volume focus on some of the major critical issues 
that confront the WTO Membership. They review developments 
in trade policy and technology and regulation. They make clear 
that PTAs are at best a partial solution to the global governance 
gap. Regulation of the “Internet of things,” e-commerce, cross-
border services, digital trade and data flows will become ever 
more important. Global rules of the game are required. The same 
is true for old fashioned protectionism. The future of the WTO is 
an important topic for the health and expansion of global trade in 
the 21st century.
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CHAPTER 1 
Future of the  
Global Trade Order
Carlos A. Primo Braga and Bernard Hoekman
IMD and Fundação Dom Cabral;  
European University Institute
The global economy is going through major economic and geopolitical shifts. 
The balance of  economic power between the established powers of  the North 
and the emerging “new” ones of  the South has changed, not only fostering 
tensions in the global governance structure that has characterized the post-
World War II era – centered around the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF 
and the World Bank), the GATT/WTO and the Security Council of  the UN 
– but also leading to new alliances among emerging economies.
The typical narrative for economic and geopolitical trends in the 21st century 
involves considerations about the impact of  globalization, the role of  disruptive 
technologies in changing the economic landscape, as well as the terms of  
international competition, and the growing economic relevance of  emerging 
economies.  These economic considerations are often complemented by 
geopolitical considerations focusing on the relative “decline” of  the United 
States and the rapid economic ascendancy of  China.  
This collection of  papers looks into one of  the main pillars of  global 
governance: the multilateral trade system, anchored by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  Membership at the WTO requires credible market-
oriented economic policy credentials – it’s tough to get in and accession by 
new Members invariably requires significant reforms. In 2016, the WTO will 
reach at least 164 Members (as the accession of  Afghanistan and Liberia are 
completed), with a number of  countries still in the accession process. It is 
close to reaching universal coverage of  trading nations – a stark contrast  to 
the original 23 members of  the GATT in the 1940s. The accession of  China 
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to the WTO in 2001 will probably remain as one of  the landmark trade 
developments of  the 21st century. 
The year China acceded to the WTO is the same year the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) – the first round of  multilateral trade negotiations in the 
WTO era – was launched, following eight earlier rounds conducted under 
the GATT. Almost 15 years later negotiations are formally still ongoing, but 
in spite of  some progress at the Bali Ministerial in 2013, the conclusion of  the 
negotiations remains a distant goal.  The 2015 Nairobi Ministerial Declaration 
is a noteworthy example of  “constructive” ambiguity, underscoring the 
deep divisions that now characterize the WTO Membership with respect 
to the DDA.  Its Article 30 states that “many Members reaffirm the Doha 
Development Agenda, and the Declarations and Decisions adopted at Doha 
and at the Ministerial Conferences held since then, and reaffirm their full 
commitment to conclude the DDA on that basis. Other Members do not 
reaffirm the Doha mandates, as they believe new approaches are necessary 
to achieve meaningful outcomes in multilateral negotiations.”
The long dragging DDA has had a negative effect on the reputation of  the 
WTO. The private sector in particular seems increasingly frustrated with the 
multilateral trade system, but civil society groups are also disenchanted with 
lack of  progress in addressing issues of  interest to them. There is a general 
perception that WTO disciplines and modus operandi are outdated and have 
not kept pace with globalization. Unsurprisingly, some observers are even 
asking whether the WTO is worth “saving.” 
This is the wrong question. The DDA talks are just the tip of  the “iceberg” 
that encompasses a much broader set of  WTO functions. Even if  the DDA 
were to fail – and as indicated above, some WTO Members take the view 
that it has failed – the WTO would continue to play an important role in 
fostering transparency in trade practices, monitoring and enforcement of  
existing multilateral rules and agreements, and providing dispute settlement 
services. Notwithstanding the difficulties of  the DDA, following the 2008 
global financial crisis the WTO made a contribution to the world economy 
by disciplining trade protectionism and helping prevent the Great Recession 
morphing into a Great Depression à la 1930s.
One consequence of  the DDA deadlock is that trade liberalization and new 
trade rules are increasingly being negotiated in the context of  preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs).  In 1990, there were roughly 70 active PTAs; today 
there are more than 300. The interest in PTAs is not limited to issues on which 
the DDA cannot make progress. Many of  the matters that are on the table in 
PTAs are driven by deeper integration objectives that often have WTO-plus 
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characteristics. This is the case for many policy areas, including protection 
of  intellectual property rights (IPRs), mutual recognition or  harmonization 
of  “behind-the-border” regulations, liberalization of  investment flows and 
provisions on investor protection, to name just a few. The new mega-PTAs that 
are being pursued by major OECD member countries, such as the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), are better attuned to the needs of  transnational corporations and the 
dynamics of  international trade in the 21st century than is the WTO. 
This collection of  papers looks into possible future scenarios for the multilateral 
trade system. They focus on some of  the major critical issues that confront the 
WTO Membership and the stakeholders in the multilateral trading system. 
As mentioned by Miguel Rodriguez in Chapter 2, one could argue that the 
WTO is currently facing an “adaptability” crisis.  This is nothing new in the 
history of  the multilateral trade system.  Actually, a similar crisis occurred in 
the 1980s during the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-1994), which led to 
the GATT morphing into the WTO with an associated increase in the number 
of  policy areas covered by multilateral rules of  the game.
In a nutshell, the creation of  the WTO was made possible by a bargain 
that involved the inclusion of  two new agreements under the multilateral 
system of  trade governance (GATS and TRIPS), a priority for industrialized 
nation negotiators, in exchange for new disciplines for agricultural trade and 
the dismantling of  the system of  quotas that governed textile and clothing 
trade (the MFA), priorities for most developing countries. The history of  the 
“marriage of  convenience” between traditional trade policies and the inclusion 
of  new policy areas such as services and protection of  IPRs illustrates the 
capacity of  the multilateral trade system to adapt over time.  
IPRs are territorial by nature (i.e. the rights are awarded and enforced at the 
national level) and attempts to promote harmonization and coordination across 
countries can be traced back to the 19th century.1  International conventions 
(the Paris Convention in 1883, the Berne Convention in 1886, and so on) in 
this area typically adopted national treatment provisions as the basic standard 
for international harmonization.  As international trade in knowledge products 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows expanded significantly in the post-
World War II era, conflicts between innovators (at the level of  countries and 
enterprises) and imitators began to increase. 
1 This section on IPRs relies on Primo Braga (2016).
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Already in the 1970s, the United States began to push for the adoption of  an 
Anti-Counterfeiting Code at the level of  the GATT.  This effort – launched 
in the final stages of  the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) of  multilateral trade 
negotiations – was driven by the lobbying of  trademark-holding companies, 
which were trying to limit counterfeited products in international trade.  This 
attempt did not succeed, but it signaled the way of  the future for innovation-
leading nations – in particular, the United States. When the eighth round of  
multilateral trade negotiations (the Uruguay Round) under the GATT started 
in 1986, the strategy was refined to go beyond anti-counterfeiting with a view to 
establishing minimum standards of  protection and enforcement across a broad 
array of  IPRs instruments.  The appeal of  this approach was to connect the 
strengthening of  IPRs protection to the broader trade agenda and to provide 
access to the dispute settlement mechanism of  the multilateral trade system. 
Most developing countries, in turn, preferred the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) as the institutional locus for IPRs discussions. The lack 
of  effective enforcement powers in the WIPO conventions, however, is often 
presented as the reason behind the US efforts in favor of  a GATT-related 
solution.2  This time the strategy succeeded, leading to the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
A similar dynamic occurred with services. As was true for IPRs, there were 
no multilateral disciplines on trade in services in the GATT. Services were 
put on the GATT agenda in the early 1980s by the United States, which had 
a significant surplus in its balance of  trade in services, as opposed to running 
a deficit for trade in merchandise. This led to a process of  reflection and the 
preparation of  a series of  national studies on the state of  play for trade in 
services and the possible benefits of  developing rules for services trade. The 
suggestion to expand the coverage of  the trading system to encompass services 
was controversial, however, and many developing countries, including Brazil 
and India, were initially of  the view that the Uruguay Round should not 
address services. At the ministerial meeting that launched the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, it was agreed – based on a compromise proposed by Colombia 
and Switzerland – that services negotiations would proceed on a parallel track.
The agreement that was eventually negotiated was innovative in defining 
trade in services very broadly, including FDI and provision of  services through 
temporary movement of  natural persons, and permitting countries to make 
(or not make) specific commitments for sectors and the different modes of  
supplying services across borders. The main result was to establish a framework 
for future rule-making and liberalization. Few commitments were made by 
2 See Kastenmeier and Beier (1989) and Primo Braga (1990, 1996).
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countries to open their services markets – the main result was to expand the 
coverage of  the trading system but to do so in a way that allowed for great 
flexibility by countries as to how much to do in the way of  making market 
access opening commitments. This was left to future negotiations, which were 
to start within five years of  the entry into force of  the WTO. In the event, new 
services negotiations became an element of  the DDA. 
The relative success of  those advocating stronger protection of  IPRs at the 
global level via the negotiation of  trade agreements, and the expansion of  
the WTO to include trade in services, however, did lead to reactions from 
affected countries.  This was particularly the case with respect to the impact 
of  TRIPS on access to medicines amid public health crises, as underscored by 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  This reaction, in turn, led to some adjustments at 
the multilateral level as illustrated by the Doha Ministerial Declaration (2001), 
the related Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health, and 
subsequent decisions/waivers on compulsory licensing with special emphasis 
on the needs of  least developed countries.
Industry groups from innovation-led countries, however, continued to lobby for 
the inclusion of  IPRs chapters in trade agreements, focusing on preferential 
trade negotiations.  As discussed in detail by Fink (2012), the new generation 
of  PTAs negotiated by the United States – starting with NAFTA – typically 
included “TRIPS-plus” provisions.  The European Union also followed 
a similar track. Moreover, IPRs provisions became standard in bilateral 
investment treaties entered both by the United States and the European Union 
with other nations.
The latest major development in this area is the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) agreement recently negotiated – but not yet ratified – by 12 countries 
in the Pacific Rim.  The TPP agreement heralds a new era in terms of  trade 
governance.  It can be argued, for example, that at least in the medium term, 
the mega-regionals are eroding the relevance of  the multilateral trade system 
and the WTO.  TPP may also have a significant impact on the organization 
of  global value chains (GVCs), as it will introduce more liberal rules-of-origin 
(the “accumulation of  origin” concept) facilitating the operation of  GVCs 
across its members.
Not surprisingly, one of  the most controversial chapters of  the agreement 
concerns its IPRs provisions.  The United States put emphasis on longer terms 
of  copyright protection, regulatory changes that would effectively translate 
into longer patent terms and constrain the entry of  generic drugs into these 
markets, as well as additional rules for biologic medicines (pharmaceutical 
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products developed from living organisms), including minimum standards 
for data protection.
The final terms of  the TPP agreement did not deliver on all the demands 
of  the US negotiators.  Still, several of  these “TRIPS-plus” measures were 
adopted.  Some noteworthy measures adopted in the TPP agreement 
include: trademark terms of  protection of  no less than 10 years (TRIPS 
requirement is of  seven years) and the removal of  barriers for the protection 
of  sound marks; a minimum copyright term of  protection of  at least 70 years 
(TRIPS minimum standard is 50 years) and stronger copyright enforcement 
(including the possibility of  criminal prosecution against acts of  removal of  
rights management information and the requirement that TPP countries be 
signatories of  WIPO “Internet treaties”); requirement of  enforceable legal 
means for the protection of  trade secrets (TRIPS does not specify these means); 
protection of  undisclosed test data submitted for marketing approvals (at least 
10 years in the case of  agricultural chemicals and five to eight years in the case 
of  pharmaceuticals, TRIPS does not have such a requirement); the explicit 
protection of  new pharmaceutical products that are or contain a biologic (the 
TPP is the first trade agreement to do this);3 and adjustment for patent office 
delays in the granting of  patents that will promote harmonization of  patent 
granting practices among TPP parties.   
Some of  these provisions go beyond the “TRIPS-plus” aspects that the United 
States had already negotiated on a bilateral basis in the context of  its FTA 
treaties with countries such as Australia, Chile and Peru.  In short, TPP – once 
ratified – will provide for higher standards of  IPRs protection that better 
reflect existing US law.4  Inevitably, some of  these provisions have generated 
significant controversy, even among like-minded countries.  One concern is 
that it may “export” to other countries the flaws of  the US IPRs system with 
its emphasis on litigation – as illustrated by the growing role of  non-practicing 
entities, or NPEs (i.e. entities that focus on licensing and litigation of  IPRs 
rather than production and innovation) – and strategic behavior to block the 
introduction of  generic drugs.5 
3 In the United States, a biological product is defined as a “virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, 
blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemically synthesized polypeptide), 
or analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of  arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic 
compound), applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of  a disease or condition of  human beings.”  See BIO 
(2013) for further details.
4 One major exception – reflecting resistance from other TPP parties – was the term of  regulatory data protection for 
biologics.  In the United States, this term is of  at least 12 years from the date of  approval.  Article 18.52 of  the TPP 
provides only for an eight-year term of  protection.  For further details see ITAC-15 (2015).
5 For an excellent discussion of  NPEs and strategic manipulation to delay the introduction of  generic drugs in the 
United States, see Feldman (2016).
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Other topics that contribute to the “sense of  malaise” that currently 
characterizes the multilateral trade system include the lack of  progress in 
services negotiations at the multilateral level and the perception that the WTO 
is not well equipped to deal with new themes such as policies affecting the 
operation of  GVCs, digital trade and e-commerce, and environmental issues, 
to name just a few. 
Services figured much less prominently in the DDA than in the Uruguay 
Round, reflecting a decision by negotiators to first determine what the contours 
of  a possible DDA deal could be for trade in agricultural and industrial 
products. This in turn can be explained in part by the fact that international 
businesses were less active in pushing for making the services agenda a 
priority. The inclusion of  services on the Uruguay Round agenda owed much 
to the proactive efforts of  services providers, including large transnational 
companies such as American Express. Such firms were much less engaged in 
the DDA. Whatever the reason, services talks made little progress, and at the 
8th WTO Ministerial Conference in December 2011 it was agreed that WTO 
Members should pursue talks in parallel to the DDA with the aim of  reaching 
“provisional or definitive agreements based on consensus earlier than the full 
conclusion of  the single undertaking.” This led to the launch of  negotiations 
in 2012 on an agreement on trade in services (TiSA) outside the WTO.6 Thus, 
services – which represent 70% or more of  the GDP of  many economies 
and are the most dynamic category of  global trade growth (and trade growth 
potential) – were essentially taken off the WTO table. They now figure mainly 
in mega-regionals and in the TiSA negotiations. These efforts do not include 
most of  the major emerging and developing economies, who have the most 
to gain from policy reforms and that offer the greatest prospects to generate 
an increase in trade flows. For the global trading system, much will depend 
on whether participants in the TiSA decide to make the outcome a PTA or, 
instead, inscribe the results of  the negotiations into their GATS schedules of  
commitments and make the TiSA a so-called “critical mass agreement.” From 
a trading system perspective, the latter would be an important boost; making 
the TiSA a PTA would in contrast be a major blow.    
The shift to a PTA-centered trade strategy by many major high-income 
countries is not just a result of  the difficulties that have been experienced in 
getting to “yes” on the DDA, it also reflects the increasing complexity of  dealing 
with the spillover effects of  a broad set of  policies affecting GVC trade, and 
6 The TiSA includes Australia, Canada, Chile, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong China, Iceland, 
Israel, Japan, the Republic of  Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Pakistan, Peru, Switzerland, 
Turkey and the United States.
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the changing composition of  trade as technology supports a rapid increase in 
trade in services and associated cross-border data flows. 
The structure of  international trade has changed in recent decades as a result 
of  the increasing fragmentation of  global production that is associated with 
global value chains. A GVC involves a collection of  firms (plants) located in 
different countries jointly forming a “production line,” with different parts 
of  the production process undertaken by firms (plants) in different countries. 
Depending on the location of  a firm (country) in a GVC, participation may 
either involve forward linkages, where an activity produces an output that is 
used in production for export in another nation, or backward linkages, where 
a firm uses imported parts and components that are inputs for production 
that is exported. An example is country A producing hides from cattle that are 
tanned and dyed in a neighboring country B using chemicals imported from 
a third country C, with the leather produced in B used in the production of  
a car seat cover in country D that is used by a car plant located in country E 
that exports the cars to country F. 
A GVC permits enterprises in different countries to concentrate on (specialize 
in) specific tasks and activities without having to source required inputs 
locally or to vertically integrating to produce and market the end product. 
GVCs increase interdependence – each link in a chain relies on the upstream 
producers delivering their output on time and meeting the required quality and 
safety standards, whereas upstream firms are dependent on the downstream 
segments working efficiently, as stoppages or distribution problems there will 
affect the demand for inputs. The growth in GVCs has been accompanied by 
greater cross-border movement of  capital and knowledge, as well as workers. 
GVCs span a huge variety of  firms, ranging from SMEs that provide a variety 
of  inputs, to logistics providers, processors, manufacturers and service suppliers. 
While large multinational lead firms decide where to locate plants, where to 
invest and who to source from and how, these lead firms source inputs and 
buy services from numerous local suppliers and subcontractors that provide 
a range of  goods and services. Much of  the value added that is embedded in 
a product reflects the payments for intermediate goods and services. Thus, a 
wide range of  firms and sectors, including companies providing services to 
firms in other sectors, benefit from and are affected by GVC-based trade and 
investment decisions. Available data indicate that about one-third of  the value 
of  all traded manufactured goods reflect the value of  embodied services, and 
that, overall, if  account is taken of  sales of  services by foreign affiliates, services 
account for more than 50% of  world trade (Francois and Hoekman, 2010). 
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The structure and volume of  GVC trade is very sensitive to operating and 
transactions costs. This makes a wide range of  policies relevant, both policies 
that impact directly on financial and operating costs and policies that affect 
the reliability and predictability of  flows within GVC networks. Uncertainty 
and (risks of) delays associated with unpredictable operating environments 
give rise to a need to maintain higher stocks and other forms of  hedging and 
insurance, the costs of  which may preclude supply chain-related  investments.7 
An open trade regime matters for GVCs, but equally important are actions 
to minimize trade frictions,  such as delays in border clearance and low-
quality transport and logistics that lead to physical losses, and to facilitate 
investment in operating or distribution facilities. Connectivity – including the 
quality of  transport and logistics services and information and communications 
technology (ICT) networks and related services – is often critical. The policy 
agenda becomes more complex, spanning many areas that may not be covered 
by the WTO, or only partially. For example, very specific types of  government 
intervention may be needed to address coordination failures that negatively 
affect GVCs, but at the same time such measures may have negative spillover 
effects on other countries. 
Challenges Looking Forward
The most immediate challenge confronting the WTO as an institution is to 
move on from the failed DDA negotiations. This may entail greater reliance on 
variable geometry – agreements and cooperation between clubs of  countries. 
The revealed preference for PTAs illustrates that club-based cooperation is the 
revealed preference of  many countries. The task for the WTO is to channel 
more of  the energy that currently is invested in PTAs towards rule-making under 
the WTO umbrella.  Necessary conditions for this to occur are deliberation 
on both old and new policy areas that generate negative externalities and call 
for concerted action and cooperation, and more collective learning about the 
experiences of  PTAs in dealing with these policy areas.  The 21st century agenda 
confronting the WTO centers on “behind-the-border” regulatory policies as 
well as “legacy” 20th (or, indeed, 19th) century issues such as remaining tariffs. 
Reducing the market-segmenting effects of  differences in regulations is difficult 
because of  concerns that it may compromise the attainment of  regulatory 
objectives (a “race to the bottom”). Identifying areas of  regulation that could 
be the focus of  cooperation in the WTO requires discussion and deliberation, 
7 See Hoekman (2104) for an extensive discussion.
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with active participation of  the business community, policy research institutes 
and international regulatory networks. 
Numerous observers have argued that cooperation on regulatory “behind-the-
border” policies cannot occur between 163+ countries.8 An implication is that 
the WTO Membership may need to accept greater small group cooperation 
inside the organization as opposed to leaving the field to PTAs. 
Movement in this direction has already been occurring, and indeed, has 
always been an element of  cooperation in the GATT/WTO. Recent 
examples of  agreements between only a subset of  the WTO Membership 
include the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), ongoing negotiations 
on an agreement on environmental goods, and past agreements on basic 
telecommunications and financial services that were incorporated into the 
GATS. As noted above, it is possible (and desirable) that the TiSA become 
another example. A key feature of  these agreements is that benefits extend to 
all countries, not just those that sign them – they are so-called “critical mass 
agreements.”  
Another challenge for the WTO as an organization concerns the need to 
establish and deepen partnerships and harness complementarities with other 
international organizations dealing with trade policy, and the international 
business community. Greater engagement with business organizations 
is necessary for better economic governance, not least because of  GVCs, 
which increase the interface between private and public international law; 
are giving rise to transnational initiatives among firms to agree on norms 
and standards; are an element of  corporate social responsibility initiatives; 
and a focal point for public and private capacity-building programs, to name 
just a few dimensions of  the governance dimensions associated with GVCs. 
Public-private partnerships are now commonplace when it comes to investment 
projects and the operation of  (segments of) GVCs. The purely state-to-state 
nature of  WTO operations is increasingly outdated.  
Many international organizations, regulatory networks and standards-setting 
bodies play a role in creating the governance frameworks for policy areas 
that impact on trade and investment. The WTO is in many respects a weak 
organization in comparison with the multilateral development banks, the IMF, 
the OECD, and so forth when it comes to its mandate and financial resources 
to undertake monitoring, research and analysis, engage in policy dialogue and 
advisory services, capacity-building, etc. There are many “linkages” between 
8 Baldwin (2016), for example, suggests that world trade governance is likely to evolve into a two-pillar system, with the 
WTO focusing on traditional trade issues and the mega-preferentials dealing with disciplines for GVCs, capital flows, 
enhanced protection of  IPRs, and so on.
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the domain of  the WTO and the areas of  activity of  other institutions. 
Examples include sectoral regulation and associated international efforts and 
networks through which regulatory cooperation is pursued; governance of  
(multinational) business and associated GVC-based production and trade 
(including private product and production standards, labeling and traceability 
requirements, etc.); mega-regional PTA-based initiatives in areas of  direct 
relevance to the trade order (e.g. the proposal by the European Union to 
establish a permanent investment court); as well as the regimes governing 
international financial flows and exchange rate policies.
Mention should be made here of  the UN system as well, in particular as it 
relates to the achievement of  the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
Trade is mentioned as an instrument to achieve some of  the SDGs, including 
by correcting distortions in world agricultural markets, improving Aid for Trade 
support for developing countries, regional and trans-border infrastructure 
investments, and increasing the integration of  small-scale enterprises into 
GVCs. An open, rules-based, non-discriminatory multilateral trading system 
and doubling the LDC share of  global exports – in part through the timely 
implementation on a lasting basis of  duty-free, quota-free market access – are 
other instruments identified in the document presenting the SDGs (United 
Nations, 2015). 
Hoekman (2015) suggests the adoption of  a trade cost reduction goal would 
help to leverage trade to achieve the SDGs. Reducing trade costs benefits both 
exporters and importers as well as households in developing countries. A trade 
cost reduction target would also encourage governments to identify actions 
that will do the most to facilitate trade, including in areas that are not covered 
by the WTO.   There are many reasons why costs may be high, including 
own trade policies of  developing economies, a lack of  trade facilitation and 
weaknesses in transport and logistics services.  A trade cost reduction target 
leaves it to governments to work with stakeholders to identify how best to 
reduce prevailing excess costs – thus encouraging the type of  public-private 
partnerships and cooperation with other organizations discussed above. 
Conclusion
The inability to get to “yes” in the DDA does not imply a lack of  relevance 
of  the WTO. Multilateral negotiations have become more complex because 
developing countries are more active and engaged in pursuing their objectives. 
PTAs may well be more effective mechanisms to address matters of  a regulatory 
nature, or that involve the liberalization of  politically sensitive areas such as the 
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movement of  people. It is noteworthy that some PTAs address matters such 
as labor and environmental standards and include a focus on human rights, 
rule of  law and other dimensions of  public governance. These are areas of  
policy that are not covered, or covered only tangentially, by the WTO. In other 
regulatory policy domains there is already a substantial interface between 
the WTO and other international regimes – one example is in the area of  
product standards (health and safety norms for food and animal products), 
another is the protection of  IPRs. In these various areas, other institutions 
take the lead in setting substantive norms (ISO, FAO/Codex Alimentarius 
for product standards; WIPO for intellectual property). The same is true 
for development assistance, where the WTO today interacts more with 
international development agencies than it did in the past. 
These are all areas where PTAs have little role. PTAs also generally do not address 
subjects that have been the source of  disagreement in WTO negotiations such 
as agricultural support policies, which are important to developing countries. 
As the world economy becomes even more interconnected as a result of  the 
“Internet of  things”, e-commerce and the associated increase in cross-border 
service flows, policies that limit or raise the cost of  digital trade and data flows 
will become ever more important. Mega-PTAs may result in agreements on 
how to address such matters, but from a global efficiency perspective what 
is needed are rules of  the game for digital commerce and cross-border data 
flows that span all major economies. In short, the future of  the WTO is an 
important topic not only for the institution itself, but also for the health and 
expansion of  global trade in the 21st century.
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CHAPTER 2 
A New Architecture for the WTO?
Miguel Rodríguez Mendoza
WTI Advisers
Introduction 
The WTO is currently facing an “adaptability” crisis. The world economy 
has changed significantly since the WTO was created back in the mid-1990s, 
and new challenges are quickly piling on top of  the old ones. The rise of  
emerging countries and the relative decline of  traditional economic powers; 
the negotiating requests, demands and approaches from different member 
countries; the proliferation of  regional trade pacts and the need to deal with 
complex new issues, such as climate change and food security, are – in different 
ways and intensity – shaking the foundations on which the WTO was built 
some 20 years ago.
Thus, a key question is whether the WTO is capable of  facing these new 
and complex issues or whether there is instead a need to revise it in some 
fundamental ways. Should the WTO’s current negotiating mandate and 
structure be expanded? Would it be better or necessary to complete the 
unfinished business of  the Doha negotiations before taking up new negotiating 
initiatives? What should be done to strengthen the multilateral trading system 
and to ensure the future success of  the WTO? Are the results and/or limited 
agreements reached at the last WTO Ministerial in Nairobi make a difference 
to the rather negative perception developed recently about the “negotiating” 
function of  the WTO?   
To strengthen the multilateral trading system is especially important from a 
sustainable development perspective. Over the past six decades, the system has 
provided an unprecedented level of  stability and predictability in the way WTO 
members conduct their trade operations. It has also provided – particularly 
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since the establishment of  the WTO – a credible and solid mechanism to 
adjudicate trade disputes, one that is guided by law rather than power.
Developing countries, most of  which steered clear of  the system during the 
GATT years, have for the most part joined the WTO, making the multilateral 
trading system a truly universally accepted set of  values and rules, and not the 
rather limited “club” that it used to be. These developing countries are now 
using the system to their advantage – they hold the key to forward-looking 
negotiating outcomes, and account for more than half  of  the 500-plus disputes 
dealt with so far by the WTO.1
But the WTO is at a critical juncture. A renewed sense of  international 
cooperation among WTO Members is essential for dealing, first and foremost, 
with the never ending Doha negotiations. Completing Doha would allow the 
WTO to focus on some of  the most pressing challenges that in my view the 
system now faces: first, defining a new set of  negotiating modalities for the 
future;  second, revisiting the traditional approach to the participation of  the 
private sector (i.e. the business community) in its activities; and third, dealing 
appropriately with the increasing number of  trade agreements entered into 
by its Member countries, especially the so-called mega-regional agreements 
such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP), whose negotiations were recently 
concluded, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
which is still under negotiation.2 
Completing the Doha Negotiations 
Trade negotiations are what the WTO was created for in the first place. 
Concluding the Doha trade talks – approaching their 15th anniversary in 2016 
– is a must if  the WTO wishes to move forward and tackle future challenges 
head on. Not delivering on Doha will damage the organization’s very core 
function, discredit its efficiency, and make it extremely difficult for the WTO 
to acquire a mandate to deal with pressing non-Doha issues (such as climate 
change and food security) and, as I mentioned before, the increasing number 
and complexity of  regional trade agreements. Thus, the issue is not whether 
1 Dispute number 504 was initiated  on March 16th, 2016 when Japan requested consultations with Korea on certain 
antidumping duties it had imposed on pneumatic valves from Japan (see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm).
2 This chapter draws significantly on the reports and discussions that took place in the context of  the E15 Initiative, 
a program of  exchanges and analyses on the current status of  the multilateral trading system launched in 2011 
by the International Centre on Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and a number of  partnering 
institutions, including IMD/The Evian Group, and involving an impressive number of  leading international experts; 
see www.ictsd.ch for more detailed information on the E15 Initiative.
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the WTO should complete the Doha negotiations – that’s a given. The issue 
instead is how to put an end to the current deadlock and keep the negotiating 
machinery rolling on.3
Dealing with the “Single Undertaking”
Over the years, a number of  options have been suggested for moving the 
negotiations forward. However, these have run against the wall of  the “single 
undertaking,” a procedural device that has been elevated to the category 
of  guiding principle in WTO negotiations. Initially designed to facilitate 
an equitable global agreement during the Uruguay Round, the “single 
undertaking” is no longer a negotiating tool. Instead, it has become a way 
for those countries least willing to take on new commitments to hold the 
negotiations hostage.
There is a need to revisit the meaning and purpose of  the “single undertaking.” 
Does it mean that every single word in every single agreement needs to be 
agreed simultaneously by all participants to have an agreement on the whole? 
Do the negotiating issues have all the same value to all the negotiating partners? 
Are they all equally important? The common answer to these questions is, 
obviously, a rotund “no.” 
If  the GATT negotiating history is to offer any lesson, it’s that every negotiating 
round has always left aside some pending issues, with the goal of  addressing 
them later on in future negotiations. In the early years of  the system, during 
the first GATT negotiations – which dealt mainly with tariff cuts – it was clear 
that further, additional cuts had to be dealt with in future negotiations. During 
the Tokyo Round – the first to deal with non-tariff issues – the concluding 
deals also left a number of  pending subjects to be resolved at a later stage. 
Even the Uruguay Round, despite being based on the “single undertaking,” 
was no exception to this rule, as it left aside a number of  issues in agriculture 
and trade in services – the famous “built-in agenda” – with the goal of  
addressing them later in a post-Uruguay Round environment. Thus, the “single 
undertaking” does not mean solving all negotiating issues at the same time; 
it just means finding an appropriate outcome for all of  them at a particular 
point in time, even if  occasionally some of  these issues are to be dealt with 
in the future. 
3 Some analyst and “practitioners” are even questioning the need to “revive” a process that they see as already dead 
(see the Financial Times article of  December 31st, 2015 by Michael Froman, the US Trade Representative; and Carlos 
A. Primo’s article on the IMD website at http://www.imd.org/news/Doha.cfm).
18    Future of the Global Trade Order
Moving to a Final Doha “Deal”
At present, of  all the Doha issues, an agreement on non-agricultural market 
access (NAMA)  is the one that holds the promise to move the negotiations toward 
a final deal. Even if  tariff reduction is perhaps not the most “economically” 
significant of  all the subjects included in the Doha negotiations, negotiating 
tariff cuts and consolidating them in the various country schedules is something 
that trade negotiators are used to doing, can be done relatively quickly and 
has a very high visibility. Progress in this area may thus have a demonstration 
effect in the other areas of  the negotiations.
The situation that WTO Members face today is not unlike the one faced by 
GATT members in the early rounds, i.e. a need to reach an acceptable level 
of  tariff cuts among the key trading partners – including now China and the 
other emerging economies – and to apply them on a most-favoured nation 
basis. Thus, strange as it may seem, the old issue of  tariffs cuts might today 
help to unlock the paralysis in the other areas of  the negotiations and finalise 
a global pact, just as they have traditionally done. 
It may seem ironic that a protectionist device that most analysts had written off 
as insignificant and outmoded could continue to play such an important role in 
today´s negotiations. However, the reason may lie not in the intrinsic value of  
tariff protection, but rather in the visibility that it would give to a negotiating 
package. In politics, reality almost always takes a back seat to perception, and 
in developed countries the perception that some countries are “free riding” 
in the negotiations has taken a strong hold.
Tariffs are not a major impediment to global trade. Existing tariff protection has 
not prevented world trade from growing significantly in the last few decades. 
Applied tariffs are now at historically low levels, due, in part, to past trade 
negotiations, WTO accessions and unilateral tariff reductions undertaken by a 
number of  countries, mainly developing countries. However, tariff protection 
in most emerging markets, which account for a growing proportion of  world 
trade, is well above tariffs in many developed and developing countries. For 
example, average applied tariff levels in China and Brazil are 9.6% and 13.5%, 
respectively, as compared with average tariffs of  3.5% in the United States, 
3.4% in Peru, or 6.7% in Switzerland (WTO, ITC and UNCTAD, 2015).
Importantly, opening emerging economy markets is not only in the interest 
of  the industrialized countries, but also benefits developing countries, whose 
exports go increasingly to emerging markets and to other developing countries. 
According to UNCTAD, in 2013 South–South trade flows represented more 
than half  of  overall developing country trade. This share varies by region, 
ranging from above 40% in Latin America and transition economies to almost 
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70% in South Asia and East Asia. Although a proportion of  South–South trade 
encompasses intraregional flows, the largest part involves trade with the East 
Asian region, and since 2008 this region has become an increasingly important 
trading partner for all other developing country regions (UNCTAD, 2015). 
A solid agreement on the market access negotiations – one that requires all 
countries to make a meaningful contribution consistent with their economic 
realities and possibilities – will give the Doha Round a renewed sense of  
progress. But this alone will not be enough. A solid deal on agriculture is 
also required, as no final Doha deal will be possible in the absence of  more 
disciplined farm markets.  The agreements reached at the Nairobi Ministerial 
go in this direction, and the commitment of  WTO Members to eliminate 
export subsidies for agricultural exports may help the Doha negotiations to 
move to a final stage, but the “jury is still out” on this. Negotiations on services, 
on antidumping rules, on intellectual property issues and on trade facilitation 
are all important, but none of  these could individually facilitate agreement in 
other areas of  the Doha trade talks in the way a market access deal, including 
agricultural reform, would. 
Getting New Negotiating Modalities
As for the future, WTO negotiations should not necessarily be based on the 
“single undertaking,” at least not exclusively. They will require a different, 
complementary approach. This approach should be predicated on the need for 
a more cooperative understanding among Members – one where negotiations, 
authorised by the entire WTO Membership, could be undertaken by groups 
of  interested countries if  and when certain specific conditions are met, and, 
importantly, provided the multilateral nature of  potential WTO agreements 
is preserved. 
This overall approach, however, should have one important exception: 
negotiations involving only a limited number of  countries would not be 
appropriate when they include existing rules and disciplines. The WTO is 
a legal and institutional framework that requires its Member countries to 
conduct their trade and trade policies in a clearly defined manner. Therefore, 
the rules of  the game cannot be modified without the agreement of  the entire 
Membership, and nor can new deals be incorporated into the system without 
the acceptance of  all WTO Members. 
In almost all other instances, negotiations among groups of  interested 
countries could take place and their results incorporated within the WTO 
framework. In fact, we have already seen this type of  approach at work in 
the case of  the WTO’s “plurilateral” agreements. These deals – which were 
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made possible via the Marrakesh Agreement – are normally entered into by 
groups of  “like-minded” countries that decide to establish among themselves 
a common set of  rights and obligations to deal with a particular subject matter 
or sector. Notably, these agreements create rights and obligations only among 
the participating WTO Members, rather than being multilateral deals. The 
WTO “plurilateral” agreements were originally negotiated during the Tokyo 
Round of  trade negotiations (and were thus “codes”) but, unlike most Tokyo 
Round “codes,” did not become multilateral obligations. They became part of  
the WTO in 1995, and have been known since as “plurilateral” agreements. 
There were initially four “plurilaterals” dealing with trade in civil aircraft, 
government procurement, dairy products and bovine meat, but the latter two 
were terminated in 1997.
There is a need to move beyond “plurilateral” agreements as defined by the 
WTO agreement; if  these deals are allowed to expand much further, we 
could end up with a repeat of  the post-Tokyo Round GATT system, with a 
divided and fragmented WTO. A better alternative would be to move towards 
a “plurilateral plus” environment, where the benefits of  the agreements are 
extended to all WTO Members, and not only to the participating countries. 
The Information Technology Agreement (ITA) is a perfect example of  this 
approach. This agreement was negotiated in 1996, during the first WTO 
Ministerial Conference, by a group of  29 countries. A year later, it entered 
into force with even more members, creating an agreement that would cover 
more than 90% of  the trade in that sector. Market size was an important 
consideration for the agreement to come to life – today, more than 80 WTO 
Members are part of  ITA, and they have recently agreed to expand its 
product coverage significantly. More importantly, right from the outset the 
participating countries agreed that the benefits of  the deal would be extended 
unconditionally to all WTO Members, whether or not they belong to the ITA. 
Thus, groups of  WTO Members need to have the option of  undertaking 
negotiations among themselves on matters of  their interest. Not allowing them 
to do so will just lead these countries to take their deals elsewhere. Therefore, 
we need rules in order to create new rules. This process should include at least 
three key considerations. First, it must provide for an “opt in” and “opt out” 
approach, entitling all WTO Members to participate in the negotiations at 
their own choosing, with the option of  withdrawing from the talks at any point. 
Second, the benefits of  the agreements should be extended unconditionally 
to all WTO Members. And third, the final deals should be incorporated into 
the multilateral set of  rules and regulations as “plurilateral plus” agreements, 
with appropriate accession clauses (i.e. be open to all WTO Members under 
certain conditions). 
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In short, an alternative approach to trade negotiations moving beyond the 
“single undertaking” needs to be put in place by WTO Members, setting 
aside the confrontational nature of  the current Doha talks. We perhaps need 
to abandon all encompassing “rounds” of  negotiations for more “a la carte” 
negotiations where subjects are more likely to produce more significant and 
quicker results.
Finding an Appropriate Place for the Private Sector in 
the WTO 
Although the WTO is an intergovernmental organization and decisions are 
taken exclusively by its member governments acting collectively, the business 
community has an important stake in its performance. It is bound to be affected 
by WTO operations, as it is mainly business, not governments, that engages 
in international trade. In practice, business and governments interact in the 
WTO in many different ways, sometimes advancing the negotiating agenda 
and at other times ensuring that governments abide by their multilateral 
commitments.
However, defining a role for the business community in the WTO is not an easy 
task. The essence of  the WTO lies in its negotiating function, and negotiating 
trade deals is not something that can always be facilitated by the involvement of  
business interests along the lines of  negotiating teams. Thus, when considering 
the participation of  business interest in the WTO, an important distinction 
should be made right from the outset: the presence of  business in the day to 
day activities of  the WTO (i.e. its public discussions, its research activities 
and the provision of  information specifically geared toward their economic 
concerns, among others) should not be equated with its involvement in the 
WTO trade negotiations, as these need to be conducted in private, behind 
closed doors and very often in small groups before receiving the blessing of  
the entire Membership.
This has always been the case – trade negotiations are private affairs whose 
conduct are in the hand of  government officials; they are not, and cannot be, 
conducted in the open, as publicity is the last thing negotiators need to make 
deals.
This does not mean, however, that the business community should be totally 
absent from these negotiating process. There are many ways the business 
community could be made part of  negotiating processes, be informed of  
negotiating outcomes and also be allowed, even if  indirectly, to influence them. 
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During the NAFTA negotiations, the United States, Mexico and Canada put 
in place the “cuarto de al lado” (“room next door”) where business representatives 
from these countries regularly met their respective government’s negotiating 
teams, with the dual purpose of  being informed of  the evolution of  the 
negotiations and making their views known on the various negotiating items 
and outcomes. Over the years, this “room next door” approach was replicated 
in the negotiation of  the trade agreements that the three NAFTA partners 
conducted with other countries, particularly in the Latin American region. 
The approach was facilitated by the rather limited number of  the negotiating 
partners; it would be highly unrealistic to try to replicate it at the WTO level. 
In a negotiating process – whether bilateral or multilateral – the way each 
country deals with its business community is its own responsibility. However, 
in an institution like the WTO, some mechanisms could be put in place to 
ensure the effective, even if  indirect, involvement of  business organizations 
in its activities. Although the WTO has been formally authorized to “make 
appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-
governmental organizations,”4 which presumably include business entities, 
currently there are no formal mechanisms and the participation of  the private 
sector is based on a series of  ad hoc practices, such as briefings and public 
seminars and symposia which the WTO hosts on the occasion of  Ministerial 
Conferences in particular. However, as pointed out in an E15 report (Elsig, 
2014),5 the business community is less involved in the WTO than in other 
international fora, such as APEC, where a Business Advisory Council has been 
established, or the OECD, which has a Business and Advisory Committee, or 
the G20, with its regular B20 meetings.
Much more can be done, but it is not easy to define the appropriate or 
ideal mechanism that can ensure the effective participation of  the business 
community in an institution like the WTO, whose main functions – negotiating 
trade agreements and monitoring their effective implementation, including 
by recourse to dispute settlement – are by their very nature government led. 
It would be difficult, not to say inappropriate, to give business representatives 
full participation in these two sets of  activities, since – as indicated in the E15 
report (Elsig, 2014) – in addition to logistical issues of  significant complexity, 
full participation of  business representatives in, say, trade negotiations may 
render the crafting of  trade agreements much more difficult than is currently 
the case.
4 See Article V.2 of  the Marrakesh Agreement.
5 See also Primo Braga and Kondis (2014).
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At the last two WTO Ministerial Conferences, a number of  private entities, 
business organizations and non-governmental organizations took the initiative 
of  organizing a series of  debates where their particular concerns where 
examined and discussed with key government representatives. These debates 
took place for the first time during the Bali Business Forum, whose organization 
and purposes are explained in detail in Box 1, and subsequently during the 
Nairobi Ministerial Conference in 2015. 
Box 1: Bali Business Forum
At the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference, which took place in Bali, 
Indonesia from December 3rd to 7th, 2013, the International Chamber 
of  Commerce (ICC), the Evian Group@IMD and the International 
Centre on Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) decided to 
jointly organize a day-long event to focus on issues of  particular interest to 
business representatives from WTO Member countries. The Bali Business 
Forum (BBF) – a first event of  its type – took place on December 5th, 2013.
The BBF provided an open forum where the business community could 
examine the most critical issues in the international trade agenda and 
interact with ministers and other high-level officials to contribute towards 
a constructive outcome in Bali. The agenda of  the BBF included issues 
such as: 1) the quantitative benefits of  a Doha deal (or costs of  a non-
Doha deal); 2) the impact of  mega-preferential agreements (e.g. TPP and 
TTIP) on the WTO; 3) the complementary nature of  trade in services, 
trade facilitation and global value chains; and 4) the role of  the private 
sector in the WTO. 
An accompanying high-level luncheon focused on the topical issues at the 
intersection of  the WTO and digital economy, and a business/ministerial 
roundtable wrapped up the ambitious agenda at the end of  the day in 
a high-level setting. Throughout the panel discussions, members of  the 
private sector and government officials, including CEOs and key ministers, 
engaged in an open dialogue on the above-mentioned topics.
The ICC, the Evian Group@IMD and ICTSD acted as the core co-
conveners of  the Bali Business Forum, in partnership with the Inter-
American Development Bank and the International Trade Centre. The BBF 
also had the support of  relevant business organizations and associations, 
such as the Washington-based National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), 
the Coalition of  Services Industries (CSI), the European Services Forum 
(ESF) and the Federation of  Industries of  São Paulo (FIESP).
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Dealing with Regional Trade Agreements and 
Negotiations 
Affecting the daily work of  the WTO and hindering its negotiation outcomes 
is the fact that the large, industrialized countries have tended in recent 
years to focus on the negotiation of  a number of  ambitious multi-country 
trade agreements. These include the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPP) – involving a number of  countries from Australasia and the Americas, 
most of  which are already linked by bilateral free-trade agreements – and 
the relatively more recent initiative to negotiate a Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the Unites States and the European 
Union. Although these trade initiatives could theoretically work as stepping 
stones to a robust multilateral agreement, this is not an inevitable outcome 
under the current circumstances.
During the first “wave” of  regional trade agreements (RTAs), bilateral 
agreements were the norm – most of  the 300-plus agreements notified to 
the WTO are bilateral agreements. Although there are some exceptions, this 
is no longer the case. We are now in presence of  a new “wave” of  RTAs 
characterized by the negotiation of  mega-regional agreements. In some cases, 
these agreements are designed to foster convergence among existing RTAs 
and/or involve countries representing a large share of  global trade, GDP 
and population.
Box 1 (contd.)
The Forum helped to facilitate, through engagement and dialogue between 
business executives and policymakers from all over the world, a better 
understanding on the possibilities of  enhanced multilateral cooperation 
and on the need for a vibrant WTO. 
Another key objective of  the BBF was the identification of  ways for the 
private sector to get more effectively engaged in WTO activities – for 
example, by setting up the institutional mechanisms that would facilitate 
engagement, such as a Business Advisory Council at the WTO, and/or 
the holding on a more permanent basis (e.g. on the occasion of  WTO 
Ministerial Conferences) of  a forum/dialogue along the lines of  the 
BBF, something which was also implemented at the Tenth Ministerial 
Conference in Nairobi in December 2015.
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The recently concluded TPP and the TTIP, which is still under negotiation, 
have had their deadlines systematically postponed. The TPP was supposed 
to be finalized by November 2011, but it was not until October 2015 that the 
negotiations ended; the TTIP negotiations are still ongoing. In general, the 
negotiations are conducted in confidentiality, not to say secrecy, as most trade 
negotiations are. Thus, the precise content of  these agreements or the depth 
of  the commitments to be made are only known when the negotiations are 
completed. Therefore, when trying to visualize the impact of  these agreements 
on the Doha negotiations, a series of  assumptions regarding their content and 
the likelihood of  their completion need to be made.
However, two key facts are known: the economic weight of  the participants 
and the list of  subjects under negotiation. The more important (economically 
speaking) the partners are to these agreements, the more potentially significant 
their impact on Doha and the multilateral trading system would be. By the 
same token, the wider the subjects under negotiation – including a number 
of  “WTO plus” issues or issues not currently within the WTO purview – the 
more complex the analysis will become.
Both the TPP and the TTIP involve countries representing a very large share 
of  the world’s population, economic activity and trade. The TPP countries 
are both economically and demographically diverse, as they include developed 
and developing countries, big countries such as the United States and small 
ones such as Singapore. Roughly speaking, the TPP countries include 40% of  
the world’s population and are responsible for some 60% of  global GDP, and 
trade among TPP partners was more than US$2 trillion in 2012.
The TTIP, for its part, involves 29 developed countries (the United States 
and 28 EU member countries) that represent the world’s largest economic 
relationship, with reciprocal trade (goods and services) and investment flows 
that amounted to more than US$1 trillion in 2012. The negotiating parties 
are also the source of  most trade preferences in favor of  developing countries.
The economic weight of  countries participating in mega-regional negotiations 
will certainly influence the capacity of  these agreements to impact both the 
Doha negotiations and the multilateral trading system, and the elimination of  
tariffs among them will have an undeniable effect on tariff preferences through 
preference erosion (although some studies see preference erosion as a relatively 
minor effect). These agreements may also have, as do most preferential trade 
agreements, trade diversion effects, although these are difficult to quantify.
However, it is in the area of  trade regulation that mega-regionals may have 
a more lasting effect, and it is in this area that the impact on Doha and the 
multilateral trading system at large will be felt more dramatically, especially 
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if  mega-regionals are completed relatively soon and the Doha Round has not 
yet drawn to a close . What distinguishes mega-regionals from other free-trade 
or preferential agreements is the inclusion in the negotiations of  a number of  
regulatory issues, many of  which are currently outside the scope of  the WTO 
and subject to domestic regulations, but which are nevertheless considered 
essential for today’s global commercial relations.
These regulatory issues include, but are not limited to, regulatory coherence 
– for example, on the safety of  products and the methods of  production – 
state-owned enterprises, professional services, customs, e-commerce, labor and 
environment issues, government procurement, investment issues, currency 
issues, temporary entry of  business people as well as standards related to 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical barriers to trade.
In other words, the mega-regionals have the potential – due to the sheer size 
of  the countries involved in the negotiations and the nature of  some of  the 
issues under negotiation – to significantly expand the scope of  the international 
trading system by setting up standards that would apply initially only among 
those countries, but that could eventually become global standards. 
Once the mega-regionals are completed and new regulatory issues agreed 
upon by the participant countries, the newly agreed standards will not be 
easy to modify in WTO negotiations or elsewhere; they will fix TPP and/or 
TTIP countries’ positions in future negotiations and form the basis for their 
negotiating positions. Therefore, there is the risk of  a “fragmentation” of  the 
multilateral trading system with different standards adopted by different sets 
of  countries, a situation not too dissimilar to that experienced after the Tokyo 
Round of  negotiations and the adoption of  “codes” on a number of  non-tariff 
barriers by a group of  (mainly developed) GATT members.
Thus, more than the traditional market access issues such as tariff reductions, 
preference erosion or trade diversion, the impact of  mega-regionals on Doha 
and the WTO should be analyzed in terms of  their “regulatory” impact, that 
is, in terms of  the implications for the multilateral trading system of  such a 
large group of  countries, involving both developed and developing countries 
and representing such a large share of  global trade, setting up new standards 
in areas either not yet covered or insufficiently covered by the WTO.
Summing up, the current mega-regional negotiations present both risks 
and opportunities to developing countries, the Doha negotiations and the 
multilateral trading system. Like any free trade agreement, these negotiations 
may have an impact on trade preferences and may have some trade diversion 
effects. However, these ramifications should not be overemphasized. If  the 
experience with past free trade agreements offers any guidance, trade diversion 
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and/or preference erosion are less significant than some academic analyses have 
suggested. More significant could be the set of  new standards and regulatory 
frameworks that might be incorporated into the agreements which would, as 
a result, fix the positions of  participant countries to those standards, thereby 
complicating the multilateral examination of  the latter.
One of  the reasons why countries have moved to regional negotiations is 
often said to be the  long-lasting deadlock in the Doha negotiations. Yet, the 
WTO continues to play a critical role in today’s global economy. It ensures 
the transparency of  the trade practices of  its members, enforces existing 
multilateral rules and disciplines, and adjudicates trade disputes in case of  
breach of  WTO obligations by any of  its Members. And it is precisely because 
of  these important functions that delays in completing the Doha negotiations 
and the focus on preferential trade initiatives are challenges that the WTO 
cannot ignore or underestimate. And this should certainly be the preferred 
approach by developing countries, most of  which are outsiders to regional 
and/or bilateral deals, including mega-regional negotiations.
In order to keep an eye on the current negotiations of  regional deals and 
to provide a forum where interested parties and entities can examine and 
discuss issues of  relevance to these agreements and their possible impact/
relationship with the multilateral trading system, ICTSD, together with the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), is implementing an E15 initiative: 
the RTA Exchange. The main features are summarized in Box 2.
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Box 2: The RTA Exchange
For the last few years, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
and the International Centre on Trade and Sustainable Development 
(ICTSD) have been working towards the implementation of  the RTA 
Exchange, an initiative whose basic contours were agreed during the 2013 
WTO Ministerial Conference that took place in Bali, Indonesia, after 
being pencilled out at several meetings of  the E15 Group of  Experts on 
Regional Trade Agreements.i More recently, the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) has also decided to be part of  this initiative and to contribute to its 
implementation, and both the IADB and the ADB are in the process of  
defining their cooperation activities in this area.
The RTA Exchange is intended to provide a venue, virtual and otherwise, 
where interested stakeholders from the RTA and the WTO worlds interact 
with each other, discuss policy relevant issues around WTO and RTA 
convergence and identify options to multilateralise best practices or, as 
appropriate, regionalize best multilateral rules and/or institutions.
A key device of  the RTA Exchange is an interactive website (www.
rtaexchange.org), which is being coordinated by INTrade, an IADB 
mechanism that provides information on trade and integration activities in 
Latin America and the Caribbean.ii The activities of  the RTA Exchange will 
also include the provision of  information and news on RTA developments, 
the organization of  global and regional conferences, informal roundtables, 
briefing sessions, expert meetings and functional dialogues on key RTA 
rules and institutions, in association with RTA Exchange partners.
i The E15 Group of  Experts on RTAs has been jointly managed by the International Centre on Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and the IADB with the main objective of  examining whether a new 
substantive and institutional framework for addressing RTAs by the WTO is necessary and desirable.
ii INTrade (www.intradebid.org) is a comprehensive online gateway bringing together information on integration 
and trade in Latin America and the Caribbean. The system includes in-depth data on trade agreements, 
detailed statistics on imports and exports, and indicators that measure the structure and performance of  trade. 
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Conclusions
None of  the issues discussed in this chapter is new – they have been discussed 
by policymakers, academics and practitioners, both inside and outside the 
WTO, for a long time already. The suggestions for reform put forward are 
also well known by most trade practitioners and, to varying degrees, could be 
accepted by most of  them. However, no action has been taken so far to put 
them in place and no process is envisaged to collectively discuss them, as WTO 
Members and trade negotiators seem to be too busy getting out of  the current 
stalemate to engage in discussions on the future of  the WTO.
Yet, something needs to be done, and done quickly, to keep a vigorous 
multilateral trading system from stagnation. And if  governments are too busy 
to engage collectively in a reform process, perhaps the WTO leadership (i.e. its 
Director General and its DDGs) or a group of  like-minded governments could 
take the initiative and, with the help and support of  interested institutions from 
civil society and the business world, engage in a collective, open and effective 
discussion on the kind of  multilateral trading system that would be best suited 
to the trade and economic challenges of  the 21st century. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Why Engage in Trade Negotiations 
and the Relevance of the WTO
Alejandro Jara
King & Spalding
The attempt to further trade liberalization that has been a feature of  the 
multilateral trading system since 1948 has stalled. The inability to conclude 
the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations, particularly since 2008, 
is a crisis of  major proportions of  international cooperation in the field of  
economic relationships and beyond. The reasons are several, but one stands 
out. The DDA was launched to make possible liberalization of  trade in 
agriculture, which means among other aspects the elimination or reduction 
of  the most trade-distorting instruments. 
This crisis contrasts with the increasing spiral of  trade agreements negotiated 
around the world that shows that the appetite for trade liberalization is 
present and active. We shall call these “preferential trade agreements,” or 
PTAs. This paradox is explained by the fact that such agreements do not deal 
with agricultural support (there are other areas in this situation), while this 
is a central element of  the DDA. The unwillingness of  one major power to 
deal with domestic support, as well as the position of  one major emerging 
economy seeking to rewrite the agriculture rules agreed upon in the Marrakesh 
Agreement, make a consensus impossible. As a consequence, those seeking 
further liberalization have sought other means, PTAs being the main vehicle. 
All the same, since the 2008 crisis, many governments have applied trade 
restrictive measures which have piled up. Both the Global Trade Alert (GTA)1 
and the WTO Secretariat2 have documented this. This might indicate that the 
rulebook of  the WTO needs to be updated and tightened to limit protectionist 
measures by governments. In this regard, results of  PTAs show a mixed picture.
1 http://www.globaltradealert.org.
2 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/trade_monitoring_e.htm.
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On the one hand, PTAs have shown little, if  any, progress in areas such 
as subsidies and trade remedies, besides agriculture.  On the other hand, 
in response to the diversification of  economies, global value chains and 
technological changes, some progress is being made in improving international 
cooperation, particularly in the regulatory field, e-commerce, state-owned 
enterprises, business facilitation and transparency. In this sense, PTAs may 
well be the “breeding” ground where new disciplines are enshrined which, 
if  successful, could be the foundations of  an updated rulebook of  the WTO, 
should the political conditions change. 
In the meantime, countries will face increasing pressure to take part in PTAs 
that become part of  the international law landscape. They are important 
both from the viewpoint of  the economic impacts as well as the systemic 
implications. 
In this context, and as part of  training officials, it is important to pose some 
of  the most relevant questions that policymakers must face when setting up a 
trade policy strategy that involves negotiations of  trade agreements with other 
economies, which is what this chapter attempts to do.  While a seasoned trade 
negotiator would take for granted most of, if  not all, the questions and analyses 
that follow, that may not be the case for those who are at the beginning of  a 
career in trade policy. Indeed, some elements of  what follows may serve as a 
good basis to assess trade agreements after their conclusion and for those with 
a more inquisitive mind. The questions are based on the assumption that the 
country concerned is already a Member of  the WTO. It is also worthwhile 
to raise some issues concerning the organization of  the negotiations and the 
corresponding allocation of  resources, as these are bound to have political 
impacts.
1. Why is it necessary or convenient to negotiate a trade agreement 
(bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral)? What is the purpose of  
the negotiation? Most, if  not all, trade agreements have the purpose of  
liberalizing and/or facilitating trade and investment, which implies that 
it will go beyond what it has already agreed upon in the WTO (unless, 
of  course, the country is negotiating with a non-member of  the WTO). 
Consequently, a trade agreement will no doubt result in a change in the 
country’s policies and/or in the policies of  the counterpart(s). Presumably, 
a government will decide to negotiate when it perceives that such changes 
will be to the overall benefit of  its economy, even though there may be 
adjustment costs to certain sectors. 
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2. Unilateral liberalization. To the extent that these changes are limited 
to domestic policies, they can also be pursued unilaterally. In other words, 
liberalization and/or facilitation can be achieved by implementing the 
corresponding measures without the intermediation of  a negotiation 
with another country. Liberalization is easier and faster to achieve if  
made unilaterally. In addition, the result may be of  better quality since 
no compromises are necessary with other countries. However, from 
the viewpoint of  the quality of  the outcomes, some compromises with 
domestic interests may be necessary, whereas in a negotiation with other 
countries such compromising domestic pressures may be avoided or offset. 
Moreover, a unilateral liberalization may be rolled back by an ulterior 
piece of  legislation or regulation, as the case may be. A trade agreement 
does not prevent this from happening but it comes at a price, because it is 
not simple to denounce or modify international agreements, and because 
of  the loss of  benefits in the market of  the counterpart. Thus a trade 
agreement brings greater stability to domestic changes (the “lock-in effect”) 
that, in turn, probably gives greater confidence to economic agents. Finally, 
unilateral liberalization presents some political economic limitations, since 
it imposes adjustment costs to the domestic producers without any direct 
benefits for exporters (although it may help indirectly by diminishing the 
indirect anti-export bias of  trade protection). Consequently, the resistance 
that some domestic producers may put up will only be countervailed by the 
support that may be elicited from importers and consumers, who usually 
have weaker organizations. 
3. What policy changes should be pursued? In other words, what 
are the objectives of  a negotiation? Usually there is no one single 
reason, but rather a combination of  motivations that respond to the 
various interests and stakeholders that participate directly or indirectly in 
the decision-making process, that leads to a trade negotiation. The greater 
the number of  interests that are reflected in the objectives, the greater 
the support for the negotiation. However, to define the objectives of  the 
negotiations requires the agreement of  the other party (or parties), and 
some of  those may generate resistance from particular interests in a given 
jurisdiction. Some countries elect to have the objectives to be pursued in 
the negotiations pre-stated in a public statement, sometimes worked out 
with the legislative and after consultations with stakeholders. For example, 
the United States achieves this by approval by Congress of  the Trade 
Promotion Authority (TPA). This is a vehicle whereby Congress agrees 
to not use its prerogative to amend draft laws, provided the Executive acts 
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within the agreed-upon objectives to be pursued in trade negotiations.3 
Likewise, the European Commission has published its trade policies 
objectives after extensive consultations with the European Parliament, 
among others (European Commission, 2015). The following are some 
objectives typically pursued by governments in a trade negotiation: 
i. To lock-in domestic reform. For example, in the GATT Tokyo Round 
(1973-1979) Chile negotiated an across-the-board binding of  35% 
for all products (while the applied tariff across-the-board was 10%) 
to ensure there would be no rollback above the bound level.
ii. To liberalize its own trade regime. For example, throughout the 1990s 
and beyond, Chile deliberately pursued free trade agreements (FTAs) 
to further liberalize imports. 
iii. To prise open other markets for its goods, services and investments. 
An FTA involves reciprocal opening of  the market of  the other 
party (or parties), which makes any adjustment cost more politically 
palatable. However, if  the negotiation is with a duty-free country 
such as Singapore or Hong Kong, China, such partners will “appear” 
to give nothing since they have virtually no tariffs. This is a mere 
appearance, since binding the duty-free is very valuable, as are other 
provisions related to services and investment that may part of  the deal. 
iv. To introduce more competition and fight inflation in the domestic 
market. Trade policy is part of  an overall economic policy, and for 
the policymakers there will be welfare benefits because of  enhanced 
competition, thus limiting domestic prices from rising. 
v. To prevent discrimination against its exporters and investors in 
other markets. For example, towards the end of  the 1990s under 
the leadership of  its new Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, and in 
order to give priority to the Doha Round of  multilateral negotiations, 
the European Union self-imposed a moratorium on the initiation 
of  negotiations for new FTAs, only continuing those already in the 
pipeline. However, in 2006 the moratorium was terminated as the 
European Union observed that the United States and Korea were 
starting negotiations for an FTA and invited Korea to begin talks for 
a bilateral FTA, for fear that otherwise its exporters would face less 
favorable treatment than competitors from the United States in the 
Korean market. This has become one of  the most powerful drivers 
3 See https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/995/text.
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of  negotiations; in other words, a struggle against discrimination in 
the absence of  further liberalization through the WTO. 
vi. To enhance security, cooperation and bilateral relations. Examples 
include FTAs such as the one between the United States and Israel. 
vii. To settle problems and prevent conditionality. For example, developing 
country beneficiaries of  benefits under mechanisms such as the 
Generalized System of  Preferences are regularly subject to pressures 
to change regulations such as environmental or labor standards, under 
the threat of  losing the preferences. An FTA will ensure duty-free 
treatment once and for all, without prejudice to challenges under the 
dispute settlement mechanism for not complying with such standards.
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of  bilateral, 
plurilateral, regional and multilateral formats? Trade agreements 
can have different geographical coverage. Normally, the lower the number 
of  participants, the easier it will be to reach agreement and achieve a better 
result. However, three or more participants can assist in achieving a balance 
that otherwise would not be possible. This is particularly effective when 
one of  the parties is a much bigger economy than the other participants. 
NAFTA would be a good example in this regard.  Also to be considered 
are the distortions that preferences introduce in the allocation of  resources. 
From this perspective, a multilateral agreement would be the optimal 
format. Except in the case of  the latter, all other formats imply a choice 
of  the parties to the negotiation. Such choice has obvious political and 
geopolitical considerations. Putting these aside, there a number of  other 
factors that could be considered in this decision. 
i. The first consideration is the model to be used in the integration project. 
These are well known because Article XXIV of  GATT defines what 
is a “free trade area” and a “customs union.” An essential element 
in a customs union is that beyond the formal definition that requires 
the existence of  a common external tariff, many more common or 
harmonized policies are in fact required to ensure a proper functioning, 
such as competition policy, subsidization, government procurement, 
standards and trade remedies, among others. Little wonder that the 
only customs union to function effectively in the last 60 years is the 
European Union, followed by the Southern African Customs Union 
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(SACU)4 (and the jury is still out on the Eurasian Economic Union).5 
The choice of  the integration model is of  course a determinant of  
the partners.
ii. Gains. A trade agreement needs support from government, business, 
politicians, unions, and so on. While the results cannot be measured 
until the text is divulged, it is nevertheless inevitable that the intention 
of  initiating a negotiation is sustained on perceived gains or benefits 
for the economy. The assessment of  gains should not be overstated to 
avoid the risk of  overselling and losing credibility. Increases in existing 
exports of  goods and services, new exports, cheaper imports, more 
and better paid jobs, and new investments are all important selling 
points. If  none of  these gains is perceived in the case of  a possible 
partner, it becomes difficult to justify a negotiation.
iii. By the same token, sensitivities are equally crucial in terms of  their 
identification and assessment. If  they outweigh the perceived benefits, 
a negotiation becomes difficult, if  not impossible. An example to 
illustrate this is the case of  New Zealand and Chile. Starting in the 
mid-1990s, officials met frequently and proposed, with the approval 
of  the respective heads of  government, to initiate negotiations for 
a bilateral FTA. They regarded it as being of  systemic long-run 
interest to establish a trans-Pacific model that could be expanded 
to other APEC economies. However, bilateral trade was small and 
the structure of  production was similar, and the initiative did not 
elicit much enthusiasm in Chile. On the contrary, New Zealand is a 
powerful exporter of  dairy products and Chile is a net importer, and 
Chilean domestic producers – who are highly sensitive to international 
prices – expressed firm opposition to the idea of  a bilateral FTA. They 
had the support of  other agricultural producers and the Ministry 
of  Agriculture, in effect killing the idea for a few years. It was only 
in 2003 that an expansion of  the number of  participants to include 
Singapore and Brunei made it possible to carry out the negotiation 
that concluded in 2005 giving birth to the P4, the precursor to the TPP. 
iv. Size and quality of  the market.  By negotiating a trade agreement, a 
country is “exchanging” access to its market for better access to other 
markets. For a small country, it would seem a very good proposition to 
4 Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. However, South Africa chose to negotiate an FTA with 
the European Union independently of  its SACU partners. The latter in practice treat EU imports duty-free, but 
their exports do not enjoy the same access as South African products to the EU market, without prejudice to the 
Everything but Arms initiative of  the European Union. 
5 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.
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negotiate with a much larger economy. But “size” can be measured in 
different ways: GDP (at market or PPP exchange rates), total imports 
by value or volume, imports of  products exported by the bigger 
country, etc. (or a combination thereof). A real example to illustrate 
this occurred in the second half  of  the 1990s, when Chilean exporters 
observed that Mexico was negotiating FTAs with several Central 
American countries and requested that their government do the same 
to avoid being discriminated against. Putting aside the maxim that 
“any market is a good market” and any political considerations, the 
decisive factor behind allocating resources to negotiate with Central 
America was the fact that, though small (measured in different ways), 
these markets imported more manufactures from Chile relative to 
other markets. In this case, the quality of  the market was a compelling 
reason. 
5. Defining the agenda. In parallel with the above points, another important 
consideration is the determination of  what exactly will be the subjects of  
the negotiation. This involves an understanding of  what are the objectives 
to be pursued in each item or chapter. For example, it makes a difference 
to say that there will be a chapter on cross-border trade in services with 
the objective of  liberalizing all services, as opposed to binding the present 
status quo of  access and national treatment for services supplied from the 
negotiating partner, which implies that existing restrictions are maintained.6 
The political impacts of  the two are very different. In many cases, using 
existing agreements as a template can facilitate the determination, since 
there will a clearer view of  the possible outcomes. The more parties that are 
involved, the greater the need for this understanding and the more formal 
it becomes, to the point that multilateral agreements need a document 
to launch a negotiation, such as the Doha Ministerial Declaration. In a 
bilateral setting, this usually takes the form of  a press communiqué. 
6. The communication of  “red-lines” is important but not essential. 
“Red-lines” refer to limits to liberalization or other disciplines that, for 
whatever reason, a government will not agree to, even if  implies that 
an agreement will not be reached. This is a process that runs in parallel 
with the definition of  the agenda, and involves communicating to the 
counterpart what is not negotiable. However this is done – in writing or 
through verbal exchanges – it is important to avoid unpleasant surprises 
down the road that may impact key expectations and upset the balance of  
6 Usually the preservation of  existing restrictions is accompanied by the “ratcheting effect,” which implies that any 
future changes cannot increase the degree of  non-conformity with the treaty; changes can thus only be more 
liberalizing.
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interests, and that may derail a negotiation and generate mistrust. A typical 
example would be communicating that everything will be negotiable except 
certain products (the United States typically excludes sugar from most of  
its trade agreements) or a service (most countries follow the GATS and 
exclude air transportation from PTAs). The red-lines should not be used 
to acquire bargaining chips. If  during the negotiation a red-lined issue is 
negotiated away, then all other red-lines may be regarded as negotiable, 
thus losing its effect. In the absence of  red-lines, there is less trust and 
the parties will not be willing to table their final/best offers in order to 
retain chips should red-line issues suddenly appear in the negotiation. For 
example, in the TPP negotiation, because of  internal electoral politics, 
the United States took a long time to communicate its approach and 
positioning with regards to textiles and apparel, and other sensitive areas. 
According to some negotiators, this was the cause of  unnecessary delays. 
7. The political economy of  the other party (or parties). As in 
most negotiations, difficulties often arise because of  domestic political 
constraints, however beneficial a particular outcome may be. To have a 
good understanding of  what lies behind a particular position is crucial in 
order to determine what is important and what the limitations are that 
the counterpart faces. This also allows those positions that are motivated 
by a negotiating tactic of  acquiring bargaining chips, instead of  a genuine 
concern or resistance, to be weeded out. To have the necessary and 
undistorted relevant information at hand probably implies the employment 
of  law firms or other sources of  legal, economic and political analysis of  
the other party. For example, negotiating services and investment implies 
dealing with complex regulatory frameworks that are better understood 
by local lawyers, particularly when the other party does not share a similar 
legal and administrative culture. 
8. The domestic consultative process with most, or all, stakeholders is an 
imperative of  modern day trade agreements. Moreover, as the agreements 
cover other areas besides tariffs (in particular, services and intellectual 
property), the number of  parties with opposing interests increases. Time 
and resources spent on consultations before and during the negotiations 
are therefore  a key element to neutralize the resistance, or at least force 
stakeholders to develop arguments with the relevant evidence. In this 
process, it is likely that many sectors that fear greater external competition 
will argue that they should be excluded from the negotiation. In other 
words, they will want to become part of  the national red-lines. Such 
positions are best dealt with when the government communicates ex ante 
that exclusions (or other exceptional treatments) will only be entertained 
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when certain objective criteria are met. Once the negotiation is launched, 
this dimension becomes more difficult because a balance must be struck 
between the transparency that is required to engage domestic stakeholders 
in consultations on the one hand, and the necessary confidentiality of  the 
negotiations, particularly the texts as they are developed, on the other. 
The manner in which consultations are organized is not something 
for this chapter to dwell upon. However, it seems valuable to point out 
that some of  the best practices are those that force the stakeholders to 
organize themselves in order to bring to the table approaches that have 
already been negotiated, eliminating extreme and unrealistic positions. 
Since the stakeholders will be many, it follows that such practices will 
increase efficiency and help generate consensus. Without counting other 
ministries and governmental agencies, examples of  other stakeholders 
include i) business; ii) politicians; iii) parliamentarians; iv) unions; v) non-
governmental organizations (NGOs); vi) academia; and (vii) professional 
associations
9. The consultative process: the special case of  business. While all 
stakeholders are important, business is special in the sense that it bears the 
risks, and therefore has much to win or lose depending on the quality and 
size of  the markets. By the same token, business has special responsibilities 
to engage by expressing its views and, if  the case warrants, by providing 
political support. Understandably, however, business is a mix of  competing 
and sometimes contradictory interests. It follows that at a national level, 
its messages often get diluted in generalities that accommodate all sectors, 
which renders the content quite useless. In this regard, sectoral expressions 
are more valuable for a government. Having said that, business should be 
encouraged to state its views of  the type and quality of  rules it needs to 
make more investments and exchanges of  goods and services possible. This 
is at the heart of  the modern trade agreements, including the WTO. While 
business acts mostly at the national level, it should also build international 
coalitions and be active, particularly in Geneva. While the International 
Chamber of  Commerce or the Coalitions of  Services Industries in several 
countries (and also grouped in the Global Coalition of  Services) offer good 
examples, the fact is that they are present in Geneva only two or three times 
a year, and consequently involvement in the details of  negotiations is not 
possible. A much better example is the Global Express Association, which 
groups express delivery industries, with a permanent presence in Geneva. 
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By the same token, governments and international agencies should do 
more to engage business, particularly by opening institutional channels for 
their participation (and that of  other stakeholders as well). This could be 
done at the WTO, for example, by opening to observers the proceedings 
of  the trade policy reviews and allowing business to pose questions directly 
to the government under review; or by allowing business to express its 
specific trade concerns to the Committees of  Technical Barriers to 
Trade and of  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. These are but a few 
examples of  how engagement by business can be improved. In shaping the 
future agenda of  trade negotiations, the view of  business will be crucial 
regarding content, and its support indispensable to move to higher levels 
of  international cooperation. 
10. The role of  the media, including social media, is also a central 
element to be considered in pursuing a negotiation. With few exceptions, 
the professional media is not specialized and cannot be expected to 
accurately communicate to a wider public issues relating to complex public 
policies. 
11. Points 8 and 9 above have an external dimension insofar as the process 
of  consultations can also be carried out with stakeholders of  the other party, 
particularly those that could be more supportive. Likewise, the media of  
the other party should not be neglected as an important dimension of  the 
political effort to advance and conclude negotiations of  a trade agreement. 
12. The organization of  a negotiation. In the absence of  an institution 
(like the WTO), and therefore of  a Secretariat, the organization of  a 
negotiation is a time-consuming and not inexpensive affair. Consequently, 
much effort and resources are devoted to developing the institutional 
backup and efficient processes. For example: 
i. Who will play the role of  secretariat?
ii. How will texts be controlled and circulated? 
iii. Which are to be the negotiating groups, and who shall preside and 
report?
iv. Who will responsible for providing background information (texts of  
other negotiations and jurisprudence)?
v. What language(s) will be used to conduct the negotiations and in the 
texts?
vi. The legal scrubbing
vii. Translation.
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13.  The legislative process of  incorporating international obligations 
into the domestic legal framework. While this is not part of  the 
negotiation proper, the manner in which the incorporation takes place has 
an important impact on the scope of  trade agreements. Broadly speaking, 
there are two models. As an example of  one approach, in the United States 
the Executive doesn’t seek the approval of  the treaty itself, but instead 
submits to the legislature the text of  the changes to domestic law that are 
necessary to implement the international obligations.7 This implies that 
by and large, once this process is completed no further legislative action 
is required to implement a trade agreement. It also means that any future 
law approved by Congress can modify prior law, and thus the international 
obligation contained therein. 
The other approach is approval of  the treaty itself  by the legislature, and 
under many legal systems future law cannot derogate or modify such 
treaties. However, many treaty obligations may need further legislative 
action. For example, if  a treaty provides that there will be an authority 
to carry investigations when an application of  a safeguard measure is 
requested, a separate law must designate who will be the investigating 
authority. This can be avoided if  in the treaty itself  such designation is 
made (typically in an Annex), and is thus of  the text that the legislature 
approves. It is doubtful, however, whether this technique can be used in 
more complex matters. If  ulterior legislative action is required for some 
treaty obligations, there is an element of  uncertainty over whether or not 
approval will be forthcoming after ratification of  the trade agreement. 
Other parties may require full approval not only of  the treaty, but also 
of  the implementing legislation before allowing entry into force. This 
may generate tensions because it may be perceived as an intrusion by a 
foreign government in the legislative process.  A prior understanding of  
the procedures in this regards, along with the appropriate explanations, 
may facilitate the incorporation of  trade agreements into domestic law 
and the subsequent implementation. 
7 To approve trade agreements as treaties, under the US Constitution the advice and consent of  two-thirds of  the 
Senate would be required. In contrast, domestic laws can be approved by simple majority in both Houses. 
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The Future of WTO Trade Negotiations
Despite the failure of  the DDA negotiations, it is inconceivable that the 
multilateral trading system will cease to be a forum – and arguably the best 
forum – to negotiate trade liberalization. 
The failures of  the past 15 years leave no doubt that the manner in which 
negotiations are  conducted must change, at least to reflect present realities and 
future needs. To achieve a new understanding of  the format and substance 
of  the negotiations will take time and a long-term political approach to 
international cooperation in the field of  trade. Many changes are necessary, 
and indeed some are already underway. The following flags some of  the most 
important issues that members will have to confront.
No negotiating process can continue to be organized along traditional lines 
(developed, developing and least-developed countries).  By the same token, 
flexibilities like special and differential treatment will no longer work as an 
instrument for inclusiveness unless they are based on the individual needs of  
each economy, as in the approach used in the Trade Facilitation Agreement.
The politics must change. Not much more can be achieved if  the inability 
for the last 10 years of  the United States to accept outcomes that will change 
its domestic laws persists, particularly to reduce the levels of  trade-distorting 
agriculture domestic support. Likewise, some emerging economies (for 
example, India and South Africa) cannot persist in refusing results that will 
liberalize their imports and instead seek to increase safeguards and other 
trade-restrictive instruments. 
Plurilateral negotiations have surfaced. Some of  these are based on the 
perception that a critical mass exists and thus the outcomes are made extensively 
on an MFN basis, such as the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and 
Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) exercises. In contrast, other processes, 
such as the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA),  envisage  results that only 
benefit the signatories (even though nothing could prevent a TiSA signatory 
from binding its individual concessions under the GATS).  However, some 
form of  packaging still seems necessary to ensure that the necessary trade-offs 
are present. For example, it is difficult to foresee a stand-alone agreement to 
reduce or eliminate trade-distorting domestic support in agriculture.
The real economy requires an expansion of  the agenda, along at least two 
dimensions. Since the financial crisis, protectionism has been on the rise, even 
though trade disciplines have undoubtedly contained some pressures. A review 
is required of  the existing disciplines on subsidies, anti-dumping measures, 
government procurement, export duties and restrictions, among other areas, to 
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check the worst manifestations of  protectionism. Another dimension concerns 
rules in “new” areas such as investment, competition policy and state-owned 
enterprises. Special attention should be placed on implementing agreements 
reached in other multilateral fora , such as the elimination of  fossil-fuel subsidies 
agreed upon at COP21. 
Perhaps the first achievement of  any future process should be to establish a 
different basis for any negotiation by binding everything at the applied level, 
including industrial tariffs, agricultural domestic support, services, government 
procurement and export duties, among others. This confidence-building 
approach would set the stage for effective liberalization.
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CHAPTER 4
The Future of the  
WTO Dispute Settlement System:  
Consolidating a Success Story
Giorgio Sacerdoti
Bocconi University
Results Achieved
On reaching its 20th anniversary, the Dispute Settlement System (DSS) of  
the WTO continues to be considered a success story, and rightly so. The 
mechanism has been defined by a former Director General as the “jewel in the 
crown” of  the WTO, a statement which is even more justified in the light of  
the failure of  the WTO Members to conclude the Doha Development Round 
(started in 2001), notwithstanding the limited success of  the Bali (2013) and 
Nairobi (2015) Ministerial Conferences, and to reinforce other non-judicial 
mechanisms within the WTO. 
It is interesting to note that the DSS, specifically the Appellate Body, is now 
taken as a model for “judicializing” other fields, an example being the recent 
EU proposal to replace investor-state arbitration (ISDS) with a two-level 
international tribunal in the TTIP.1 At its beginning, however, the DSS was 
criticized both by some WTO Members2 and by NGOs for allegedly devolving 
to unrepresentative international  “faceless judges” – accused moreover of  
1 See the full text at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf. A two-level, 
permanent bilateral Investment Court, replacing Investor-State traditionl dispute settlement arbitration,  has been 
introduced in the final revised text of   the Canada-EU  Trade and Investment Agreement (CETA) at the beginning 
of  2016, see EU Commission,,trade doc. 154329 (February 2016) and  at www.international.gc.ca, Final CETA text.
2 Notably by members of  the US Congress.
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indulging in  “judicial activism” – disputes also affecting non-trade interest 
and individual governments’ regulatory powers.
 This positive evaluation is based on:
• The high number of  cases introduced (the 500th mark was reached in 
November 2015) and almost always (90% of  those brought to adjudication) 
resolved effectively by the removal of  restrictive measures of  an importing 
country found in breach of  WTO obligations by independent and impartial 
rule-based adjudication.
• The effective functioning of  its multi-stage procedure (from consultation 
to implementation, through a double-stage adjudication phase), which is 
meant to solve specific, mostly bilateral disputes, but at the same time to 
give guidance to all the interested members and to take into account the 
multilateral dimension of  the trading system. 
• The participation in it of  both major trading powers and small developing 
countries (signaling the importance of  the DSS also for small players and 
developing economies to ensure access for their products to the larger 
economies’ markets). 
• The development of  a balanced and consistent case law, sensitive to 
non-trade concerns such as environment protection and health, which 
recognizes on one hand the need to uphold market access obligations, and 
on the other hand the existence of  evolving non-trade values and policies 
– domestic and international – that need to be safeguarded as part of  the 
domestic policy space of  WTO Members. 
This has afforded “stability and predictability” to the system (as set forth in 
Article 3.2 of  the Dispute Settlement Understanding, or DSU), also in the 
recent times of  financial crisis and economic slowdown. According to official 
documentation, opportunistic resort to protectionist measures (anti-dumping, 
subsidies, safeguards) has been contained, although independent research tends 
to challenge this claim and has a more pessimistic view.3
3 For a relatively positive view, see the various reports submitted by the WTO to the G20 meetings pursuant to the 
latter’s request and the related data available at http://tmdb.wto.org. For a critical position, see the chapter by Simon 
Evenett and Johannes Fritz in this volume. 
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Current Problems
On the other hand, the system shows signs of  stress (as a victim of  its own 
success, mainly due to the increase in the number of  disputes and their 
complexity), while multilateral negotiations in the Doha Round are lagging. 
The following major issues have emerged which threaten its effectiveness and 
may thus diminish the trust in, and recourse to, the system:
1. The increasing number of  cases brought to panels and the increasing 
complexity of  disputes and sophistication of  arguments made is extending 
the length of  proceedings beyond reasonableness, especially at the panel 
stage, and is putting strain on the limited resources of  the Secretariat.
2. The willingness of  losing respondents to promptly comply with the 
decisions appears to be decreasing, in that effective implementation, 
while usually performed, requires on average more time. Alternatives to 
compliance (such as compensation), which appear to be on the rise, may 
tilt the system towards the protection of  the interests of  major trading 
nations, who may be able to pay-off weaker members while maintaining 
their import restrictions.
3. WTO Members appear to be unable to agree on further liberalization 
(notably in services) and on adding new rules to the multilateral system to 
face new issues (such as the green economy, environmental subsidies or 
electronic commerce). This leads to a possibly problematic role of  “gap-
filling” and “law-making” for the DSS, which was not intended.
4. The parallel massive increase of  regional trade agreements (RTAs), to 
which WTO Members are increasingly turning (including “mega-RTAs” 
such as the TPP and the TTIP), risks reducing the relevance of  the WTO 
and therefore possibly of  its DSS, which moreover might find competitors 
in the dispute settlement mechanisms of  RTAs.4
This chapter addresses these issues and points to possible solutions, several of  
which have already been aired in various circles in the past. These proposals fall 
into two groups. The first group is meant to address the most pressing problem 
at present, which has been raised more than once by countries concerned at 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), namely, delays in the process at the panel 
stage due to the lack of  legal resources in the Secretariat to staff the many 
4 It has been noted that RTAs have practically never been challenged in the WTO DSS. This could be due to the 
fact that they are considered by and large to be compliant with WTO obligations. Alternatively, it is possible that 
participants in RTAs refrain from challenging other RTAs in order to avoid provoking challenges to their own (the 
compliance of  any RTA with all WTO requirements being doubtful). 
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panels that are being established.5 The second set of  proposals looks at broader 
changes to remedy structural problems, but still through changes to the DSU 
that can be adopted within the current framework. 
As a result, panel proceedings that should in theory take not more than six 
months (Article 12.9 DSU), but which in practice took around one and a 
half  years in “normal” cases until recently, now may well take between two 
or three years from the formal establishment of  the panel by the DSB to the 
circulation of  their report. Panel reports are thereafter subject to appeal, 
where the Appellate Body faces increasing difficulties in respecting the short 
90-day period prescribed for issuing its own reports, not to speak of  the further 
possible proceedings before full implementation by the losing party.6 This time 
lag undermines the value of  any favorable decision for obtaining effective 
redress against domestic measures in breach of  WTO commitments, which is 
especially damaging in respect of  temporary measures such as anti-dumping 
duties.
More broadly, this dysfunctional operation of  the DSS, in disregard of  one 
of  its basic tenets and praised features, namely its speed, may undermine the 
whole operation of  the system and recourse to it as the key instrument for 
ensuring respect of  trade-opening commitments. As stated by Korea at the 
DSB meeting of  August 31st, 2015: 
“WTO disputes are not about abstract disagreements. Real world 
economic interests underlay every dispute. There were real people 
suffering while a dispute was pending (…) The problem would get worse 
if  left unaddressed. Long delays created perverse incentive by lowering 
the cost of  adopting and maintaining WTO-inconsistent measures, 
5 A forceful complaint was that by Korea at the DSB of  August 31st, 2015. Korea complained that in DSS 488, 
where Korea challenged US anti-dumping measures, the Secretariat had notified Korea that the panel established 
on March 25th, 2015 would not begin its work until the end of  2016 at the earliest, a date some 15 months from 
the time Korea had been notified of  the delay, “not because the panelist were unavailable, but due to the constraints 
affecting the Secretariat.” Korea pointed out that this “remarkable, extraordinary, unreasonable delay” in light of  
both the DSU provisions and the economic reality, just for the case to get started “was almost twice as long as the 
period foreseen by Art. 12.9 DSU between the establishment of  the panel and the circulation of  the report.” 
6 As an example, at a recent DSB meeting in 2015 Canada complained that four and a half  years after the establishment 
of  the panel, the COOL dispute with the United States was still far from being settled. After the panel the appeal, the 
fixing by an arbitrator of  the reasonable period of  time for the US to comply that was not respected, a compliance 
panel (Art. 21.5 DSU) against the United States by Canada and Mexico (the other complainant) where the panel 
and the Appellate Body found that the measure taken by the United States had not brought compliance (but possibly 
even worsened the breach), the arbitration panel (Article 22.6 DSU) was just starting its work to establish whether 
the countermeasures announced by Canada and Mexico were excessive in comparison with the trade loss caused 
to them by the COOL measure, as submitted by the United States. President Obama announced the repeal of  the 
relevant US provisions on December 18th, 2015, just a few days after the arbitration panel had concluded its work, 
determining the level of  retaliation that Canada and Mexico could put in place to offset the adverse effect of  COOL 
on their exports. For a realistic view, see “Torture by Tariff – Retaliating against unfair trade practices is a calculation 
in cruelty”, The Economist, June 20th, 2015.
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insisting, rightly, that they would not be subject to review by the WTO 
for years. Members could therefore expect more protectionist measures 
and more, not less disputes being brought to the WTO. These in turn, 
would cause further delays, prompting a vicious, never-ending cycle. It 
was in the interest of  everyone, the parties, the wider membership and 
the Secretariat not to let this happen.”7 
It is curious, however, that Korea itself, followed by other speakers, did not 
ask for more effective remedies – which the Director-General (DG) instead 
initiated thereafter – beyond increased transparency and information from the 
Secretariat as to the reasons for the “queue,” and as to the situation in the line 
and the outlook for “their” case being decided. The same attitude prevailed 
in the discussion that followed the DG’s lengthy and detailed statement at 
the DSB of  October 28th, 2015 where he made the point that the problems 
would not be resolved just through administrative measures and a shifting of  
resources within the Secretariat. Several Members acknowledged this issue 
and decried the negative consequences of  the current set on the effectiveness 
of  the DSS, but abstained from launching any ideas for tackling the problems 
more seriously.8
7 Doc. WT/DSB/M/ 367, pp. 22-29. The concerns of  Korea were shared at the meeting by a number of  countries, 
starting with Guatemala (whose delegate stated aptly, “[t]he WTO dispute settlement system was one of  the most 
effective and prompt international systems of  adjudication. Victim of  its own success, the system faces the risk of  
becoming slower. If  no effective action were taken to address this unfortunate situation, the principle of  “prompt 
settlement of  disputes” in art. 3.3. DSU would become a mere “best effort” provision, not more than an illusionary 
aspiration.(…) long delays in the DSS mechanism may create perverse incentives for the adopting political motivated 
WTO-inconsistent measures.” Others interventions came from (in order) Chile, China (“this unprecedented situation 
would seriously undermine the effectiveness and credibility of  the WTO DSS”), Australia (“willing to consider any 
option that might help alleviate the current situation and improve the system over the long term. This included 
ensuring that the Secretariat had the resources needed to service disputes in a timely manner and also exploring ways 
for the Membership to reduce the burden on the system in terms of  the length and complexity of  disputes”), Russia, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Japan, Brazil, Canada, India, (“the credibility of  the system was at stake”), the European Union 
(“manage the situation at hand” and “find solutions to the mid and long-term situation against the background of  
ever increasing pressures in the WTO DSS”), Argentina, Chinese Taipei and Norway. In contrast with the serious 
concerns voiced by most other countries, the United States was more restrained, stating briefly that “Korea has raised 
an important systemic issue (…) This raised some significant concerns, particularly in light of  the fact that the WTO 
DSS had, for many years, operated with admirable concern. The US shared the view that members needed a better 
understanding of  the causes behind delays so that they could develop and consider appropriate solutions.”
8 See the minutes of  the meeting at WT/DSB/M/369 of  January 20th, 2016, p. 20. DDG Brauner has been entrusted 
by the DG to follow up with the Members on these issues.
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Proposals
This chapter subscribes to the practical measures at the administrative level 
that the DG has declared he is implementing at recent DSB meetings.9 At the 
same time, the current initiatives of  the DG for increasing human resources 
– i.e. competent lawyers – in the Secretariats of  the Legal Division and Rule 
Division that service panels does not seem sufficient to fix the problem. Other 
solutions may be called for that go beyond the competence of  the DG.
Accordingly, the second set of  proposals hereunder are more far reaching and 
forward looking, as they are meant to address the long-term sustainability of  
the DSS with regards to effectiveness and outputs. While these proposals do 
not require any overhaul of  the current system, and nor would they affect 
the basic tenets of  the original WTO DSS, in order to be adopted (as would 
any other proposal to this effect) they would require a broad consensus of  the 
membership that is currently lacking, and not just in relation to these issues.
Those more substantial reforms to resolve this issue at the panel level would 
require considering more far-reaching options, such as:
1. Discouraging the bringing of  complaints to the panel stage by making 
the initial phase (consultations) less of  a mere formality, possibly with the 
engagement of  the DG and resort to mediation and conciliation
2. Putting more financial resources to the service of  the legal Secretariat, 
overcoming the zero-growth budgetary constraint that tilts in favor of  first 
shifting resources within the WTO Secretariat without the possibility of  
adding new resources from the legal market place
3. Reorganizing the legal Secretariat by merging the Legal Division with the 
Rule Division, a distinction which reflects a division of  work from GATT 
times and which is not just any more
4. Enlarging the available pool of  panelists, resorting also to non-governmental 
panelists from third parties in any dispute; using more systematically 
available competent panelists (leading to the de facto creation of  a pool 
of  recurrent, semi-permanent panelists); and reducing procedural delays 
9 His first intervention on the subject was at a DSB in September 2014, when he announced the creation of  15 new 
lawyer posts in the three dispute settlement divisions: Legal Affairs, Rules, and the AB. However, the organization 
had difficulties in filling these. In his address to the DSB on October 28th, 2015 the DG explained in detail the further 
steps he had taken and was taking to mitigate delays, consisting mostly of  reallocating of  personnel; hiring new legal 
staff; adjusting the grades and salaries to the competence of  the lawyers, taking into account the competition by law 
firms; increasing internal mobility; and pooling junior lawyers of  both divisions assisting panels. This should result in 
more efficiency and has already nearly doubled the relevant positions – from 30 to 57 – since 2013. 
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due to the “interim report” and translation (the availability of  a greater 
number of  more devoted and competent panelists could in turn make it 
possible to rely more on them also for drafting, as is the practice in both 
international courts and investment or commercial arbitration)
5. Making the disputing parties pay a share of  the costs of  the proceedings, 
which are currently charged to the whole membership.
Other phases and aspects of  the DSS also need interventions to make them 
more efficient.
As to the Appellate Body, in view of  the fact that the number of  disputes brought 
to the panels is ever increasing so that very soon it will also the appellate stage, 
possible remedial solutions are:
6. Staffing the Appellate Body more adequately
7. Increasing the number of  Appellate Body members from seven to nine
8. Making their position permanent , a status that would also better ensure in 
the future the selection of  competent, diverse and truly independent judges
9. Making their reappointment for the second four-year term automatic, or 
replacing the two four-year terms with one non-renewable seven-year term.
As to the implementation phase:
10. The monitoring role of  the DSB should be made more effective in order 
to induce more prompt compliance.10
The procedure should be tightened so that the prospective nature of   WTO 
remedies (the obligation to comply not being retroactive from the date of  
the breach but to be implemented only after a “reasonable period of  time” 
from the adoption of  a panel or Appellate Body report)  does not reward the 
dragging of  feet by the losing party with regards to compliance with adverse 
decisions.
Maintaining the efficiency of  the DSS and its effectiveness in ensuring 
compliance with the WTO multilateral trade rules entails broader benefits 
beyond ensuring the effectiveness of  expected trade openings from the 
commitments that WTO Members have undertaken, as important as these are.
It ensures at the same time the role of  the WTO as the guardian of  the 
multilateral trading system and the position of  its multilateral rules as the 
accepted global framework within which interested countries may engage in 
regional trade agreements. RTAs should be the basis for extending international 
10 As advocated by Canadian Ambassador Jonathan Fried when he was chairman of  the DSB in 2013. 
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cooperation and trade liberalization (“WTO -plus”) without endangering the 
WTO acquis. They should represent building blocks, and not stumbling blocks, 
by establishing supplemental frameworks to further facilitate trade through 
coordinated regional action which should be supportive of  the multilateral 
rules.
It must be recognized that the possible solutions to the current problems 
set forth above are not a quick fix that may be implemented without WTO 
Members engaging in the issues, evaluating the most appropriate remedies 
and being open to looking for shared improvements. That said, this is not an 
out-of-reach ambitious program or an all-comprising shopping list.
Rather, it is a realistic and modest agenda for fixing, within the existing 
framework, the current problems and enabling the DSS to go on serving the 
WTO Membership and complying with its objectives and purpose in the 
years to come. We do not propose to transform the panels in a first instance 
tribunal, or to abolish the adoption of  panel and AB reports, or other similarly 
radical overhauls.
Moreover, there is a specific instrument for Members to discuss and elaborate 
the necessary amendments to the dispute settlement rules. This is the DSU 
review negotiation framework agreed by a Ministerial Declaration in 1994 
and extended by the Doha Ministerial Declaration in 2001, under which 
amendments to the DSU may be agreed without having to activate the 
cumbersome WTO amendment process. This exercise should have been 
completed first by 1997/1999, and then by 2003, but it is still going on 
indefinitely at an almost standing pace.
The DG’s statement to the DSB of  October 28th, 2015 presented the various 
measures he has put in place in order to add resources to the Secretariat to 
address the most pressing problems, but it warned the Members that more 
is needed. However, the unconcerned attitude of  most WTO Members as to 
these issues, at least until recently (they see the problems but prefer to leave 
any solution to the DG, though conscious of  its limited capabilities to resolve 
them), does not bode well for any effective solution. 
On the contrary, the DSS not being too efficient and allowing delays in 
implementation and political twisting may even accommodate some frequent 
users of  the DSS. They may view themselves more as defendants and thus 
not in a hurry to implement changes through politically difficult domestic 
processes of  compliance, rather than as successful claimants eager to obtain 
as promptly as possible the other party’s due market opening to the benefit 
of  its producers and exporters.
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Analysis and Suggestions
The Current Situation 
Results Achieved, Disputes Resolved, Legal Security Provided
On November 10th, 2015, the WTO website featured within its news items the 
statement of  DG Roberto Azevêdo celebrating the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System (DSS) having reached the 500 mark.
The receipt of  the 500th trade dispute for settlement, said the DG, “shows that 
the WTO’s dispute settlement system enjoys tremendous confidence among 
the membership, who value it as fair, effective and efficient mechanism to solve 
trade problems.” The 500th dispute was submitted on November 10th, 2015, 
when Pakistan filed a request for consultations with South Africa regarding the 
latter’s provisional anti-dumping duty on cement from Pakistan. The parties 
involved and the subject matter of  the dispute are also significant, because 
they show that developing countries use the system both as complainants and 
respondents in South-South relations, and that trade remedy measures feature 
importantly in matters brought to the WTO. 
The news item included comments and data that can be the starting point of  
our analysis, taking stock of  the achievements of  the DSS as an introduction 
for addressing the current issues in a system that has been, and is, successful in 
offering an orderly rule-based solution to trade frictions, but that shows signs 
of  stress (in part due to its own success).
The success is evidenced by the fact that resort to the DSS has become a normal 
feature in the operating of  the multilateral trading system, displacing resort to 
unilateral measures. Practice has confirmed what had been set forth in Article 
3.10 DSU, namely that “requests for conciliation and the use of  the dispute 
settlement procedures should not be intended or considered as contentious 
acts.” This setting distinguishes the WTO from other international fora, where 
respondents often raise lack of  jurisdiction as a preliminary objection to escape 
the process. It makes it more business like, as is the case in the national context.
Of  the 500 disputes notified to the WTO, only 282 have been brought 
to litigation. Resolution through bilateral negotiations, including formal 
withdrawal of  the request, has been notified to the WTO in 110 of  the cases, 
while the parties have not informed the WTO of  the status of  the other 108 
(which must be considered dormant or de facto settled).11 As of  the end of  
11 This lack of  information signals the need  to strengthen the obligation of  Members to notify the WTO in a timely 
manner of  the status and outcome of  all disputes that have been formally filed.
54    Future of the Global Trade Order
2014, 201 panel reports had been issued, of  which 136 had been appealed 
(68% of  the total, on average). In 2014 there were 13 panel requests appealed, 
while the AB issued eight reports concerning five matters. 12
In 2015, by the end of  November four panel reports had been issued covering 
five disputes and 11 had been adopted by the DSB, while the AB had issued 
appellate reports in four disputes on different subject matters.13
A measure of  success is also the broad participation of  WTO Members in 
the process. As of  the same date, about two-thirds of  the Members (102) have 
participated in dispute settlement proceedings, either as parties (claimants 
and/or respondents) or as third parties (35 Members as third parties only). 
Looking at the consultation requests, developing and developed countries are 
equally represented as complainants, while complaints are mostly directed 
towards developed countries.
As can be expected, the largest economies are both the most frequent initiators 
of  cases (with the United States leading with 108, followed by the European 
Union, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, India, Japan and Argentina all above the 20 
mark) and the most frequent defenders (with the United States again leading 
with with 124, followed by the European Union, China, India, Argentina). 
Finally, the compliance mark is said to be about 90%. Countermeasures in the 
form of  withdrawal of  benefits, i.e. imposition of  selective additional duties, 
have been imposed only in a handful of  cases, while no Member has ever 
denied responsibility to comply with an unfavorable final decision.
Of  course the number of  disputes is not by itself  a sign of  a healthy system; the 
ability to process them timely and according to the rules is.14 Notwithstanding 
some delays in full compliance, there is no sentiment that WTO Members 
have become less inclined to respect the rules. On the other hand, a certain 
surge of  national anti-dumping measures, as monitored by the AD Committee, 
could be a sign of  increased pressure on export markets at a time of  economic 
12 The data provided are drawn from those provided, mostly in the form of  tables, by the DG in his statement to the 
DSB of  October 22nd, 2015, those annexed to the AB Report for 2014 and those included in the news item of  
November 12th, 2015 on the 500 mark. Some data are not easy to compare, especially since there is a difference 
with regards to the relevant year between panel and AB reports issued and adopted by the DSB. Moreover, some 
proceedings concern several disputes brough by different claimants against the same measure of  the respondent 
State, that are examined together by a single panel. On the other hand some appeals are formally separate ( and 
counted individually) because the claimants are different but are dealt with in a single report. 
13 The exact numbers do not always match because of  the different practice of  the panels and the AB in calculating as 
single or separate disputes those in which different claimants challenge the same measures of  the respondent state, 
the same panel being appointed to hear all the challenges.
14 According to the AB Report for 2014, “[i]n its first 16 years the DSB has handled disputes spanning over USD 1 
trillion in trade flows” (WTO, 2015, p. 3). 
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slowdown, to the point of  being a sign of  resort to unfair competition.15 This is 
possibly a cyclical phenomenon, rather than a structural disregard for the rules.
In fact, Article 3.7 of  the DSU would discourage Members from bringing 
disputes which might be resolved amicably without even resorting to the 
system, stating that “[b]efore bringing a case a Member shall exercise its 
judgment as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful” 
and that “[a] solution mutually acceptable to the parties to the dispute and 
consistent with the covered agreement is clearly to be preferred.” In the same 
spirit of  not considering the starting of  a case to be an unfriendly act and 
encouraging at the same time parties to exercise some kind of  self-restraint 
when considering bringing a case, Article 3.10 states in its final sentence that 
“[i]t is also understood that complaints and counter-complaints in regard to 
distinct matters should not be linked.” 
This notwithstanding, on several recent occasions the initiation of  a case 
by a country against another country has been immediately followed by the 
initiation of  a separate case by the respondent in the previous case against 
the first country (notably between the United States and China and between 
Argentina and the United States and the European Union). Although there is 
no evidence that the second case was a kind of  tit-for-tat response to the first 
one, this belief  has been informally expressed as a sign of  an abuse or political 
strategic use of  the DSS contrary to its purpose.16
Finally, the smooth functioning of  the DSS and the accumulation of  
consistent interpretations of  key provisions of  the WTO agreements, while 
not discouraging the bringing of  new disputes, has made reliance on those 
provisions more firm. Outcomes are more foreseeable, thanks to the role of  
the AB in providing consistent case law on which panels in turn can rely. The 
overall role of  the DSS has been expanded by the lack of  action by Members 
in other capacities. Authoritative interpretations by the General Council 
acting under Article IX of  the WTO Agreement have never been issued and 
other quasi-legislative action by Members, such as within WTO specialized 
15 This could be the situation in the steel market, where sources indicate overproduction in the face of  a decrease in 
demand (see https://www.steelorbis.com/steel-news/latest-news/oecd-steel-committee-calls-for-immediate-action-
to-address-excess-capacity-909449.htm).
16 See Feinberg and Reynolds (2006); European Commission, Press Release (IP/13/772), European Union requests 
WTO Panel on Chinese Anti-Dumping duties on Steel Tubes, August 16th, 2013, available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release-IP-13-772 en.htm
56    Future of the Global Trade Order
committees, has been scant. Thus the DSS has remained the only source of  
authoritative guidance for the multilateral system at large.
The Increased Number and Complexity of  Disputes
In its statement at the DSB on October 28th, 2015, following that of  September 
26th, 2014 on the same issues and informing the Membership of  initial 
measures undertaken by him to face the problem,17 the DG gave a variety 
of  information and figures evidencing the increased use of  the DSS and the 
increased complexity of  cases that are putting a strain on the resources and 
generate delays. The DG has pointed to the number of  active panels that 
are operating at the same time, which reached 30 as of  September 2015 
(compared with 29 in 2014,18 and an average of  20 between 2000 and 2013). 
The number of  new panels established by the DSB has also increased from 
six in 2010, to nine in 2011, to 11 in 2012, to 13 in 2014 and finally to 15 by 
September 2015.19 
Disputes have also become more complex in that more domestic measures of  
the respondent country are being challenged – currently each dispute involves 
an average of  28 measures and 180 claims. The evidentiary burden before 
panels is also more demanding – one ongoing dispute (and not one of  the two 
massive Boeing-Airbus aircraft disputes, which are still before the panels under 
Article 21.5 at the compliance stage) has reached more than 1,700 exhibits 
just at the initial stage. “On average, there are three times as many exhibits 
per panel now than in early WTO days,” noted the DG. 
Another complexity relates to the requests by parties for preliminary procedural 
rulings (for example, to declare some claims inadmissible because they were 
not included in the initial request for consultations), which has become almost 
a standard feature in panel proceedings, adding submissions or exhibits, and 
therefore requiring more time of  the Secretariat and the panelists.20 This is 
a typical lawyers’ trick that shows how much the system has tilted – as have 
17 An important initiative of  the Legal Affairs Division has been the launch of  the WTO Digital Dispute Settlement 
Registry, which will allow electronic filing of  submissions and secure access to briefs and documents by the parties, 
besides serving as an electronic repository of  all panel and AB records and providing easy online access to non-
confidential information on cases to the public.
18 Nineteen panels in operation (12 in trade remedies and seven in other areas), 11 in composition, besides three appeals 
and two arbitrations on the reasonable period of  time pending.
19 The issue of  delays at the panel level caused by resource constraints in the Secretariat had been already raised at the 
DSB in 2014, and the DG explained the shifts and increase in legal resources he had undertaken in a statement at 
the DSB meeting of  September 26th, 2014. This statement and the data provided are to be found in the AB report 
for 2014 (WTO, 2015, p. 93).
20 The high number of  third parties in many proceedings (up to 36 in a recent case) adds also complexity in the 
handling of  cases by panels.
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other arbitral fora – towards judicialization, when a more conciliatory approach 
originally prevailed and was assumed.
Suggestions for Tackling the Problems
Panel proceedings: Possible Remedies to the Growing Delays
As I have explained above, the first effect of  the increase in the number of  
disputes brought to panels is the delay in the effective initiation of  the work 
by panels after the DSB has established them formally at the second meeting 
in which a Member has requested so, pursuant to Article 6.1 DSU. The DSU 
envisages in Article 8.7 that a panel be composed – that is, the panelists be 
appointed – 20 days thereafter, if  the parties agree on the names suggested by 
the Secretariat (Article 8.6), or within an additional 10-day period if  the DG 
appoints them due to lack of  agreement. Recently, however, the practice has 
been for several months to elapse between establishment and composition, or 
between composition and initiation of  the panel process. This is not due to 
procedurally difficulties but is a deliberate, inevitable choice by the Secretariat 
because of  a lack of  resources to staff the panels. The difficulty of  finding 
suitable panelists due to the high demand, caused by the number of  panels 
operating at the same time, adds an increased layer of  difficulty and possibility 
for delay.21 It must be said that the situation of  an adjudicating body to which a 
dispute has been submitted not even starting to examine the matter for several 
months is not unprecedented at the international level, where various courts 
and their member states strive to find solutions to the increasing recourse to 
adjudication.22 This is however not a justification for the WTO not sticking to 
its short deadlines which are one of  the most distinctive and positive features 
of  its dispute settlement system.
The DG itself  underlined in its statement that the measures he was undertaking 
– reinforcing the human/ legal resources available to panels and reorganizing 
the cooperation between the Legal and Rules Divisions – would not resolve 
21 Besides the 15-month delay complained about by Korea at the DSB of  August 31st, 2015 referred to above, the 
most recent document on the issue is telling. On October 6th, 2015 the chairman of  the panel in a case between 
the European Union and Brazil (joined to one on the same issue initiated by Brazil against Japan, DS 472 and 
497) informed that the panel established on December 17th, 2014 and composed more than three months later on 
March 17th, 2015 expected to issue its report by the end of  2016, more than two years after the European Union 
had obtained the institution of  the panel in order to obtain the withdrawal of  the measures by Brazil that it had 
challenged.
22 Thefore in the European Union it was decided in 2015 to double from the numbers of  the judges of  the first level 
tribunal (the General Court) from 28 to 56. At the European Court of  Human Rights, various procedural devices 
have been introduced through the years (such as increasing the possibility of  summarily dismissing petitions for 
manifest inadmissibility) to cope with the explosion of  recourses (which, however, are predominantly from private 
parties in both fora).
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the structural problems or prevent the increase of  the backlog.23 The DG 
invoked the cooperation of  the Members, specifically of  the disputing parties, 
to “alleviate the pressure on the system” and to avoid a collective failure. In 
this respect, he alluded to “Member-driven, demand-side solutions,” without 
indicating specific initiatives, which might be beyond his powers. He launched, 
procedurally, a cautious consultation process with Members within the WTO to 
devise solutions that could be implemented by best practices without implying 
DSU amendments (such as limiting the number of  pages of  briefs or the 
number of  exhibits).
It is unlikely, however, that the tendency to have recourse to the DSS will slow 
down, in view of  the increased favor for litigation at the international level, 
the increase of  instances where trade obligations collide with the exercise of  
domestic regulatory powers, and the increase in WTO Members that are 
actively engaged in international trade matters. Innovative remedies must be 
devised by looking at and tackling the roots of  the problems.
The inability of  the current system to cope with the increase in litigation is 
due in great part to its structure, which at the panel and Secretariat levels is 
still basically patterned after the GATT model of  panels. As is well known, 
these panels were made almost exclusively of  governmental experts, picked ad 
hoc to resolve occasional specific disputes among trade diplomats in Geneva 
familiar with the system, reflecting the non-legal character of  trade disputes 
in those days.24 Even today, panelists are not professional judges or arbitrators 
– about half  of  them are trade diplomats based in Geneva who do not have 
a legal degree and normally work for their government. The rest is made of  
governmental experts, rarely are academics resorted to.
As a consequence, these panelists have to rely heavily on the lawyers of  the 
Secretariat assigned to each panel (one senior and one junior, as a rule) to 
perform their job, from research, to organizing hearings, to drafting. In the 
abstract, this approach appears contradictory in view of  the professionalization 
required and legalization inserted in the system, but WTO Members are 
attached to the tradition of  being judged by their peers and also value the 
assistance of  the Secretariat as a guarantee of  consistency.
Now that the flow of  cases is constant and sustained, similar to or perhaps 
even more so than in a regular court, the system will be increasingly unable 
23 The merging of  the two divisions could also be envisaged, fully pooling the resources devoted to the DSS while 
maintaining the distinct expertise of  the Rule Division in trade remedy disputes.
24 Small but important efficiency innovations could also concern the composition of  panels, where parties often 
disregard the provision of  Article 8.6 that “[t]he parties to the dispute shall not oppose nominations suggested by the 
Secretariat under the same provision except for compelling reasons,” thus causing additional delays; and the suppression 
of  the Interim Review Stage (Article 15), which has become redundant with the introduction of  appeal. 
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to perform its functions effectively unless (a) the Secretariat is expanded in 
consequence, including its budget; and/or (b) panelists are more devoted to 
the task and professional, that is, available on short notice to actively and 
exclusively perform their tasks and able to so more autonomously.25
This suggested configuration is found both in permanent international courts 
and within international commercial and investment arbitration under different 
models. At international courts, judges are mostly full time and are assisted by 
a centralized secretariat and/or by one or two full-time individual clerks. The 
secretarial support is much less in international arbitration, even compared 
to the WTO – arbitrators are selected among recognized experts in the field 
who are able to research and draft by themselves, possibly with the support of  
personal assistants from universities or their own law offices.26 The support of  
the secretariat of  the institution is limited to procedural matters and formal 
external review of  the decision as autonomously prepared by the arbitrators 
themselves. 
At the WTO such a development, that is, engaging more panelists while 
maintaining the unique role of  the Secretariat, would in turn be facilitated 
by broadening the pool of  potentially available panelists. The first easy change 
is to allow nationals of  third parties to a dispute to be selected as panelists, 
provided they are non-governmental. Currently, nationals both of  the litigating 
parties and of  third parties can be appointed only with the consent of  the 
parties (Article 8.3). Besides depriving the system of  competent experts who 
could act as panelists27 and thus relieving the shortage, this restriction leads 
to the panelists being chosen mostly from a small group of  (small, mainly 
developing) countries that are rarely involved in disputes. This means the 
representative character of  the adjudicators is not in line with the geography 
of  the litigants and the issues raised.28
Also, the procedure for selecting panelists, which is currently rather cumbersome 
and entails a delicate interaction between the Secretariat, the parties and the 
prospective panelists, should be streamlined so as to discourage parties from 
dragging their feet (Malacrida, 2015). 
25 In December 2015 the General Council adopted a new fee pattern whereby non-governmental panellists now receive 
CHF900 per day and government panellists CHF300.
26 The differences between the WTO DSS at the panel level and ISDS, especially as concerns origin, qualification and 
the role of  the adjudicators, has been addressed recently in Pauwelyn (2015). 
27 This means that in practice, potential US, European, Japanese, Canadian, and Chinese panelists are hardly ever 
appointed, since the respective countries almost always participate as third parties to proceedings when they are not 
the main parties.
28 Joost Pauwelyn has noted that by contrast, for investment disputes at ICSID, where most challenges involve 
developing countries, most arbitrators chosen are nationals of  developed countries (Pauwelyn, 2015).
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Transferred to the WTO, either model would require:
• More financial resources to the legal Secretariat (Legal Affairs and Rule 
Divisions), also for compensating panelists;29 adequate additional funding 
cannot be made available by just shifting funds within the budget, and a 
real increase of  the budget and therefore of  the members’ contribution 
would be required
• Having recourse to a (probably not so) small group of  recurrent panelists, as 
is already de facto the case,30 who should be able to ensure availability 
and capability of  operating autonomously; they should therefore not be 
engaged currently in governmental work and be remunerated adequately.
Panels could thus operate somewhat like the AB, their members meeting 
for longer periods in Geneva during proceedings and immediately thereafter 
for the deliberation of  their report. It would be for the Secretariat to go on 
giving support to the panelists in the form of  research, previous case law and 
precedent, while active drafting could be more in the hands of  the panelists 
or, in any case, of  the chairman. The current role of  the Secretariat would 
remain necessary in order to ensure that these ad hoc panels, composed of  
diverse members, do not endanger with their individual decision making the 
consistency of  case law (which is, in any case, subject to appellate review). 
Such an evolution would not even require changes in the DSU provision. 
It would probably entail a change in the mix of  panelists’ backgrounds. 
There would be fewer active trade diplomats and more retired experts and 
persons with different backgrounds, such as academics and former officials 
from international organizations.  Since high-quality reports are a must that 
is advocated by everybody concerned it is difficult to see how this quality can 
be maintained without changes to the current system. The challenge is that 
the more and more complex disputes and sophisticated arguments (moreover 
increasingly exposed by expert lawyers from specialized resourceful law firms) 
require increasing:
• The legal competence of  the adjudicators 
• The availability of  legal support to them
• The time they must be able to devote to each case
• Their remuneration.
29 Governmental panelists currently work for free since they are supposed to act for the WTO during their working 
hours (the WTO pays a small sum to the Members that lend them); the others receive a small per diem, which does 
not reflect the engagement that should be required of  them, even after a recent small increase. The issue has been 
recognized and an increase was decided in December 2015, see note 24.
30 Pauwelyn (2015) assessed that there are 15 panelist that have been appointed more than six times in recent years, and 
a high number of  “single shooters.” 
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What this change requires is for sure additional financial resources, whereas 
Members appear/like to believe that quick, high-quality and efficient justice 
may be obtained at no cost – an obvious impossibility. The mantra that 
Members are not ready to accept increases in the yearly budget (“zero-growth”) 
of  course renders a solution quite difficult.
Hardly anybody has looked at the cost of  the DSS, how it is financed and how it 
is apportioned among those who directly benefit from it. There is no accurate 
breakdown of  the general costs of  the WTO Secretariat and those pertaining to 
dispute settlement, because it appears that a consistent share of  the latter (above 
the official figure of  only 13% of  the total) is charged to general administrative 
costs. Looking at the official data on the WTO website, however, it appears that 
the services of  the organization cost little in absolute terms to the Members, 
and even less so the Dispute Settlement System. 
The United States’ contribution to the total WTO budget in 2015 is US$22 
million, China pays $16.8 million, Japan $8.7 million, Brazil $2.4 million, and 
the EU members together (although they contribute individually) about $75 
million. Without commenting on the incredible imbalances that these figures 
reveal, especially considering the frequency of  recourse to DSS by individual 
Members (such as Austria contributing almost as much as Australia, and 
Singapore almost twice that of  Brazil), one is on the safe side submitting that 
just the costs of  the lawyers engaged by either parties (including the lawyers 
of  the industry concerned standing behind them) in the cases involving the 
United States are higher than the contribution of  the United States to the 
whole WTO budget (and this is the same for any other country involved in 
disputes).31
If  the overall budget devoted to the DSS cannot be increased (some Members 
may even consider that this constraint is a way to put pressure on the DSS 
and its components by micro-managing any additional resource and their 
destination), one should reflect on an alternative solution – making the users pay 
for using the system (either through a fee system or having a separate budget 
for the DSS), as is the case in most courts and for the international secretariats 
administrating institutional arbitration, such as ICSID or the ICC.
A final item concerns the demand side. Is it possible to limit the number of  cases 
brought to adjudication?
In this respect, it would be worth studying how to make the pre-adjudication 
phase (the consultations) more effective, possibly providing for the input of  the 
Secretariat as legal-economic support (What is involved economically? What 
31 By comparison, it has been stated that the legal costs of  an average ICSID case are $4 million.
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legal alternatives could be acceptable? What issues are in fact not in dispute?). 
Also, recourse to “good offices, conciliation and mediation” as envisaged in 
Article 5 as voluntary steps at any time during the dispute, for which the 
DG is available under Article 5.6, could be reinforced. They might be made 
compulsory as a preliminary stage for certain types of  disputes.
Also related to the demand side is the frequency of  compliance proceedings 
under Article 21.5 DSU. These are panel proceedings started by the original 
complainant who challenges the WTO consistency of  the measures that the 
respondent has taken to comply with an unfavorable outcome. This entails the 
obligation to withdraw or amend appropriately the measure found inconsistent 
with the provisions invoked by the claimant (as per Articles 3.7 and 21). These 
disputes are heard by the original panel reconvened for this purpose, whose 
report may in turn be appealed. Article 21.5 claims are upheld in the DSS most 
of  the time, signaling a lack of  proper follow-up by respondents. At the same 
time, these proceedings consistently absorb resources of  the system, especially 
considering that some of  the most complex disputes have gone through this 
stage and thus appear almost never-ending (e.g. EC-Hormones; the two aircraft 
cases, Boeing /Airbus, US-COOL, just concluded after more than four years; 
US-Tuna II).32 Some kind of  simplified or accelerated proceedings should 
be devised for these cases, which are often the most complex. In these cases, 
the parties involved could be asked to assume the costs, which are currently 
charged to the whole membership.
The Appellate Stage: Improving the Organization of  the Appellate Body and the Selection 
and Reappointment Process in Order to Guarantee its Independence from WTO Member 
Interference and its Authority
The problems faced by the panel stage and the Secretariat due to the increase 
in the number and complexity of  disputes are now reaching the Appellate 
Body – lengthier panel reports,33 more appeals pending at the same time, more 
complex cases with more issues appealed and more challenges raised.34 Cross 
appeals have also become more frequent. This makes the issuance of  shorter 
reports, as is also often advocated for panels, quite difficult.
This “wave” may put additional pressure on the ability of  the AB to perform 
its task in a timely manner while maintaining the high quality of  its reports, 
32 If  the reports of  the compliance panels in the two aircraft cases (DSB 316 and DSB 353) are issued as announced 
in mid-June 2016, this will be around four years after the two panels were composed in 2012. The Australia Tobacco 
dispute will also have lasted about four years at the panel stage if  the report is issued as announced in mid-2016.
33 The number of  pages of  “average” panel reports has increased from 49 in 1996-2000 to 183 in 2010-2014, as 
reported in the DG Statement of  September 26th, 2014 in the AB report for 2014 (WTO, 2015, p. 88).
34 This evolution has been highlighted by the AB in a Communication of  May 30th, 2013 (“The Workload of  the 
Appellate Body”).
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for which it is generally praised and which represents a basis of  the trust that 
the DSS inspires in Members and beneficiaries.
The organization of  the AB under the relevant rules of  the DSU (Article 17) 
leaves it little flexibility to cope with a regular higher number of  cases; it is 
made of  only seven members, who decide in randomly composed divisions 
of  three, and it must issue its reports within 90 days. 
As to procedure, the AB has adopted in recent years several practical measures 
within its competence to establish its “working procedures” (Article 17.9), 
including reducing the time framework in the initial phase of  the process in 
order to have more time to examine the case and decide (in 2010), and asking 
the parties to supply summaries of  their arguments, to be annexed to the AB 
report without need for the AB and its legal staff to perform this task directly 
(in 2014). In parallel with the increase of  staff at the panel level, the legal staff 
of  the AB – until recently a relatively small group of  just ten lawyers – has also 
been marginally increased. The AB has lately suggested a limit to the volume 
of  parties’ submissions in a communication circulated in October 2015, in 
which the AB gave evidence of  its workload and the size and complexity of  
the cases, with a view to stimulating the debate with interested WTO Members 
and in the hope of  a positive response.
Dealing with the case load and the complexity of  appeals is directly related 
to the issue of  respect of  the 90-day deadline. The AB has tried its utmost to 
respect in all cases this deadline, to which Members attribute great importance, 
although a delay of  a few days is irrelevant compared to the delays normally 
accumulated in the other phases of  the proceedings, sometimes by decision 
of  the parties themselves.
Going beyond this deadline is sometimes caused by the complexity of  the 
case (such as in the aircraft cases), but recently it is more often caused by 
the overlapping of  appeals that makes it impossible for the members of  the 
AB to attend to multiple disputes according to the standard time schedule. 
The issue has been that a few parties, especially the United States, insist that 
this should be made only with the consent of  the parties to the dispute. The 
AB has recognized that involving the parties is appropriate and has done so, 
but does not want its hands tied and to subordinate the establishment of  its 
agenda, as necessary in these formerly labeled “exceptional cases,” to the 
will of  the litigants in any given case. The debate has been ongoing for some 
time, fueled by criticism from some countries in the DSB when a deadline has 
been missed (although when this does occur it is usually just by a few days). 
The complaints have not been against extending the proceedings in case of  
objective impossibility of  respecting the deadline, but focus on the lack of  
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previous agreement with the parties (the United States) or the lack of  full 
information on the reasons thereof  from the AB (Japan).35 Other countries 
(the European Union, India and Brazil) pushed back against Japan’s request, 
saying that micro-managing the AB schedule would not help resolve the issue 
of  delays. An alternative is to have a custom-made schedule, agreed with the 
parties, for any case where the 90-day deadline does not appear not.
If  the workload remains at the current level, relaxing the 90-day deadline by 
a few days on a case-by-case basis, or even replacing the 90 days with 120 
days, will not resolve the issue. The number of  the AB members should be increased, 
taking into account that when it was initially created with seven members, the 
Membership of  the WTO was more limited and important current players 
in the DSB, such as China and Russia, were not even members. Nine has 
been suggested as a reasonable number of  members; new human resources 
would be added, reflecting geographically the expanded membership without 
diminishing the collegiality on which the consistency of  the AB case law and 
its independence rests.
The AB would benefit from (modest) reforms limiting the risk of  a reduction of  
the authority of  the AB as a pivot of  the stability and the predictability of  the 
WTO system. First, since the AB members are de facto engaged full time, it 
would be reasonable for the terms of  their employment to reflect this situation. 
In case of  full-time employment, a fixed monthly compensation might even 
be less onerous for the WTO budget than the current per diem arrangement.36
Second, and more importantly, the issue of  the modalities of  the renewal of  their 
tenure after the first four-year term should be streamlined. Until recently 
renewal was de facto automatic, and appropriately so, with the DSB extending 
any mandate as a matter of  course if  the AB member concerned had expressed 
his willingness to renew. More recently, under the impulse of  the United States, 
the DSB has asked that the AB members coming up for renewal meet the WTO 
Members and be available for questioning. The issue has become sensitive – 
one could foresee a situation in which countries would subtly interfere with 
pending cases and try to influence the judges, making the renewal of  AB 
members dependent upon their answers.37
35 Most recently at the DSB meeting of  October 28th, 2015.
36 Making the position full time would also make potential candidates more aware of  what the position entails and 
would thus encourage more competent candidates to come forward. 
37 This process is reminiscent of  the hearings by the US Congress of  candidates to the US Supreme Court proposed 
by the president, but the setting, the position of  the US Supreme Court and the individual role of  its judges is quite 
different. On the other hand, one should not forget that the AB, however modest its name and institutional setting, is 
the only international court with compulsory jurisdiction (moreover in respect of  broad sensitive matters) over states 
such as the United States, China and Russia, which usually accept to participate in international adjudication, if  at 
all, only on an ad hoc, mostly ex post facto basis. Hence the keen interest of  large economies in the selection of  their 
future judges.
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The solution was finally found by holding an informal DSB meeting on 
November 12th, 2015, with this encounter taking place on the understanding 
that questions by delegations would be of  a general and systemic nature only. 
In the subsequent, formal DSB meeting of  November 25th, Singh Bathia 
from India and Thomas Graham from the United States were reappointed 
by consensus.
In view of  this development, a one-time term, for instance of  seven years, 
would avoid any inappropriate impression of  pressure and interference in the 
reappointment process by individual WTO Members.38 The current active 
engagement of  key WTO Members in the appointment process appears 
excessive; it gives the impression that some key WTO Members try to form 
an AB composed of  members who are responsive to their wishes with regards 
to their approach to interpretation and similar issues. The process has recently 
even entailed interviews in Washington and Brussels (a kind of  roadshow to 
which candidates have had to submit lately) and the close scrutiny of  their 
academic CVs and publications.39 This resulted in a notable instance in 2014 
when a qualified candidate who had accepted by all the membership was 
then vetoed by one country, leading to the repetition of  the selection process.
The increased tendency for AB members to come from trade diplomacy and 
national administration, at the expense of  academics and national judges (who 
are endowed with practical international experience as negotiators, arbitrators 
or administrators), risks diminishing the ability of  the AB to reason and decide 
with full independence, impartiality and objectivity. This is irrespective of  the 
personal integrity of  all AB members, who have never been criticized from 
this point of  view.40 An appropriate mix of  competences within the AB is key 
for it to operate at the highest qualitative level, irrespective of  the ability of  its 
dedicated legal staff. It is important that the AB be able to issue well-reasoned 
reports, based on a full knowledge of  international law, that receive not only the 
approval of  WTO Members but also praise from the community of  academics 
and other experts in the field.41 
38 There is a widely shared belief  among those familiar with these developments that the unavailability for 
reappointment of  the US AB members Merit Janow (in 2007) and Jennifer Hillman (in 2011) was prompted by the 
negative position towards their reappointment privately aired by the USTR at the time. The reasoning behind a 
country not supporting a member of  its nationality in a body, such as the AB, that operates by consensus  and where 
dissents are rare, anonymous and not capable of  shifting the course of  the case law, is unclear. This attitude may even 
undermine the trust of  his or her colleagues in the independence of  such member. In the case of  a smaller country 
not supporting an outgoing AB member of  its nationality, it is almost inevitable that the successor would be of  a 
different nationality. This is what happened upon the resignation from the AB of  Oshima from Japan shortly before 
the expiration of  his term in 2012. His successor was the current AB member from Korea, Seung Wha Chang, and 
as a consequence, Japan “lost its seat,” which it had held since the beginning of  the AB. 
39 Elsing and Pollack (2014) examined this issue through extensive interviews with former candidates.
40 On these issues see Shaffer et al. (2016)
41 See the piece by former AB member David Unterhalter of  South Africa (Unterhalter, 2015). 
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The independence of  the AB is fortunately assured by two factors. First, the 
collegial attitude of  its members makes it impossible to single out an individual 
member’s position on any specific issue from the outside. Second, the different, 
even opposing positions of  WTO Members on these issues, as on many others, 
while paralyzing even modest reforms, has the advantage of  making it unlikely 
that initiatives to reduce the authority of  the AB will succeed.
As to the Implementation Phase
The DSS ultimately pursues a practical objective: maintaining the balance of  
rights and obligations, market access and liberalization commitments agreed 
upon by the Members in the various WTO agreements, discouraging breaches 
and redressing them as promptly as possible. 
The monitoring role of  the DSB on implementation is one of  the features that 
makes the WTO DSS stand out in comparison to other international dispute 
settlement mechanisms, where implementation is ultimately left to the good 
will of  the party concerned, under threat of  diplomatic pressure or unilateral 
countermeasures.
Surveillance by the DSB should be made more effective, as advocated by 
the Canadian Ambassador Jonathan Fried when he was chairman of  the 
DSB in 2013. It should not be just a formal exercise of  registering statements 
or automatically authorizing countermeasures in the form of  suspension of  
concessions when an adjudicative body has confirmed non-compliance.
Ways and means should be devised, based on 20 years of  experience, to 
exercise collective pressure on a recalcitrant Member in order to induce and 
facilitate prompter compliance. One avenue might be to suggest ways to effect 
implementation, which is currently left completely to the party found in breach. 
This option is currently in the hands of  panels and of  the AB under Article 
19.1 DSU, but they have generally refrained from using it. The reason is that 
these suggestions risk not being followed (they are not binding), thus indirectly 
diminishing the authority of  the underlying holdings contained in the panels 
and Appellate Body report. A commitment to the DSB by a party obliged to 
comply might stimulate more active domestic engagement by the competent 
national authorities to effect timely and complete implementation.
The implementation procedure should also be tightened to induce compliance 
by avoiding that the prospective nature of  (future) WTO remedies, which 
already favors non-compliant respondents, rewards even more dragging of  
feet by the losing party in implementing adverse decisions.
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One possible way to reinforce the compliance process might involve rethinking 
the relationship between the imposition of  countermeasures and arbitration 
ex Article 22.6 when there is a dispute on the proportionality of  the level of  
concessions that the winning party intends to put in place. Currently, the 
principle stated therein is that “[c]oncessions or other obligations shall not 
be suspended during the course of  the arbitration.” As currently framed, 
this provision favors the party in breach, in that the application of  trade 
sanctions against it is postponed. At the same time, it protects that party from 
being subject to unilaterally determined excessive sanctions by prohibiting 
their application altogether. A more efficient compliance-inducing mechanism 
should be devised (for example, providing for  authorization to apply trade 
sanctions at the initiation of  the Article 22.6 arbitration, subject to restitution 
with interest and possibly a penalty of  sanctions applied in excess of  the 
determination of  the arbitrators). 
Concluding Remarks
Some concluding remarks should address the interplay between the broader 
evolution of  international trade relations and the functioning of  the DSS.
On the one hand, it has been submitted that the existence of  an efficient DSS 
makes concluding the Doha Round less pressing, since its smooth functioning 
alleviates the need to address difficult negotiating issues. The most contentious 
issues, so runs the argument, may be left to be resolved by the panels and the 
AB. This argument does not stand in my view, because adjudicating disputes 
concerning existing agreements cannot be a replacement for the making of  
new agreements, whether within the Doha mandate or “post-Doha,” especially 
if  negotiations are meant to cover “new,” hitherto unregulated areas. Nor 
can dispute settlement “compensate” for the lack of  further liberalization of  
trade, be it in the form of  negotiated reductions of  tariffs on goods or new 
concessions on services.
I do not believe that there is any evidence of  the inverse either, namely that 
the efficiency of  the DSS makes WTO Members vary of  concluding new 
agreements; it would be always possible to carve-out some agreements from 
the DSS jurisdiction should this be the problem.42 The greatest challenge to 
the WTO comes rather from regional trade agreements, since difficult issues 
that are intractable at the global level may be agreed more easily between 
like-minded countries or countries with similar or complementary economies. 
42 Thus in the TPP certain “SPS-plus” obligations have been excluded from the dispute settlement mechanism.
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A multilateral response might be to resort to plurilateral agreements in which 
the WTO and its DSS maintain a role (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2015).
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CHAPTER 5 
“Behind-the-Border” Policies: 
Regulatory Cooperation and  
Trade Agreements
Bernard Hoekman1
European University Institute and CEPR
Introduction
With the establishment of  the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, much 
of  the vision of  the drafters of  the 1948 International Trade Organization 
(ITO) Charter was realized, albeit some 50 years later.2 However, since its 
creation, WTO Members have found it very difficult to negotiate new rules 
of  the game. Disagreements among countries regarding the benefits of  
committing to additional policy disciplines, most notably between the United 
States and other OECD nations on one side and emerging economies such as 
Brazil and India on the other, have impeded progress on the WTO’s traditional 
market access agenda (mostly tariffs and agricultural support). This in turn 
has precluded moving on to new issues. 
The average level of  tariffs for OECD member countries has fallen to the 
3% range; for major emerging economies like China and India the average 
applied tariff is less than 10%. Policy-induced market access frictions and 
trade costs today are increasingly regulatory in nature. The rapidly changing 
composition of  trade as a result of  technical changes – reflected in global value 
chains that span many countries, and products embodying value added services 
1 This chapter draws in part on Hoekman (2015a, b) as well as research with Petros Mavroidis and Charles Sabel.
2 The ITO was supposed to complement the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the area of  trade-
related policy, but never entered into force as a result of  a decision by the US government not to submit the treaty for 
approval by the Congress.
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that are connected to each other (the “Internet of  things”) and the increase 
in cross-border data flows this generates, with associated concerns about data 
security and privacy – is moving national regulation to center stage. The 
associated agenda is not about deregulation – what is driving concerns in the 
business community are the trade-impeding (cost-raising) effects of  differences 
in applicable domestic health, safety and security standards, prudential and 
licensing requirements, certification and compliance assessment procedures 
for both products and production processes used by suppliers of  goods and 
services. 
Continued deadlock in the WTO starting in 2008 led to the focus of  attention 
in addressing such international regulatory spillovers shifting to other fora – 
notably preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The ongoing negotiations on 
a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU 
and the US and the recently concluded Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU are important examples 
of  PTAs that include a significant focus on regulatory matters.3 This is a 
second-best solution, given that the organization of  production and trade into 
international value chains/networks means that end products are impacted 
by many regulatory jurisdictions. PTAs almost by definition will not span all 
the countries involved in many (most) global value chains, thus limiting the 
positive impact that they can have in addressing regulatory differences and 
uncertainty for firms and consumers, while at the same time giving rise to 
the possibility that PTA-based regulatory initiatives may generate trade and 
investment diversion. 
Trade agreements are not the only game in town to address regulatory 
spillovers. Governments may and have pursued different types of  regulatory 
cooperation efforts, ranging from sector-specific initiatives such as mutual 
recognition agreements (MRAs) to cross-sectoral, “horizontal” efforts that 
center on “practice” and learning from international experience and more 
formal mechanisms such as the Canada-US Regulatory Cooperation Council 
(Canada, 2014) that operate independently of  a prevailing trade agreement 
(i.e. NAFTA). 
What follows discusses the general challenges confronting international 
regulatory cooperation from the perspective of  reducing trade frictions. The 
3 Only two chapters of  CETA deal with reductions in import tariffs and the removal of  discrimination in government 
procurement — that is, classic market access issues where there are direct restrictions on the ability of  foreign 
companies to supply products. The majority of  the substantive chapters of  CETA deal with product regulation, 
customs procedures, trade facilitation, policies affecting specific services sectors, mutual recognition of  professional 
qualifications, domestic regulation more generally, procedures for regulatory cooperation and dialogue, and sector-
specific protocols (e.g. on the mutual acceptance of  the results of  the conformity assessment of  good manufacturing 
practices for pharmaceutical products).
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first section defines the task confronting policymakers and develops a typology 
of  the types of  initiatives that can be used to reduce negative trade spillovers 
created by regulatory differences. The next section discusses the question 
what role a trade agreement might play in addressing regulatory spillovers, 
something that arguably has not been considered seriously enough by the trade 
community. The third section briefly reviews some of  the extant disciplines and 
provisions in the WTO that have a bearing on domestic regulatory policies. 
The fourth section does the same for recent PTAs. The fifth section suggests 
some limited initiatives that could be pursued under WTO auspices or in a 
plurilateral trade setting. The final section concludes. 
Dimensions of Regulatory Cooperation
Competition between regulatory regimes is the default situation in international 
relations, with different jurisdictions independently applying their own set of  
regulations to products and producers. While competition implies differences in 
applicable standards across countries, over time, as learning occurs, there may 
be incentives to emulate more successful approaches and norms, generating 
convergence over time.  Competition is a powerful discovery mechanism 
and a force that will help to identify more efficient forms of  regulation to 
achieve a given objective. But competition may also have adverse outcomes. 
The commonly expressed fear of  a “race to the bottom” is one possibility, 
albeit one for which there is generally little evidence. A much more frequent 
consequence of  competition is excess costs associated with different regulatory 
regimes that have similar objectives. In such cases there are potential gains 
from cooperation.
International regulatory cooperation is difficult. There have been long-
standing transatlantic efforts to cooperate on regulatory matters, with only 
limited success (Vogel, 2012). The most progress has been achieved in the 
European Union in the context of  creating a single European market for 
goods and services, as this required overcoming the trade-impeding effects of  
differences in product market regulation. This was pursued through a variety 
of  approaches, ranging from harmonization of  new regulations to mutual 
72    Future of the Global Trade Order 
recognition (Pelkmans, 2012).4 The EU is of  course sui generis. The more 
general challenge confronting the trade community is to identify approaches to 
reducing trade costs through regulatory cooperation in the absence of  a political 
commitment to fully integrate markets and without supranational institutions 
that are tasked with reducing the market segmenting effects of  national policies. 
In principle, addressing this challenge should be facilitated if  regulatory 
objectives are equivalent across countries and economies have similar 
income levels. Approaches may differ towards reducing risk and avoiding 
catastrophic events, but if  goals are very similar, regulatory cooperation may 
reduce compliance costs without undercutting the attainment of  national 
regulatory objectives. The agenda here is not just about reducing compliance 
costs for firms and thus prices for consumers. More important – and, indeed, 
a necessary condition for reducing costs (increasing efficiency) – is that 
cooperation enhances the effectiveness as well as the efficiency of  regulation. 
Cooperation must be a mechanism that improves regulatory outcomes over 
time in all participating jurisdictions (Hoekman, 2015b). A basic question for 
policymakers is how best to design international regulatory cooperation so 
that it does so. This requires knowledge about the potential benefits and the 
political feasibility of  cooperation. 
Table 1 distinguishes between the magnitude of  net economic gains from 
regulatory cooperation and the political and technical difficulty (cost) of  
implementing the necessary cooperation. In principle, cooperation should 
center on areas that fall into the bottom-right cell D and on efforts to move 
items from C to D.  As important is to avoid investing resources in regulatory 
areas that fall into box A. Mapping policy areas into these different categories 
cannot simply be based on technical analysis but requires active engagement 
by regulators, business and consumers. Regulators should be interested in those 
activities and initiatives that increase their ability to achieve their mandate more 
effectively and efficiently. Business presumably would like to see compliance 
costs fall, while citizens and consumers may worry that cooperation will erode 
regulatory standards, resulting in a “race to the bottom.” This is a major 
factor underlying the strong resistance by some civil society groups in the EU, 
Korea and other nations to new PTAs that involve “deep integration” (see, 
for example, Cardoso et al., 2013 on fears that TTIP may do so). The result 
4 Mutual recognition involves agreement that products legally introduced into the commerce of  one jurisdiction 
may be sold and consumed without additional controls in another jurisdiction. To take the example of  food safety 
standards, mutual recognition between A and B implies that A recognizes that the norms prevailing in B satisfy its 
own safety norms and vice versa. If  the underlying norms in the two jurisdictions differ enough, such an approach 
is not feasible. Even if  A and B harmonize their norms, trade still might be affected by redundant costs if  both 
continue to inspect products before they are allowed to be sold. Only if  A and B mutually recognize (accept) that their 
respective enforcement systems are effective will harmonization eliminate regulatory trade costs.
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of  these different entry points implies that not all issues will lend themselves 
equally to cooperation. Insofar as the areas of  concern fall into boxes C or D, 
a precondition for cooperation is to address the worries of  either regulators 
and/or consumers that make an issue area politically sensitive. But efforts to 
do so through joint learning and interaction should prioritize areas that offer 
the highest potential economic benefits. In some instances this may not be 
possible; in others it may require a substantial amount of  time to establish 
the needed understanding and trust to allow cooperation to occur. There is 
therefore a dynamic time dimension to this two-by-two matrix. 
Table 1: Net economic payoffs and feasibility of cooperation
Political/technical costs
High Low
Net economic benefits
Low A B
High C D
Various approaches have been pursued to attenuate international regulatory 
spillovers (OECD, 2013). These include seeking to converge over time on 
the substance of  new regulatory norms (harmonization and international 
standardization), accepting differences in regulation and focusing on putting in 
place processes to address negative spillover effects of  such differences through 
mutual recognition agreements or determinations of  regulatory equivalence, 
and efforts to increase “coherence” across regulatory regimes. The latter 
generally center on identifying good practices and basic principles such as 
transparency, consultations with stakeholders, use of  impact assessments, and 
so on.5 
Cooperation can be characterized along a spectrum of  “soft” to “hard” 
depending on how binding (enforceable) the commitments are, with 
agreements ranging from “shallow” to “deep” depending on whether they 
entail commitments not to do something or go beyond that to require positive 
action. Efforts to increase coherence across regulatory regimes are an example 
of  “soft” cooperation. They have been a central element of  international 
initiatives on regulation pursued in the OECD and APEC, which focus on 
principles and processes as opposed to the substance of  regulation. 
“Shallow” types of  cooperation may be limited to commitments to enhance the 
transparency and visibility of  extant regulation and new regulatory initiatives, 
5 There is of  course an extensive literature on the various options and experiences; see for example, Vogel (2012) and 
OECD (2014). Much of  the focus will (have to) be sector specific; see, for example, Arnold (2005), Bismuth (2010) 
and Verdier (2011) for analyses of  services regulation.
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or they may go further and involve creation of  processes through which parties 
inform and/or consult each other or commit to providing opportunities for 
comment before adopting new regulations. Some instances of  “shallow” 
regulatory cooperation may be relatively straightforward to apply to a large 
number of  countries, as they are in the nature of  focal points and guidance 
for national policy. Whether or not a country implements the principles or 
good practices will not have a direct effect on the realization of  regulatory 
goals in another nation.
Deeper forms of  regulatory cooperation have implications for the realization 
of  regulatory objectives – they create interdependence between jurisdictions: 
the attainment of  a regulatory goal in country A becomes a function of  actions 
by country B. Deeper forms of  cooperation span a range of  possibilities, from 
harmonization at one extreme – i.e. adopting the same norms – to (mutual) 
recognition agreements or acceptance of  the equivalence of  regulatory regimes. 
Table 2 illustrates different types of  regulatory cooperation and lists a number 
international institutions and fora that have been created to support their 
implementation. There are many examples of  both “shallow” and “deep” 
regulatory cooperation – the ones mentioned in Table 2 are just illustrative.6 
Many (most) of  these do not involve trade agreements, but some do. The 
alternative approaches can all be embedded into trade agreements. There are 
several mentions of  the WTO in Table 2, reflecting the fact that its multilateral 
agreements – GATT, GATS and TRIPS – make references to harmonization 
(international standardization) and/or mutual recognition agreements, even 
if  there is no legal obligation imposed on all WTO Members to harmonize 
their norms or to recognize those of  trading partners (the WTO status quo 
is discussed below).
Coherence involves efforts among jurisdictions to ensure that the regulatory 
process conforms to what are generally accepted to be good practices (e.g. 
ensuring that regulation is transparent; that there is the opportunity for 
stakeholders, including foreign firms and governments, to comment on 
proposed new regulations; or that the process of  regulatory development should 
be informed by an economic impact assessment or a cost/benefit analysis). 
The aim here is not to question or discuss the objectives or the substance of  
regulation. Instead the focus is on the process through which regulation is 
developed and implemented. Coherence is an important element of  WTO 
6 Major international regulatory/standards-setting bodies include the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the 
International Electrotechnical Commission, the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the International Organization of  Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) and the International Association of  Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).
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disciplines on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers 
to trade (TBT)  and has been the focus of  work programs in organizations such 
as the OECD, various UN bodies and APEC for many years. 
Consultation goes beyond joint efforts to define and implement good practices 
(coherence) and begins to engage with the substance of  regulation and its 
spillover effects. Examples include the scope that has been created in the 
WTO to raise specific trade concerns (STCs) regarding (proposed) TBT and 
SPS measures (Wijkström, 2015) and the framework that has been established 
for consultations on regulatory matters through the Canada-US Regulatory 
Cooperation Council (RCC).
Table 2: A typology of regulatory cooperation and illustrative examples
Global Plurilateral Bilateral
“Shallow” cooperation
Coherence BCBS, UNCITRAL, ISO; ICN; WTO
OECD, APEC, GPA; 
GATS (Telecom 
Reference Paper)
BITs
Consultation OIE, IOSCO, WHO,     WTO: TBT/SPS EU; G20 RCC (Canada-US)
“Deeper” forms of cooperation
Recognition 
(MRAs) CIPM; ILAC; IAF
EU-US (various);     
ASEAN (various); …
US-Australia 
(securities); 
Trans-Tasman MRA
Equivalence SPS (WTO) EU EU-US air safety; ANZCERTA
International 
Standardization
UNECE, Codex 
Alimentarius; IMF; 
GlobalGap; VSS
FSB, ESMA, EU, ICH RCC (new regulations)
Notes: ANCERTA: Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement; BCBS: Basle 
Committee for Banking Supervision; BIT: bilateral investment treaty; CIPM: International Committee for 
Weights and Measures; FSB: Financial Stability Board; GPA: WTO Government Procurement Agreement; 
IAF: International Accreditation Forum; ICH: International Conference on Harmonization of Technical 
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use; ICN: International Competition 
Network; ILAC: International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation; OIE: World Organization for Animal 
Health; RCC: Regulatory Cooperation Council; VSS: voluntary sustainability standards.
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Deeper forms of  cooperation go further in seeking to reduce the market-
segmenting effects of  differences in regulation across countries. Examples are 
agreements to (mutually) recognize a foreign regulatory process, efforts between 
regulators to determine instances where regulatory regimes are equivalent, 
and efforts to adopt common regulatory standards or conformity assessment 
processes – i.e. harmonization of  norms. Such deeper forms of  regulatory 
cooperation are difficult to achieve for a number of  reasons. There may be 
(i) mandate gaps, in that domestic regulators are not permitted to pursue 
cooperation or have not been given the resources to do so; (ii) coordination 
gaps in instances where international cooperation requires several regulatory 
agencies within a country to work together; or (iii) informational gaps within 
and across countries, such as a lack of  data on how a regulatory regime “works” 
(Hoekman, 2015a). Addressing these gaps requires institutions and processes 
that foster regular communication and repeated interaction. This is needed 
both across agencies within countries – frequently multiple regulators and 
government bodies are engaged in setting and enforcing product and process 
regulations – and across countries. This is non-trivial, especially in federal states 
where regulation is applied at the state level (for example, in 13 provinces and 
territories in Canada, 29 states in India and 50 states in the US). In the case 
of  the EU, the 28 member states continue to have significant autonomy in the 
implementation of  regulation in many areas.
Regulators frequently have their own mechanisms through which they interact 
with each other internationally. Governments at different levels (central, sub-
central, municipal), regulators and international businesses are all engaged 
in mechanisms that entail cooperation with counterparts across borders 
(jurisdictions). Lead firms set standards for quality, health and safety for both 
products and processes that occur in their supply chains. They may cooperate 
in private standards-setting activities that have as a goal achievement of  inter-
operability and minimum standards across supply chains. They may work in 
cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governments 
to do so (an example being the Global Food Safety Initiative). NGOs do the 
same – there is a plethora of  different private standards-setting bodies that 
develop norms and offer certification services to companies that engage in 
international trade. The characterization of  levels of  “regulatory” cooperation 
in Table 2 also applies to the world of  private standards, as is illustrated by 
the inclusion of  several such initiatives.
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What Role for Trade Agreements?
A key question for policymakers and stakeholders is whether, given a 
presumption that there are good reasons for pursuing regulatory cooperation, 
this should be embedded in trade agreements. Given a rationale for regulatory 
cooperation, what is the value added of  tying this to a trade agreement as 
opposed to simply giving regulators a mandate to interact and work together 
to improve regulatory requirements and processes? Assuming a positive answer 
to the question on embedding regulatory cooperation in trade agreements, 
an ancillary question is whether this is best pursued through the multilateral 
forum (the WTO), through PTAs or both. 
Trade agreements are designed to reduce explicit discrimination against foreign 
suppliers of  goods and services. An implication is that traditional sector-
specific regulation that entails barriers to entry lends itself  to the reciprocal 
bargaining and market access commitments that are the core feature of  trade 
agreements.  As such regulation can be “captured” by incumbent firms who use 
their political influence to ensure that they have favorable treatment (Stigler, 
1975), a very similar dynamic as that underpinning trade negotiations can 
be used to reform such types of  regulation. However, while entry-restricting 
regulation continues to exist for some sectors – especially in some services – in 
the 1980s and 1990s regulation changed in nature. Regulation is no longer 
dominated by efforts to control the behavior of  firms in sectors in which entry is 
restricted.7 Instead, the focus is on ensuring that markets are contestable and on 
the use of  market conduct and liability rules that are (supposed to be) applied 
equally to domestic and foreign goods and services to do so, complemented by 
mechanisms to elicit revelation of  information by firms on their costs (Laffont, 
1994; Posner, 2013).
The source of  regulatory trade costs lies in differences in regulations across 
jurisdictions and the need to comply with the requirements of  multiple 
regulatory bodies in different countries. As already noted, reducing the 
market-segmenting effects of  differences in regulations is difficult because of  
concerns that it may compromise countries’ regulatory objectives and hinder 
the execution of  regulatory agencies’ legal mandates and obligations. This 
implies that reciprocal commitments to change national policies – the bread 
and butter of  trade agreements – often simply will not be feasible. The nature 
of  regulation is technical and dynamic, involving many actors with different 
degrees of  autonomy and decentralization; moreover, regulators will respond 
7 A caveat to this is that state-owned or state-controlled enterprises continue to be prevalent in many countries. Insofar 
as this is associated with barriers to entry, trade agreements are appropriate instruments through which to seek to 
impose market disciplines on such entities.
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to differences in local circumstances and changes in knowledge over time. This 
makes it difficult – indeed, undesirable – to “negotiate” substantive changes 
in regulation or to impose regulatory harmonization or convergence by fiat. 
Instead, regulatory cooperation must be premised on mutual assessments of  
performance of  regulatory regimes to enable regulators to assure principals 
(stakeholders, legislatures) that the other party has effective systems in place. 
In practice, convergence, if  it occurs at all, will most likely be gradual, with 
partner countries over time moving closer to systems that are constructed and 
implemented the same way.
The increasing complexity and interdependence of  modern economies that 
is reflected in the growth in collaborative international production networks 
(“global value chains,” or GVCs) has led to forms of  what has been called 
meta-regulation (Coglianese and Mendelson, 2010). Meta-regulation involves 
the establishment of  monitoring and learning regimes. Instead of  presuming 
that regulators should define uniform rules based on scientific evidence, the 
aim of  meta-regulation is to create incentives for companies to invest resources 
in regular collection and analysis of  data to identify and mitigate specific 
risks they either confront or may generate. Such approaches are salient in the 
context of  GVCs. For example, ingredients contaminated with pathogens are 
periodically introduced into global food supply chains and widely propagated 
as the adulterated foodstuffs are incorporated into diverse batches of  processed 
products. The inadvertent co-production of  hazards by firms that are part of  
international networks – often identifiable years after products have entered 
commerce – calls for regulatory approaches that recognize such possibilities 
and that are designed to generate and disseminate relevant data to all parties 
concerned on a timely basis. 
As a result of  the type of  uncertainty that accompanies GVC-based production 
and extensive cross-border flows and interdependence, the regulatory problem 
becomes one of  organizing and supervising joint investigation by firms of  
emergent risks and responding to them before they cause harm. This is a 
problem that calls for approaches that involve data collection, data analysis 
and data sharing. An example is the use of  hazard analysis of  critical control 
points (HACCPs) for pathogens, implemented on both sides of  the Atlantic, 
involving a mix of  administrative action, legislation and private standards 
(Sabel and Simon, 2011; Humphrey, 2012). 
Can trade agreements support this type of  regulatory cooperation? This is 
perhaps less obvious than often seems to be assumed. Trade agreements can 
be characterized as purposeful efforts to align the behaviors of  key players 
(governments in particular, and through them, regulatory agencies) in a top-
down manner. However, insofar as regulation increasingly revolves around 
“Behind-the-Border” Policies: Regulatory Cooperation and Trade Agreements   79
a decentralized effort at problem solving – i.e. bottom-up mechanisms – a 
potential role for trade agreements to support regulatory cooperation is by 
acting as a device to more credibly commit to pursuing the needed bottom-up 
approach by creating an institutional framework that promotes and supports 
this. Whether trade agreements can be designed to do so  is an open question. 
While it is often argued that a major rationale and objective of  recent mega-
regionals such as TTIP and TPP is to address the costs arising from differences 
in or duplication of  regulatory regimes, arguably there has not been enough 
engagement with the public at large to explain why it makes  sense to address 
regulatory matters in these PTA negotiations and to ensure that all parties have 
a common understanding of  what this will (and will not) entail. 
Perhaps the most straightforward case for using trade agreements is that this 
will help ensure that the trade effects of  regulation are considered explicitly. 
Regulators often do not consider the international implications of  what they 
do. To a large extent this is simply because they are not called to do so by 
their authorizing environment. They may be limited in their appreciation 
of  the economic effect and costs associated with implementation of  their 
regime on firms and consumers in other jurisdictions. A necessary condition for 
regulators to consider the (cross-border) economic implications of  their work 
is that they have incentives to do so, which raises issues related not just to their 
legal mandates but also the design of  institutional mechanisms that facilitate 
learning and a better understanding of  the overall impact of  regulatory norms 
on trade and investment incentives. In terms of  the typology of  Table 1, a 
trade agreement may help in identifying which areas of  regulation fall into 
boxes C and D. 
Trade agreements may also be used as an instrument to generate the political 
oversight needed for implementation of  cooperation. An important feature 
of  trade agreements is that there are a large number of  interests represented. 
This can not only ensure that areas that are priorities from a trade perspective 
are identified and put on the table, but also help overcome political economy 
constraints that preclude movement in a direction that governments perceive 
will enhance aggregate welfare. Regulators may have a vested interest in the 
status quo, or have been captured by a domestic industry. Focusing on such 
problems in a trade agreement context may help mobilize the political support 
needed to push through reforms. Referring back to Table 1, dealing with 
regulatory matters in a trade agreement may help move forward over time 
on issues that are in boxes C and D. 
Addressing regulatory issues in a trade agreement also may benefit regulators 
if  it helps to mobilize additional resources to support cooperation. This can 
both support greater attention being given to cooperation – as that will entail 
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a resource cost for the agencies involved – and, indirectly but potentially 
importantly, allow for a reallocation of  scarce resources to other areas. That 
is, if  cooperation is successful – for example, it results in acceptance that 
two regimes are equivalent – regulators can allocate less to surveillance of  
that particular issue area and focus more on other concerns. The benefits of  
regulatory cooperation accrue not just to companies and consumers in the 
form of  lower compliance costs; if  it results in reductions in operating costs 
for a regulatory agency, this will release resources for other purposes. 
In practice, capacity constraints may impede even the shallowest forms 
of  cooperation. Basic principles such as transparency, notification and 
allowing for comment from stakeholders on proposed new regulation may 
not be implemented because of  resource constraints. There is a significant 
technical assistance and capacity-building agenda associated with improving 
regulatory systems and governance in developing nations. Including regulatory 
cooperation in a trade agreement can provide a focal point to mobilize aid 
for trade. The 2013 WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) illustrates one 
approach through which additional resources can be mobilized to improve 
national regulation through international cooperation.8
The WTO Status Quo
The WTO is supposed to be the global apex institution dealing with the cross-
border spillovers created by national trade-related policies. The primary focus 
is on trade policies, but it also includes disciplines on domestic regulation, 
motivated by a concern that these not be used to discriminate against foreign 
products. The national treatment rule is a general obligation for goods, whereas 
it is a specific one in the case of  services – applying only to scheduled services/
modes of  supply. The WTO does not engage on the substance of  regulatory 
measures – all it requires is that foreign products are treated the same as 
domestic ones. The WTO does embody some disciplines that require minimum 
levels of  regulation – for example, the TRIPS agreement requires Members 
to implement minimum standards of  protection for intellectual property – but 
the substance of  the rights and requirements/criteria involved are left to other 
international bodies to determine. 
Concerns that product-specific regulatory norms may be used for protectionist 
purposes motivated the negotiation of  specific disciplines going beyond the 
8 This was done by linking implementation of  the TFA to technical and financial assistance from high-income 
countries, under the umbrella of  the ‘aid for trade’ initiative; see Hoekman (2016).
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national treatment rule: the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures. The TBT 
agreement addresses technical requirements (mandatory regulatory norms) 
imposed by governments for goods; the SPS agreement deals with mandatory 
health and safety-related norms for agricultural products (foodstuffs, plant and 
animal health). The TBT agreement goes further than national treatment by 
requiring that Members base their product regulation on available international 
standards (whenever appropriate) and adopt the least trade-restrictive measure 
that is necessary to achieve their regulatory objective.9 The SPS agreement 
makes explicit reference to an indicative list of  international bodies that 
promulgate SPS norms, such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission. If  a 
national product-specific regulatory measure is based on an international 
standard, it is presumed to satisfy the least trade-restrictive test in that the 
norms are considered to be necessary and non-discriminatory in effect and 
in intent.10 Whether this is in fact the case is another matter, as in practice 
the process of  international standardization may not devote much attention 
to trade effects. The presumption is that because many countries will be 
involved in the process of  defining international standards, whatever is agreed 
is regarded as being non-discriminatory in intent, no matter the actual effect 
on trade. As argued below, this is one weakness of  the current approach in 
the WTO towards international standardization.
Many of  the standards that confront firms operating internationally address 
management processes and production methods. Systems such as ISO 9000, 
ISO 14000 and ISO 26000 are used by companies as a signal of  quality, a 
demonstration of  a commitment to social responsibility or as requirements that 
must be met by suppliers in a trade relationship with buyers or by companies 
that are part of  international value chains and production networks. Standards 
of  this type are not covered by the WTO as they are not mandatory. 
Conformity assessment procedures for technical product regulations are also 
subject to WTO disciplines, including the non-discrimination rule. Relevant 
guides or recommendations issued by international standardizing bodies are 
to be used if  they exist, except if  inappropriate for national security reasons 
or deemed inadequate to safeguard health and safety. In principle, WTO 
Members are free to join and use international systems for conformity 
9 What follows focuses on the TBT agreement. Similar considerations apply to the SPS agreement.
10 One reason why there are two product standards agreements is that the health and safety concerns that arise in the 
production, trade and consumption of  food, plant life and animals are considered to be particularly important. In 
effect, many SPS norms can be characterized as measures that are aimed at catastrophe avoidance – the spread of  
diseases, the probability of  serious illness, and so on. Such considerations also arise with technical barriers to trade 
as these may have similar motivations – e.g. a ban on the use of  lead paint, radioactive residues, etc. – but they often 
address other types of  issues as well (e.g. radio frequency interference, interoperability, and so forth). 
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assessment. The results of  conformity assessment procedures undertaken in 
exporting countries must be accepted if  consultations determine these are 
equivalent to domestic ones. WTO members are encouraged to negotiate 
MRAs for conformity assessment procedures, and not to discriminate between 
foreign certification bodies in their access to such agreements.
The SPS and TBT Committees have been characterized as technical expert-
driven catalysts for multilateral dialogue, providing a forum for the development 
of  guidance (soft law) and peer review of  trade measures (Wijkström, 2015). An 
important dimension of  what the WTO does in the area of  product regulation 
is compiling information on new measures. WTO Members are required to 
notify the WTO of  new measures that are not based on international standards. 
Over 45,000 measures have been notified since 1995. The TBT and SPS 
committees have developed procedures that can used by governments to raise 
concerns they have regarding proposed or applicable product standards of  
another WTO Member. This has come to be known as the “specific trade 
concerns” (STC) procedure (Horn et al., 2013). Between 1995 and 2015, over 
800 STCs pertaining to SPS or TBT measures were raised in the relevant 
committee, implying that fewer than 2% of  notified measures raised concerns. 
This process is widely regarded as being a useful mechanism to address 
concerns raised – about 40% of  STCs in the area of  SPS have reportedly 
been resolved (WTO, 2015). Over time the STC mechanism has evolved – for 
example, in 2014 WTO Members agreed to a procedure through which they 
can seek the services of  the Chair of  the SPS Committee or another facilitator 
to help find a solution to their concerns.11 
Much prevailing regulation deals with services. The WTO has fewer disciplines 
for regulations affecting services than for goods (product regulation). Article VI.4 
of  GATS calls on the Council for Trade in Services to develop any necessary 
disciplines to ensure that measures relating to qualification requirements and 
procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute 
unnecessary barriers to trade in services,12 and Members may not apply 
regulatory requirements so as to nullify or impair specific commitments made 
for sectors/modes (Article VI.5(a)). The GATS therefore embodies a weak 
“least trade-restrictive” norm, but there is no obligation to use international 
standards – WTO Members may use whatever standards they wish.
11 See https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/sps_10sep14_e.htm.
12 A Working Party on Domestic Regulation was mandated to develop disciplines called for by Article VI:4 to ensure 
that licensing and qualification requirements and related standards are not unnecessary barriers to trade in services. 
A precursor to this working party, the Working Party on Professional Services, agreed in 1998 on a set of  principles 
to ensure transparency of  regulations pertaining to licensing of  accountants and accountancy services.
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GATS Article VII (Recognition) promotes the establishment of  procedures for 
(mutual) recognition of  licenses, educational diplomas and experience granted 
by a particular Member. It permits a Member to recognize the standards of  
one or more Members, but does not require, or even encourage, Members 
to recognize equivalent foreign regulations. Article VII:2 requires a Member 
who enters into a mutual recognition agreement (MRA) to afford adequate 
opportunity to other interested Members to negotiate their accession to such 
an agreement or to negotiate comparable ones.  Article VII:3 stipulates that 
a Member must not grant recognition in a manner which would constitute a 
means of  discrimination between countries. Members must inform the Council 
for Trade in Services about existing MRAs and of  the opening of  negotiations 
on any future ones. Most such notifications pertain to the recognition of  
educational degrees and professional qualifications obtained abroad.
The WTO does little at present to support regulatory cooperation on a 
multilateral basis; the focus has been on national policies. This has included 
deliberations (in the context of  the TBT Committee) on what constitutes good 
regulatory practice and options that governments can use to streamline the 
way regulations are prepared, adopted and applied through the “regulatory 
lifecycle.” An example is the deliberation that commenced in 2012 over 
voluntary guidelines that would reduce the possibility of  product regulation 
having the effect of  unnecessarily restricting trade. However, to date no 
agreement on a set of  good practice guidelines has proved possible because 
of  concerns that the Appellate Body might invoke such norms in a dispute, 
notwithstanding the fact that it would be explicit that they would be non-
binding.13 
There is much more to be said about the state of  play in the WTO on regulatory 
matters. The foregoing brief  snapshot makes clear that the WTO is more 
involved than might be expected, but that many areas of  regulation are not 
subject to multilateral rules of  the game – especially service sector regulation. 
The role of  the WTO as a transparency mechanism is much better developed 
for product regulation than it is for other types of  regulation that have an 
impact on trade. The various committees and working parties dealing with 
different dimensions of  economic regulation have acted as foci for deliberation 
and information exchange. More can certainly be done if  governments are 
willing to do so, but the experience over the last decade or so with attempts 
to refine and expand disciplines on domestic regulation of  services and to 
agree to voluntary principles of  good practice for regulation illustrates that 
13 The Appellate Body has held that a 2000 decision by the TBT Committee on a set of  (voluntary) principles for the 
development of  international standards, guides and recommendations was a “subsequent agreement” under the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties; see Wijkström and McDaniels (2013).
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achieving a consensus in these areas may not be possible. As far as regulatory 
cooperation is concerned, one shortfall in the approach taken in the WTO 
has been the absence of  a concerted effort by WTO Members to encourage 
international standardizing bodies to consider the trade effects of  the norms 
that they develop (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2016a). 
Regulatory Cooperation in (Mega-)PTAs
How do PTAs compare to the WTO? There is of  course huge heterogeneity, 
but most PTAs do not do more than the WTO, while the one outlier, the EU, 
goes far beyond the WTO in the area of  regulatory cooperation. The only 
other PTA that includes substantial regulatory cooperation in specific areas 
is the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
(ANZCERTA) (Steger, 2012). Recently concluded mega-PTAs such as TPP 
do not go very far beyond the WTO – the value added primarily involves 
language aiming at greater coherence of  regulatory regimes of  the signatories 
(Bollyky, 2012), along with provisions calling for consultations (i.e. the shallow 
forms of  cooperation discussed in the first section).
The EU has used a mix of  approaches to remove the market-segmenting 
effects of  national product regulation, including harmonization and mutual 
recognition. The latter became a key driver following decisions of  the 
European Court of  Justice, which ruled that, in the absence of  overriding 
concerns that permit an exception, EU members must accept products into 
their markets that have been  legally introduced into the commerce of  another 
member state. However, the EU experience illustrates that mutual recognition 
requires some minimum level of  harmonization of  norms (common “essential 
requirements”).14
Recent PTAs involving the EU complement mutual recognition with efforts 
to move towards mutual “equivalence.” This involves agreement that the 
regulatory objectives of  the parties involved are equivalent and acceptance that 
implementation and enforcement mechanisms in the parties’ jurisdictions are 
effective. Under a “standard” mutual recognition approach, A satisfies itself  that 
B achieves its norms through the similar kind of  testing, inspections, sampling 
and so on that A undertakes. Under regulatory equivalence, A simply accepts 
B’s processes and systems: each government agrees that the regulatory regime 
of  the other party is equivalent to its own in terms of  both objectives and the 
effectiveness of  the institutional apparatus through which these objectives are 
14  See Pelkmans (2012) for an in-depth discussion.
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pursued.15  A necessary condition for an equivalence approach is trust: there 
must be a prior process of  “mutual assessment” (Messerlin, 2014) or evaluation 
of  the regulatory goals and implementation regime in the relevant jurisdictions 
that results in a judgment that these are “equivalent.” 
CETA — at the time of  writing the most recent of  the new type of  trade 
integration agreements and likely to be a model for what the EU and 
the United States might agree to in TTIP — includes some language on 
equivalence (Hoekman, 2015a). CETA calls for the establishment of  a 
regulatory cooperation forum to facilitate and promote the realization of  the 
objectives laid out in the regulatory cooperation chapter. It also provides that 
the parties may consult with stakeholders, including the research community, 
NGOs and business and consumer organizations “on matters relating to 
the implementation of ” the regulatory cooperation chapter (DFATD, 2014, 
Chapter 26,  “Regulatory Cooperation,” Article X.8). Article 2 of  the CETA 
chapter on regulatory cooperation commits both parties to developing their 
regulatory cooperation to prevent and eliminate unnecessary barriers to trade 
and investment; enhancing the climate for competitiveness and innovation, 
including through pursuing regulatory compatibility, recognition of  equivalence 
and convergence; and adopting transparent, efficient and effective regulatory 
processes that better support public policy objectives and fulfil the mandates of  
regulatory bodies. Article 3 mentions such objectives of  regulatory cooperation 
as building trust; deepening mutual understanding of  regulatory governance 
and obtaining from each other the benefit of  expertise and perspective to 
improve regulatory proposals; promoting the transparency, predictability and 
efficacy of  regulations; identifying alternative instruments; recognizing the 
associated effects of  regulations; and improving regulatory implementation 
and compliance. 
Another objective of  CETA is to facilitate bilateral trade and investment by 
reducing unnecessary differences in regulation and identifying new ways of  
cooperating in specific sectors. In a similar vein, the agreement mentions the 
complementary goal of  enhancing the competitiveness of  industry by looking 
for ways to reduce administrative costs and duplicative regulatory requirements, 
and “pursuing compatible regulatory approaches including, if  possible and 
appropriate, through: a) the application of  regulatory approaches which are 
technology-neutral, and b) the recognition of  equivalence or the promotion of  
15  A key difference, therefore, is that regulatory equivalence requires a willingness to step back from a focus on technical 
product considerations and to assess systems as a whole. Thus, whereas mutual recognition means assessing country 
B’s meat inspection system on the basis of  a sampling regime and the results of  testing in country A of  a sample of  
products originating in B, an approach based on regulatory equivalence would justify trust in a partner country’s 
products on the basis of  systemic arguments.
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convergence” (DFATD, 2014, Chapter 26, “Regulatory Cooperation,” Article 
X.3(d)(iii); emphasis added).
Language on – and examples of  – regulatory equivalence embodied in CETA 
include the chapter on SPS measures, which requires each signatory to accept 
the measures of  the exporting party as equivalent to its own if  the exporting 
party “objectively demonstrates that its measure achieves the importing 
Party’s appropriate level of  protection” (DFATD, 2014, Chapter 7, “Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures,” Article 7.1). Principles and guidelines for the 
determination of  equivalence are set out in Annex IV to the SPS chapter, while 
Annex V lists areas where the parties have agreed there is equivalence. One 
function of  the CETA Joint Management Committee for SPS Measures is to 
prepare and maintain a document detailing the state of  discussions between the 
parties on their work on recognizing the equivalence of  specific SPS measures. 
A Protocol on the Mutual Recognition of  the Compliance and Enforcement 
Programme regarding Good Manufacturing Practices for Pharmaceutical 
Products provides for the determination of  the equivalence of  regulatory 
authorities that certify compliance with these practices. Annex II (on Medicinal 
Products or Drugs) of  the protocol lists products for which the parties have 
agreed that their requirements and compliance programs are equivalent.168
The CETA chapter on regulatory cooperation creates an entry point with respect 
to greater use of  regulatory equivalence among like-minded countries, but puts 
little emphasis on the use of  equivalence as a way to reduce regulatory differences 
and costs. Indeed, the chapter, while laying out a rather long illustrative list 
of  possible cooperation activities, does not mention “equivalence” in Articles 
X.4, X.5 or X.7. Article X.4.18 does call for identifying approaches to reduce 
the adverse effects of  existing regulatory differences on trade, including “when 
appropriate, through greater convergence, mutual recognition, minimising 
the use of  trade distorting regulatory instruments, and use of  international 
standards,” but the activities listed in these articles focus on transparency and 
data and information sharing. 
Even though CETA goes further than the TPP on regulatory cooperation, it 
arguably does little to reflect the changes in the way international trade is now 
organized. More rapid progress in attenuating the trade-cost effects of  different 
regulatory policies might be realized by creating processes and institutional 
16 See http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/28.
aspx?lang=eng. Some mention of  regulatory equivalence also occurs in the chapter on financial services, a sector 
where the approach has been pursued internationally for some time; see, for example, Verdier (2011). The chapter 
permits Canadian institutions to provide portfolio management services to EU professional clients on a cross-border 
basis (that is, without having to establish in the EU) once the European Commission has adopted the equivalence 
decision related to portfolio management (EU prudential requirements will still apply).
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mechanisms that take a broader value chain perspective (Hoekman, 2015 a). 
Concrete initiatives to reduce the costs of  redundant regulatory requirements 
and processes must be policy specific — that is, they must involve the type 
of  cooperation called for in CETA and that is already being pursued in the 
Canada-US Regulatory Cooperation Council. But missing from current 
approaches are cross-cutting, supply chain-informed deliberative mechanisms 
that focus on a broad range of  policies that affect trade costs and that provide 
a framework for regulatory cooperation to improve the competitiveness and 
efficiency of  industry – two goals that Canada and the European Union 
set for themselves in CETA (DFATD, 2014, Chapter 26, Article X.3d) 
(Hoekman, 2015a). 
Reducing the Negative Trade Effects of Behind- 
the-Border Regulation
Regulatory measures generally fulfil a specific social or economic purpose, 
even if  the effect is to restrict trade. Addressing possible trade-reducing 
(distorting) effects of  regulation requires first an understanding of  the effects 
of  prevailing (proposed) policies. Many desirable reforms will not require 
actions by other governments (trading partners), but regulatory cooperation 
may help in identifying what such reforms should seek to do and increase 
the effectiveness and efficiency of  regulation. Trade agreements may help by 
mobilizing and sustaining political attention and thereby overcome resistance 
by vested interests and incentivize regulatory bodies to give more of  a priority 
to actions that reduce the negative trade impacts of  regulation. 
As already discussed, trade agreements are geared towards the negotiation 
of  enforceable policy commitments. Binding disciplines reduce uncertainty 
for traders who know that the dispute settlement mechanism can be used to 
ensure that governments live up to what they sign on to. A precondition for 
agreement on binding international rules is a shared recognition that the 
negative spillovers associated with a policy (or set of  policies) are significant and 
that a proposed set of  (enforceable) disciplines will result in greater efficiency 
(lower costs).  Such an understanding exists when it comes to tariffs and related 
border barriers, but much less so when it comes to domestic regulatory policies. 
It is important to recognize that trade agreements may not have a “comparative 
advantage” in supporting effective cooperation between regulators, even if  
trade negotiators have the best of  intentions. The public backlash against 
TTIP in the European Union has largely been driven by concerns that 
greater integration of  the transatlantic marketplace may result in an erosion 
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of  regulatory regimes in areas that are of  great importance to significant 
segments of  the EU population – such as the use of  genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) and specific food standards. Regulatory cooperation is likely 
to be more easily pursued if  it involves a bottom-up process that is driven by 
regulatory agencies, as opposed to being imposed top down as an element of  
a trade agreement. A useful prescription in this regard is to apply the principle 
“first, do no harm” and to concentrate on incorporating measures in trade 
agreements that can be defended as improving the ability of  regulators to do 
their job better. That is, the aim should be empowerment of  regulatory bodies 
rather than imposing restrictions on them (or being seen to be doing so even 
if  that is not the intention). 
From a trade perspective, international cooperation on regulation arguably 
should center on improving the transparency of  applied policies; supporting 
analysis of  the trade (and investment) effects of  specific types of  regulation; 
giving regulators a mandate that encourages (permits) them to design 
regulations that do not unnecessarily restrict trade; and doing more to ensure 
that the process of  international standards-setting and norms-setting  occurs 
with greater attention given to the potential trade impacts. Measures taken by 
the trade community to achieve these objectives should not affect the ability 
of  regulators to do their job. 
Transparency. This is a core feature and function of  the WTO. The 
regular work of  the TBT and SPS Committees, including notifications and 
the opportunity to raise specific concerns, can be emulated in other areas of  
regulation. Here an obvious area to prioritize are services and regulations 
that impact on the ability of  firms to supply and consumers to buy products 
that are connected to/use “the cloud” (data localization requirements, etc.) 
The relevant GATS bodies have not ignored issues of  domestic regulation 
(see above), but much more could be done to map out the policies that WTO 
Members are pursuing. The recent joint venture with the World Bank to 
maintain and update a database on services trade policies – the Services Trade 
Restrictiveness Indicators (STRI) – is a good first step, but this is mostly limited 
to policies that are discriminatory and do not cover domestic regulation. It is 
unlikely that this can rely only on notifications – it will require a pro-active 
effort by the WTO Secretariat, working with other international organizations.
Much greater transparency is also needed as regards PTAs. Insofar as PTAs 
give rise to innovative approaches to attenuate the market-segmenting effects of  
differences in regulatory policies, they can help all countries identify approaches 
that can usefully be emulated. All WTO Members have a strong interest in 
understanding what PTAs end up doing and achieving. Documenting and 
analyzing the approaches that are implemented by PTAs to reduce regulatory 
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barriers would not only improve transparency per se, but can also inform a 
process of  learning about what works and what does not and perhaps identify 
specific features of  cooperation in PTAs that might be multilateralized. There 
have been some moves in this direction on an ad hoc basis; for example, 
the GATS Working Party on Domestic Regulation conducted a dedicated 
discussion on domestic regulation in regional trade agreements in 2014. 
Learning: analysis and deliberation.  As noted previously, there is often 
relatively little, if  any, effort by national regulators and international standards-
setting bodies to consider the trade impacts of  regulatory requirements and 
alternative approaches that might have less negative effects while not impacting 
on the probability that regulatory objectives will be realized. There is also 
arguably more that can be done to understand how the universe of  regulatory 
measures maps into the categories defined in Table 1 and the potential efficacy 
of  the different types of  international regulatory cooperation summarized in 
Table 2. There would appear to be significant scope to use the WTO bodies 
that already have a mandate to discuss regulatory policies (TBT, SPS, services) 
to commission analysis of  trade effects and to engage more regularly with 
the business community in discussions aimed at identifying where greater 
effort to pursue regulatory cooperation – which need not occur through the 
WTO – could have a significant impact on trade costs. Currently there is 
too little scope for engagement with the business community within WTO 
bodies. There is more attention for this in recent (mega-)PTAs, but even there 
the extent to which business is part of  regulatory deliberation is too limited 
(Hoekman, 2015b). 
Give regulators a mandate to consider trade effects. A simple yet 
powerful change that WTO and PTA members could seek to achieve is to 
agree that the regulatory process should include an assessment of  trade effects 
– perhaps as part of  broader regulatory impact assessments that are generally 
considered to be an element of  good practice. This is already “on the table” in 
the deliberations on a voluntary code of  good practice in the TBT Committee. 
If   no consensus can be achieved there – and given that in other areas of  
regulation, this agenda is not “on the table” – one way proponents could 
consider moving forward on this is through a plurilateral agreement (see below). 
In order to increase the prospects that such assessments are made, regulatory 
agencies should be provided with the necessary (financial) resources so that 
such an effort would not crowd out (or be seen to crowd out) other activities. 
Incorporation of  “trade effects assessment” language in trade agreements 
is in itself  an instrument through which regulatory agencies can lay claim 
on additional resources from the government that are needed to fulfil the 
commitment.
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Engaging with international standards-setting bodies. More 
generally, there is a clear case for more regular interaction with international 
regulatory bodies. Again this is something that already occurs on an ad hoc 
basis. For example, representatives of  the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, the Financial Stability Board, the International Association of  
Insurance Supervisors and the International Organizations of  Securities 
Commissions have been invited periodically by the GATS Committee on 
Trade and Financial Services to present recent developments in the area of  
international regulatory norms and initiatives in the financial sector and discuss 
possible implications for trade in financial services. However, this is largely 
limited to one-way information transmission. What would arguably make a 
difference is a greater effort by WTO Members – who are all represented in 
international standards-setting bodies – to include a focus on the trade effects 
of  new international norms and standards. 
Club Formation Under WTO Auspices?
Going beyond greater transparency, analysis and interacting with international 
standards-setting bodies, at the level of  the WTO consideration should be 
given to facilitating small-group cooperation on regulatory policies under the 
umbrella of  the WTO. There are two alternative mechanisms for Members 
to form clubs on an issue-specific agenda of  common interest: conclusion 
of  a Plurilateral Agreement (PA) under Article II.3 WTO, and so-called 
critical mass agreements (CMAs). CMAs are agreements in which negotiated 
disciplines apply to only a subset of  countries, but benefits are extended on 
a most-favored nation (MFN) basis. Examples include initiatives such as the 
Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and other so-called “zero-for-zero” 
agreements in which a group of  countries agree to eliminate tariffs for a specific 
set of  products. There are also CMAs for services, for example, on basic 
telecommunications and on financial services under the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services.  PAs differ from CMAs in that they may be applied on a 
discriminatory basis – that is, benefits need not be extended to non-signatories. 
There are currently two PAs incorporated into the WTO: the Agreement on 
Civil Aircraft and the Agreement on Government Procurement.
PAs and CMAs differ from PTAs in important respects. WTO rules require 
that PTAs cover substantially all trade in goods and/or have substantial sectoral 
coverage of  services. In contrast, CMAs and PAs can be issue specific. PTAs 
tend to be closed clubs – most PTAs do not include an accession clause. 
Those PTAs that do allow for accession often restrict it to countries in a 
specific geographic region. This helps explain the proliferation of  PTAs – a 
new agreement often tends to be negotiated between members of  any given 
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PTA and a non-member, because it is not possible for a non-member to join 
an existing regional trade agreement. CMAs and PAs, in contrast, are open 
in the sense that in principle any WTO Member can join if  it wants to and is 
able to satisfy whatever disciplines are embodied in the agreement.
There are good reasons for attempting to do more via CMAs and PAs 
(Lawrence, 2006). As discussed by Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015), CMAs 
and PAs cannot reduce the welfare of  any country, including those that decide 
not to join, because CMAs apply on an MFN basis and PAs must be approved 
by the WTO Membership as a whole. PTAs are reviewed by the WTO, but 
there is no sanctioning of  their content; the process is limited to the supply 
of  information. CMAs and PAs are more transparent as they involve formal 
scheduling of  commitments by signatories and, in the case of  PAs, regular 
reporting on activities to the WTO Membership as a whole. They imply less 
dispersion in rules and approaches – and thus transactions costs and trade 
diversion – than PTAs. Indeed, they offer a way to multilateralize elements of  
what may be covered in PTAs. Multiple PTAs dealing with the same subject 
matter often do so in ways that imply that the rules of  the game for firms differ 
depending on the PTA that applies for a given trade flow. 
There is no formal constraint on the ability of  a club of  WTO Members 
to pursue CMAs that involve deepening of  disciplines on policies that are 
already subject to WTO rules, as long as they are willing to apply these on 
an MFN basis (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2016b). There is, however, a major 
constraint that impedes the feasibility of  pursuing new PAs under WTO 
auspices: incorporation of  a PA into the WTO requires unanimity “exclusively 
by consensus.”17 This is a major disincentive for countries to pursue this 
type of  cooperation. Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015; 2016b) suggest that 
WTO Members set up a task force on a code of  conduct for new plurilateral 
agreements that apply to and benefit only signatories and consider replicating a 
GATS provision permitting WTO Members to make additional commitments 
in the GATT, so as to facilitate the negotiation of  new CMAs that deal with 
regulatory policies that affect trade in goods. Such codes would establish the 
basic principles that new club-based agreements should satisfy to be consistent 
with the principles of  the multilateral trading system, as well as substantive 
criteria for the rejection of  proposals to pursue such cooperation under WTO 
auspices. 
17 See Article X.9 of  the Agreement Establishing the WTO.
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Concluding Remarks
The gradual reduction of  tariffs as part of  a more general process to open 
economies to international trade and investment flows, in conjunction with 
technological changes that are permitting the digitization of  products and 
increasing the share of  services in global production, have greatly increased 
the impacts of  differences in domestic regulation of  products and production 
processes. The future international trade agenda is likely to become largely 
a regulatory agenda, the challenge being to devise mechanisms to reduce the 
costs of  differences in regulatory regimes while at the same time ensuring that 
this does not erode the likelihood of  attaining the regulatory objectives that 
have been established by the polities of  countries that engage in trade.  
In principle, regulatory cooperation may bolster the ability of  regulators to 
attain regulatory objectives if  it is designed with that objective in mind. Indeed, 
in practice this is likely to be a necessary condition for cooperation to be feasible. 
A key question for governments is whether trade agreements are a useful 
instrument to guide regulatory cooperation and if  so, how regulatory matters 
should be addressed in trade agreements. In some areas, such as technical 
regulation of  products, there are now well-established and reasonably effective 
mechanisms in the WTO through which the potential negative externalities 
of  differences in standards can be identified, discussed and attenuated. In 
many other areas of  regulation – such as prudential regulation of  services, 
“private standards” systems that apply to international production processes, 
or standards of  protection of  worker rights and the environment – WTO 
members have yet to put in place such mechanisms. The same is largely true of  
PTAs – while there is much discussion of  new vintage PTAs as instruments for 
regulatory convergence, to date steps to address such matters have been limited. 
Neither PTAs such as the TPP nor the WTO engage on the substance of  
regulatory norms – the focus is on the trade-impeding effects of  differences 
in regulatory standards. Cooperation on substantive norms – international 
standardization – is left to specialized bodies in which regulators interact. 
These bodies tend to be technical and focused on defining the means to 
achieve specific regulatory objectives (health, safety, etc.). They generally do 
not consider the potential impacts on trade. One role that the WTO could 
play looking forward is doing more to ensure that international regulatory 
efforts consider trade effects when developing new international norms. More 
generally, the WTO (and trade agreements more generally) could be used 
as a focal point for encouraging regulators to interact with each other and 
to consider cooperation that enhances their joint ability to attain regulatory 
objectives at lower cost. The suggestions made above regarding the form 
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this could take illustrate the potential positive role that trade agreements 
can play. Whether they will be pursued depends importantly on the stance 
taken by international business. A necessary condition is strong advocacy by 
international business for greater engagement by governments in the WTO 
to address negative regulatory spillovers.
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CHAPTER 6 
The WTO’s Next Work Program –  
as if the Crisis Really Mattered
Simon J. Evenett and Johannes Fritz1
University of St. Gallen
Introduction
Typing the words “WTO stress test protectionism” into Google reveals that 
many in the official community claim that the WTO succeeded in preventing 
the widespread resort to protectionism since the onset of  the global economic 
crisis. If, indeed, the multilateral trading system has done so well, then put 
the champagne on ice and the future work program of  the WTO can address 
other matters.
Of  course, there are many reasons why certain officials may find it convenient 
to downplay the significance of  crisis-era distortions to global commerce. Some 
may have been persuaded by the findings of  the limited WTO monitoring 
exercise on protectionism. This is not the place to detail the flaws in such 
official monitoring (see the relevant chapters in the 16th and 18th reports of  the 
Global Trade Alert). Others may suspect that beggar-thy-neighbor activity is 
far greater than officially admitted but fear that public recognition of  this fact 
could trigger a wave of  retaliation. What such fears say about the robustness 
of  the current WTO system is worth pondering.
Some business associations – such as the International Chamber of  
Commerce and the B20 – have not been afraid to speak about against crisis-
1 The authors of  this chapter are associated with the Global Trade Alert (GTA) initiative, the independent trade policy 
monitoring initiative that is run under the auspices of  the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), of  which 
Evenett is the Co-Director of  its International Trade and Regional Economics Programme.  The reports of  the GTA, 
which provide far more data than are presented here, can be accessed at http://www.globaltradealert.org/analysis. 
Comments received at a session of  the Evian Group in December 2015 were much appreciated.
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era protectionism and, if  their reports are anything to go by, are less sanguine 
than official assessments. In recent years particular attention has been given 
to far-reaching export restrictions (recall the Chinese Rare Earth case), to 
state-owned and state-controlled firms, and to the spread of  “localization” 
measures, the latter not just relating to trade in goods but also to cross-border 
data flows. That many business associations have supported the negotiation 
of  disciplines in mega-trade deals that go beyond those found in WTO rules 
probably implies some dissatisfaction with the latter. 
For the most part, when it comes to crisis-era protectionism, academics have 
been sorely behind the curve. In an age when data are downloaded rather than 
collected, most academic studies have confined themselves to datasets that were 
available before the crisis. In effect, this has meant that many studies examine 
only the impact of  tariff increases and trade defense and safeguard measures. 
Other distortions to 21st century commerce tend not to be considered. Given 
that trade defense measures are the minnows of  international trade policy, 
it is not terribly surprising that these measures have been shown to have cut 
trade by little during the crisis era.2 Much theoretical analysis of  the WTO 
makes little reference to actual policy choice – indeed, it is almost as if  the 
crisis never happened. If  academic writing is anything to go by, there is little 
to learn from the crisis era for the next work program of  the WTO.
If, indeed, policymakers conclude that the crisis era has few implications 
for the future development of  the multilateral trading system, then this 
will represent a departure from the pattern observed after previous global 
economic contractions. The formation of  the GATT was said to have been 
influenced by the beggar-thy-neighbor activity witnessed during the Great 
Depression. Similarly, the pervasive use of  voluntary export restraints during 
the sharp global downturn of  the early 1980s led to their banning as part of  the 
Uruguay Round agreements. In both instances there were enough analysts and 
policymakers that recognized the deficiencies in existing multilateral trading 
arrangements. Will this time be different?
In this chapter we summarize the evidence on the resort to discrimination 
against foreign commercial interests that has been collected by the Global 
Trade Alert initiative, with which we are associated. Furthermore, in preparing 
this chapter we have computed the share of  the G20’s exports that face 
different types of  discriminatory policies. We discuss the evolution of  these 
trade coverage ratios since 2009 and then reveal which policies affect relatively 
more of  global commerce. 
2 In this chapter we will confirm that the trade covered by trade defence and safeguard measures is a tiny percentage 
of  world trade. No disagreement on this matter.
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All in all, the data presented here point to a world trading system that is not 
holding the line against protectionism, especially against the distortions to 
global commerce that are not well disciplined by WTO rules. The best that 
can be said about existing WTO rules is that they have channeled protectionist 
pressure into policy instruments subject to weaker or no multilateral disciplines.
It is said that, in two speeches in 1959 and 1960, President Kennedy noted 
that in Chinese the word “crisis” is represented by two symbols, one for danger 
and another for opportunity. Having spelt out the former, we conclude our 
chapter with the latter – describing how a future WTO work program could 
be influenced by what has been learnt about government policy choice since 
the onset of  the global economic crisis in 2008.
We should be clear about what this chapter is not about. This chapter does 
not provide an explanation to account for the timing and form of  crisis-
era discrimination against foreign commercial interests. Readers interested 
in this matter are referred to Evenett (2015). Nor does this chapter estimate 
the impact of  crisis-era protectionism. For an analysis of  the impact of  such 
protectionism on the exports of  the Least Developed Countries, see Evenett 
and Fritz (2015a). For more information on national resort to protectionism 
and liberalisation during the crisis era, readers are referred to the reports of  
the Global Trade Alert (GTA).
Monitoring Discrimination
Several considerations need to be borne in mind when monitoring the resort 
to discrimination against foreign commercial interests by governments during 
a systemic economic crisis. First, governments have many policy instruments 
available to them, including those not subject to WTO rules. Second, the 
rationale for crisis-era policy initiatives may on paper have nothing to do with 
seeking commercial advantage yet, inadvertently or by design, these initiatives 
may discriminate against foreign commercial interests. 
Third, governments can obscure, hide or delay the publication of  the details 
of  discriminatory measures, not least to avoid being labelled “protectionist.” 
Fourth, in the 21st century, there are many more forms of  cross-border 
commerce than traditional trade in goods, widening the range of  policies of  
relevance to any monitoring exercise. Fifth, the financial origins of  the most 
recent global economic crisis raise the possibility that the allocation of  finance 
becomes another tool for state discrimination against foreign commercial 
interests.
100    Future of the Global Trade Order
For of  all of  these reasons, when monitoring discrimination by governments it 
makes sense to focus on changes in the relative treatment of  domestic versus 
foreign rivals, rather than confine information collection to a pre-specified 
set of  policy instruments. History shows that the most prominent form of  
discrimination changes with each global economic crisis (tariff increases and 
competitive devaluations in the 1930s, and voluntary export restraints in the 
1980s). So best to keep an open mind as to what form discrimination may take. 
Another implication of  the foregoing considerations is that information 
about the incidence and extent of  discrimination against foreign commercial 
interests is available with a lag. Consequently, although the Global Trade 
Alert team looks for current instances of  discrimination (and for that matter, 
liberalization), when information about government initiatives from earlier 
years becomes available then this is added to our database. At this writing, a 
total of  7,952 government measures that have been announced or implemented 
since November 2008 have been documented by the GTA team.3 In the past 
two years approximately 2,000 measures have been documented per year, 
substantially expanding the database. The GTA’s coverage is global.4
Figures 1 and 2 highlight the perils of  ignoring publication lags. Figure 1 is 
based on the data available as of  the end of  November 2015. Consequently, 
the GTA team has had six years to document discrimination undertaken in 
2009 and only 11 months to document policies undertaken during 2015. 
Without knowing this, one might erroneously conclude that resort to beggar-
thy-neighbor activity has fallen after its 2013 surge. In fact, if  our experience 
is anything to go by, the first published totals for a particular year are revised 
upward significantly over time.
In addition to tracking the annual totals, it is also helpful to report the 
total number of  measures documented for each year at the same point in 
the reporting cycle. Figure 2 reports the total number of  liberalizing and 
discriminatory measures implemented in a given year that were reported by 
31 October of  that year. This particular date was chosen as it refers to the 
information available before the end-of-year G20 summits.
3 In comparison the WTO’s Trade Monitoring Database, which has at present 3,203 entries. That database can be 
accessed at http://tmdb.wto.org/.
4 Further details on the approach used by the GTA team to identify, investigate and document crisis-era policy change 
can be found in Evenett and Fritz (2015a: 17-19).
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Figure 1: Annual resort to discriminatory measures varies a lot
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Figure 2: Correcting for publication lags matters – since 2012 there has been a 
surge in discriminatory and liberalizing measures implemented
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The worrying finding in Figure 2 is that there has been a surge in the number of  
discriminatory measures implemented and documented from 2012 on. Some 
observers have wondered if  that surge is the result of  better monitoring on the 
part of  the GTA team. Flattering as that may be, it is unlikely that the team 
has improved its productivity by over 150% since 2012. The implication being 
that the uptick in resort to discrimination since 2012 is real. While the number 
of  liberalizing measures has grown too in recent years, the gap between the 
totals for discriminatory measures and liberalizing measures has grown. Any 
notion that beggar-thy-neighbor action has been tamed or was confined to 
earlier in the crisis should be set aside. Best not put that champagne on ice.
Using a conservative methodology, for each measure the GTA team identifies 
the trading partners affected, should the measure in question be implemented. 
It is then possible to track over time how frequently a jurisdiction’s commercial 
interests have been harmed by the discriminatory measures implemented by 
its trading partners. These totals have been plotted in Figure 3 for China, the 
28 members of  the European Union, the United States, India, and the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). In each case the cumulative number of  hits to 
their commercial interests keeps rising. Ministers may want to bear this in 
mind should they receive advice from officials and international organizations 
to discount crisis-era protectionism. These hits to commercial interests harm 
firms, employees, shareholders, owners of  intellectual property and (where 
relevant) nationals working abroad.
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Figure 3: No sign that harm to commercial interests is abating
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Having described the frequency of  harm to commercial interests and, contrary 
to some official wisdom, having shown that discrimination against foreign 
commercial interests wasn’t a contained spasm at the beginning of  the crisis, 
we now turn to most popular forms of  crisis-era protectionism.
The Most Prevalent Forms of Protectionism Used Since 
the Crisis Began
Before the recent global economic crisis, the stylized fact was that trade defense 
and safeguard measures were the principal form of  discrimination used by 
governments (mainly in industrialized countries) to manage pressure for relief  
from global competition. Many developing countries still had plenty of  leeway 
to raise tariffs without breaching WTO bindings. 
As a result of  the frequent use of  these particular policy instruments, datasets 
on their use were collected and discussed. In the light of  this, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the initial instinct of  many analysts when the crisis hit was 
to check if  resort to these relatively transparent and more traditional policy 
instruments increased.
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Figure 4: The crisis-era is dominated by murky protectionism – more so in recent 
years
59.5
55.3
49.6
56.0
58.4 59.0
63.4
0
25
50
75
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f d
is
cr
im
in
at
or
y 
m
ea
su
re
s 
im
po
se
d 
th
at
 a
re
 
no
t t
ar
iﬀ
 in
cr
ea
se
s,
 tr
ad
e 
de
fe
nc
e,
 o
r s
af
eg
ua
rd
s
It turns out, however, that much of  the discrimination against foreign 
commercial interests undertaken by governments during the crisis era did 
not involve resort to trade defense or tariffs (see Table 1 for the top 10 most 
used discriminatory policy instruments and Figure 4 for the resort to other – 
murkier – forms of  protectionism).
For sure, trade defense and safeguard measures are the most popular measure, 
but only just. Bailouts and other subsidies (unrelated to exporting) come a close 
second. Together, trade defense, safeguards and tariff increases represent less 
than half  of  the discriminatory measures employed in every year except 2011 
(the crisis-era year with the least protectionism). Furthermore, the proportion 
of  discrimination that is murky has grown since 2011 from one half  to just 
under two-thirds, suggesting that governments are finding it more appealing to 
resort to discriminatory policies that tend to receive less attention from many 
analysts and international organizations.
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The degree to which existing WTO obligations restrict government choices 
of  the 10 policy instruments listed in Table 1 varies considerably. Many 
countries have applied tariffs close to their permitted bindings, while plenty 
of  countries do not. Not every WTO Member is a member of  the Agreement 
on Government Procurement and, even if  they are, a national or subnational 
government may still retain considerable latitude to discriminate. Most limits 
on the use of  export taxes and restrictions apply to recently acceded members. 
Provisions on investment policies and resort to localization measures can be 
found in the GATS and TRIMS agreements, respectively, but this does not 
seem to have stopped their widespread discriminatory use during the crisis era. 
It would seem there is plenty of  room for tightening up multilateral trade rules.
The Extent of G20 Exports Facing Crisis-era 
Protectionism
One reaction to the evidence in the previous two sections has been to dismiss it 
as merely referring to counts of  measures. What about the scale of  commerce 
potentially affected? As noted earlier, it is well known that the amounts of  trade 
subject to trade defense investigations are typically small (although the 2012-
2013 dispute between the European Union and China over solar panels was 
a notable, €20 billion exception). In the absence of  any Smoot-Hawley tariff 
increases by any of  the major trading powers, so the argument goes, surely 
the amount of  trade affected is trivial?
In preparation of  this chapter we have calculated the share of  G20 exports that 
either face a discriminatory policy instrument in a foreign market, compete 
with a subsidized foreign rival in its home market, or compete with a foreign 
rival that has received state incentives to export to a third market. We only 
consider measures that have been implemented since November 2008. 
In 2014 the G20 nations exported just under US$11 trillion of  goods, covering 
a substantial share of  world trade. It is important to bear in mind that a 2% 
trade coverage ratio implies that $218 billion of  trade was potentially affected 
in 2014. Of  course, the G20 is not the world, and trade in goods is only one 
form of  cross-border commerce. Both limitations imply that the estimated 
scale of  trade affected presented here will be underestimates.
We used product-level (technically, 4-digit HS codes) data on trade flows in 
preparing these calculations. For every discriminatory measure, we took account 
of  the products implicated by that measure, the government responsible for 
that measure and the known trading partners for the product in question. 
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As trade flows tend to react to discriminatory measures, we used pre-crisis 
trade data (for 2005-2007) to weight each trade flow once the crisis began. 
We even took account of  when measures were enacted in a year. For example, 
if  a measure lasted for only two months during a year, we discounted the 
annual trade flow affected by 10/12ths to reflect the fact that for 10 months 
the measure was not in force.
Figure 5 reports the percentage of  G20 exports that faced import tariff 
increases, trade defense and safeguard actions, localization requirements and 
discriminatory public procurement measures during the years 2009 to 2015. In 
addition, the figure shows the percentage of  G20 exports that had to compete 
in the home market of  a foreign firm that had been bailed out. 
The 2009 surge in protectionism resulted in over 5% of  G20 exports competing 
against a bailed-out firm in its home market and over 4% of  G20 exports 
involved shipments of  products to foreign destinations where “buy national” 
public procurement provisions were in effect. Smaller percentages of  G20 
exports faced higher tariffs in 2009. These totals were to rise, however. By 
2015 over 10% of  G20 exports, an amount that exceeds $1 trillion dollars in 
trade, compete with firms that have been bailed out during the crisis or have 
faced tariff increases.
In line with the WTO monitoring reports,5 we find the amount of  trade covered 
by trade defense and safeguard measures to be small, relatively speaking. We 
estimate that localization requirements affected $339 billion of  trade in 2014, 
a sizeable amount for a measure that in the eyes of  many analysts had been 
banned by the TRIMS agreement.
5 The “headline” trade coverage ratios that are found in the WTO’s monitoring reports cover only a narrow range 
of  import restrictions. The WTO computes these ratios for the G20 countries, as we have. The contrast between our 
totals and the official numbers indicate how misleading the latter are.
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Figure 5: The shares of G20 exports facing tariff increases and having to 
compete with bailed out firms in their home markets has risen markedly
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The amount of  trade covered by the trade restrictions identified in Figure 5 
and that competes in the home markets of  bailed-out firms, however, pales 
in significance to that covered by state-provided export incentives. As Table 
1 shows, the BRICS nations made frequent use of  export incentives. Most of  
these incentives operate through national tax systems (some of  the most far-
reaching are related to value added taxes, but some are not). Such incentives 
can force rivals to lower prices, shrinking profit margins and diminishing the 
incentive to export in the first place. Moreover, uncertainty over the size of  
such export incentives can deter foreign rivals.
The full extent of  G20 exports facing subsidized competitors is revealed 
in Figure 6. As nations have progressively expanded the range of  products 
eligible for export incentives, the percentage of  G20 exports competing against 
subsidized rivals in third markets has expanded to 84% in 2015, rising 36 
percentage points in just six years. 
In sum, in terms of  scale, crisis-era discrimination against foreign commercial 
interests is more about export expansion than import contraction. Having said 
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that, even if  export incentives are excluded, 28% of  G20 exports currently 
face some type of  trade distortion introduced since the crisis began. The long-
held principle of  non-discrimination has taken a battering during the crisis 
era and the latest data available suggest that there is no end in sight (Evenett 
and Fritz, 2015b).
Figure 6: The percentage of G20 exports that face competition from subsidised 
rivals in third markets has risen 30 points in just six years
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As 2015 has progressed, more evidence has come to light of  the importance of  
state competition in the provision of  export incentives. The prolonged haggling 
in the US Congress concerning the reauthorization of  the US Export-Import 
Bank is well known. It should not be forgotten too that France and the United 
Kingdom took advantage of  this situation to lure production and jobs by US 
multinational General Electric. The CEO of  General Electric, Mr. Jeff Immelt, 
went on record with the following statement:6
6 See http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/24/ct-ge-idUSnBw245620a+100+BSW20150924. See also https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-welcomes-export-framework-with-general-electric.
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“In today’s competitive environment, countries that have a functional 
Export Credit Agency (ECA) will attract investment...Export finance 
is a critical tool we use to support our customers. Without it, we can’t 
compete against foreign competitors who enjoy ECA financing from 
their governments. We are fortunate to have the support of  UK Export 
Finance (UKEF), one of  the most flexible ECAs in the world. The UK 
is pro-export and pro-manufacturing.” 
The expansion in recent years in various forms of  support for exporters 
has been documented by the Financial Times.7 Given the range of  support 
documented in that article, the assumption that export finance necessarily 
corrects for market failures ought to be revisited.
In the interest of  balance, it should be noted that certain developing countries 
have not just been expanding their export incentives but also improving the 
implementation of  existing schemes so as pay exporters more. A leading 
example comes from China. At a press conference at the State Council on July 
17th, 2015, Mr. Wang Shouwen, Vice-Minister of  Commerce for China, stated:
“During January to June, China’s volume of  export tax rebates has 
increased 12.4 percent over the same period last year, which is far higher 
than the growth of  export volumes and has greatly boosted the growth 
of  foreign trade exports.”8 
Practitioners and analysts of  the world trading system who are committed 
to the principle of  non-discrimination ought to be critical of  every deviation 
from this norm. It is unfortunate that the term “protectionism” has long 
been associated with reducing imports. This may well have created a blind 
spot towards measures that artificially favor domestic firms when they export 
products to third markets. 
Ironically, this evidence comes to the fore as WTO Members at their 
Ministerial Conference in December 2015 agreed to eliminate, once and for 
all, agricultural export subsidies. If  one can accept the argument that subsidy 
wars in agriculture are wasteful, then what makes other export incentives any 
different? Having written this, it would be wrong to infer that revising the 
WTO’s subsidy code is the only lesson from the global economic crisis. 
7 See http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fe1a26be-1be1-11e5-8201-cbdb03d71480.html.
8 See http://english.gov.cn/news/policy_briefings/2015/07/17/content_281475148824853.htm.
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Implications for the Future Work Program of the WTO
Coming on top of  the decade-and-a-half  long struggle over the Doha Round, 
the global economic crisis has exposed further deficiencies in the operation 
of  the WTO. Since this is a member-driven organization, it would not be 
appropriate that the WTO Secretariat shoulder all of  blame. The latter is 
not immune, however, from criticism – its weak monitoring of  protectionism 
has provided cover for those diplomats and officials that are not committed 
to the principles of  non-discrimination. From the point of  view of  global 
governance, if  the WTO Secretariat feels it is unable to effectively monitor 
its Member governments, then consideration should be given to assigning this 
role to another official institution.
Moreover, the mismatch between the extensive resort to discrimination against 
foreign commercial interests and the limited number of  disputes brought to 
the WTO for settlement, begs further questions. If  the discrimination is legal, 
then do existing WTO rules provide for such little constraint on government 
behavior? If  the discrimination is illegal, why are so few cases brought? Could 
a “glass houses syndrome” exist whereby “people who live in glass houses don’t 
throw stones”? Is the counterpart to the mutual indiscipline over protectionism 
mutual restraint in bringing dispute settlement cases? If  so, a key weakness 
of  the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding – namely, that only WTO 
Members can bring cases – needs to be addressed.9 Otherwise, even with the 
best possible rule book, WTO obligations could be effectively suspended when 
a systemic crisis motivates major trading powers to simultaneously introduce 
discrimination against foreign commercial interests.10
The finding that another global economic crisis has brought to the fore 
prominent forms of  protectionism not seen much in previous crises reflects the 
incentives created by an incomplete WTO rule book. Tighter rules on subsidies, 
localization requirements, and trade finance are needed. An ambitious WTO 
work program would also include negotiating new rules on export taxes and 
expanding the reach of  the Agreement on Government Procurement. The 
considerable leeway many governments have to raise tariffs without breaking 
their WTO obligations is another matter that could be addressed as part of  
a package of  reforms.
9 In the European Union, for example, the European Commission – acting in its role as “guardian of  the treaties” – 
can bring legal cases against member states before the European Court of  Justice.
10 This may be the most significant lesson from the global economic crisis for the governance of  world trade. There are 
strong complementarities between fixing the WTO rule book and strengthening its dispute settlement function. Put 
differently, the benefits from improving one are conditional in part on improving the other.
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Of  course, it is always possible to put together a wish list of  items for the 
WTO Membership to work on. However, the purpose of  this exercise was 
to demonstrate that the recent global economic crisis has revealed significant 
deficiencies in the edifice of  WTO rules. Making an effort to remedy their 
weaknesses – and bearing in mind the different types of  cross-border commerce 
witnessed in the first quarter of  the 21st century – ought to be a priority for 
the WTO Membership. There is plenty to be getting on with.11
In sum, once one accepts that there has been considerable resort to 
discrimination against foreign commercial interests during the crisis era, 
then a series of  awkward questions arises concerning the effectiveness of  
the multilateral trading system. These questions relate to the full range of  
the WTO’s functions – going well beyond a minor tidying up exercise. Many 
national and international institutions have been thoroughly overhauled after 
their deficiencies were exposed during the global economic crisis – the World 
Trade Organization should be no exception.  
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CHAPTER 7 
Regional Trade Agreements  
and the WTO
Clemens Boonekamp1
IDEAS Centre, Geneva
Introduction
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are negotiated modalities for trade between 
two or more customs territories,2 to the exclusion of  others.3 By their nature, 
members of  RTAs seek to grant trade preferences to each other, usually in 
the form of  access to their markets, thus discriminating against non-members. 
Members of  RTAs need not be geographically contiguous, or even close to each 
other; all that is needed is that they agree on arrangements for trade between 
themselves. RTAs have always dealt with reciprocal tariff reductions, but they 
are now increasingly complex, often with provisions for, inter alia, customs 
administration, standards, safeguards, services regulations, intellectual property 
and dispute settlement; some extend to competition, investment, labor and 
environment policies.
RTAs are a sub-set of  preferential trade agreements (PTAs).  These also include 
arrangements under which countries or customs territories unilaterally grant 
non-reciprocal trade preferences to other trading partners. Chief  amongst 
these is the Generalized System of  Preferences (GSP), under which (mainly 
developed) countries grant preferential tariff access for imports from developing 
1 I thank staff of  the RTA Section at the WTO, including Rohini Acharya, Jo-Ann Crawford and Maria Doner Abreu; 
their advice was invaluable but the mistakes are mine.
2 Normally these are countries, but I have used the phrase “customs territories” to include entities such as Hong Kong, 
China, and Macao, China – which are separate customs areas from China, each with their own trade policies – and 
to include a set of  nations that collectively have a single trading identity, such as the European Union.
3 The term “regional trade agreement” is a bit of  a misnomer, in that they are often not regional; traditionally, the 
WTO uses the term for such arrangements.
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countries, with each GSP “donor” maintaining its own list of  preferences and 
conditions under which the “recipients” are eligible for the more favorable 
treatment of  their exports to the territory of  the GSP provider. Other non-
reciprocal preference-granting initiatives include i) the European Union’s 
Everything but Arms initiative, under which all imports – except armaments 
– from all Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to the European Union are tariff-
free and quota-free; and ii) the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 
under which imports of  certain goods – mainly textiles and clothing – to the 
Unites States from eligible African countries are duty-free and quota-free.
This chapter deals essentially with RTAs and their status in the WTO, referring 
only in passing to the WTO coverage of  unilateral, non-reciprocal initiatives. 
RTAs have proliferated since the early 1990s, with well over 330 now in force 
compared to fewer than 30 in 1990.  They also have their own terminology, 
with terms such as “free trade area” (FTA), “customs union” (CU), the more 
prosaic “spaghetti bowl” and, more recently, “mega-RTAs.” The next section 
will deal with the present landscape and definitional framework of  RTAs, 
including their coverage.  Following this the chapter will turn, in the third 
section, to the possible reasons for negotiating RTAs and the rapid growth in 
their number. The fourth section in a sense gets to the heart of  the matter, 
examining the provisions under which members of  RTAs are authorized under 
WTO rules to provide preferential treatment in their trade relations with each 
other, thus departing from the cornerstone principle of  the WTO of  non-
discrimination.  The intent, or economic rationale, of  these provisions is to ensure 
that an RTA strengthens – or at least does not weaken – the multilateral trading 
system, but it is not always an easy matter to know whether this is indeed the 
case. The section therefore also looks at the relatively recent RTA Transparency 
Mechanism, which is a peer review exercise to improve the understanding of  
individual RTAs and, it is hoped, their abidance of  WTO disciplines.  The 
chapter then goes on to question, in the fifth section, whether RTAs, through 
their departure from non-discrimination, undermine the role of  the WTO 
as the guardian of  the multilateral trading system, particularly in light of  the 
move towards very large RTAs such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The final 
section briefly concludes.
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The RTA Landscape
RTAs come in many shapes and forms, but generically they are either free trade 
agreements (FTAs) or customs unions (CUs). The two or more members of  an 
FTA reduce the barriers to trade between themselves but retain independent 
trade policies; thus, for example, tariffs on imports from FTA partners will be 
lowered (normally to zero), but each member of  the FTA will maintain its own 
tariffs vis-à-vis imports from non-members. Such an FTA may cover both goods 
and services, though technically a services FTA is known as an “economic 
integration agreement.” An FTA may also cover less than substantially all 
of  the trade in goods between partners, and is then called a “partial scope” 
agreement.
As members of  an FTA retain their own tariffs for trade with non-members, 
rules of  origin are needed to identify products from members that are eligible 
for the lower duties and restrictions that apply to trade between members. In 
the absence of  such rules of  origin, non-members could divert their product 
to the member of  the FTA with the lowest duty on that product and then 
tranship it to the final destination in the FTA. For example, if  FTA members 
A and B, with zero duties on trade between themselves, imposed duties on 
imports of  motor vehicles from non-members of  10% and 5%, respectively, 
then a non-member exporting motor vehicles to B could initially ship them 
to A and then tranship duty-free to B, thus saving 5%; rules of  origin prevent 
such diversion.
One of  the largest FTAs is the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). With Canada, Mexico and the United States as members, NAFTA 
accounts for some 13% of  world exports.  It provides duty-free treatment 
for virtually all goods originating in the members, has an extensive services 
component, deals also with non-tariff barriers, standards, competition, 
investment, intellectual property and trade disputes between members and has 
supplemental agreements to handle labor and environmental issues. In trade 
parlance, it is known as a deep agreement, as opposed to a shallow agreement 
that would cover border measures but little else.  Other large FTAs include the 
agreement between the Association of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)4 and 
Japan, which applies only to goods and is thus a “true” FTA as compared to 
one – like NAFTA – that also has a services component, with this component 
then being known as an “economic integration agreement” (see above); the 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), which applies to goods and is relatively 
4 The members of  ASEAN are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam; Papua New Guinea is an observer.
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unusual in that its members are all developing countries, a self-designation in 
the WTO; agreements between ASEAN and, respectively, China, India and 
the Republic of  Korea, all of  which are goods and services agreements; and the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA),5 which is also a goods and services 
agreement. These FTAs may soon be joined by a mega-FTA, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), which was recently agreed but has not yet come into force; 
its membership accounts for around 40% of  the global economy.6  Eventually, 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which is currently 
being negotiated between the European Union and the United States, may 
also join the ranks of  FTAs.
Examples of  smaller FTAs include agreements between Georgia and Armenia 
(goods); Guatemala and Chinese Taipei (goods and services); Hong Kong, 
China and Chile (goods and services); and India and Nepal (goods), which has 
rather limited coverage and is thus also known as a “partial scope agreement.”
To date, somewhat over 230 “pure” FTAs have been notified to the WTO.7 In 
addition, the WTO Secretariat is aware of  some 70 such agreements that have 
not (yet) been notified.8   Over 130 FTAs with a services (“economic integration 
agreement”) component have been notified to the WTO, although a limited 
number of  these are part of  customs unions (see below); there are probably 
fewer than five such agreements that remain un-notified. Finally, there are in 
the order of  15 partial scope agreements.
The second generic category of  RTAs is customs unions. The defining feature 
of  a CU is that its members have a common external tariff. There is therefore 
no need for rules of  origin between the members; once products are in the 
territory of  the CU, they are technically free to move to any part of  the CU, 
albeit subject to the regulatory, non-tariff provisions of  each member of  the 
CU. 
The largest CU is the European Union, with a share of  some 16.5% of  the 
world’s exports of  goods and services (not including intra-EU trade). Intra-
EU trade, underpinned by the free flow of  goods and services within the 
European Union, is very significant and accounts for some 50% of  the exports 
of  almost each of  the members. As an indication, in 2014 total EU exports 
of  manufactures (agricultural products) accounted for 38.5% (38%) of  world 
exports, whereas extra-EU exports accounted for just 14.6% (10.1%)9. This 
5  EFTA members are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.
6 The 12 members of  TPP are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam.
7 Source: http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx.
8 Source: WTO document WT/REG/W/95, 17 September 2015
9 Source: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/merch_trade_stat_e.htm.
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rather remarkable degree of  integration reflects10 the comprehensiveness of  
the agreement, which has provisions on not just tariffs but virtually all aspects 
of  trade in goods and services between the members, including competition, 
domestic regulation, environment, government procurement, intellectual 
property, labor, mutual recognition (services), standards and subsidies.  Indeed, 
the European Union has a single trade policy and, unlike all other RTAs, 
speaks with one voice at the WTO.
The EU is also an example of  an open RTA. If  a country is able to accept 
and implement the “acquis communautaire” (EU law) and the existing members 
agree, it can apply and/or be invited to accede to the EU. Since the Treaty 
of  Rome of  March 1957, the original six members (Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany) have increased to 28.11
Other examples of  CUs include the Central American Common Market 
(CACM),12 which is for goods only; the East African Community (EAC),13 
which is for both goods and services; EU–Turkey, which is for goods only (and 
is emblematic of  the fact that the EU has RTAs with each of  its neighbors 
among its total of  37 RTAs, making it the WTO member with the largest 
number of  RTAs);14 the Southern African Customs Union (SACU),15 which 
is for goods and is arguably the oldest CU, having been founded in 1910; and 
the Southern Common Market (MERCUSOR),16 for both goods and services.
In all, 18 CUs have been notified to the WTO.17 The question arises as to why 
there are so few CUs compared to FTAs. The answer is reasonably straight-
forward: there is a larger cession of  sovereignty in adopting a common external 
tariff (as in a CU) than in retaining national tariffs vis-à-vis third countries 
(as in FTAs). 
The lexicon of  RTAs contains some cute terms, which nevertheless point to real 
phenomena. Most prominent among these is the phrase “spaghetti bowl.”18 
This refers to a complex network of  RTAs (Annex 1) and the complications 
that may then arise. For example, through various arrangements, a country 
may be party to more than one RTA with another trading partner, as is the 
10 I use the word “reflects” advisably because causation is not clear.
11 The members are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
12 The members are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.
13 The EAC’s members are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.
14 Alone among RTAs, the European Union is a WTO Member in its own right, as are each of  the Union’s 28 members.
15 SACU’s membership consists of  Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.
16 Its original members were Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
17 Source: http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx.
18 The term was first used by Jagdish Bhagwati in his 1995 paper “U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade 
Agreements” (Bhagwati, 1995). 
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case for Singapore, which at present has three separate RTA links with New 
Zealand,19 and a fourth when TPP comes into force. The same Singapore 
product may thus be subject to three different rules of  origin to qualify for 
preferential tariff access to New Zealand; similarly, as RTAs are normally 
phased in such that the preferential tariff may not be zero, the same product 
may face three different tariffs into New Zealand. This could certainly increase 
“search costs,” although in the case of  Singapore the authorities have put in 
place a superb website to keep its exporters fully informed and to facilitate 
decisions. Moreover, if  the producer seeks preferential access for the product 
elsewhere under another FTA, the rules of  origin may again be different. 
This might require a number of  distinct production processes for the same 
product, potentially reducing the benefits of  economies of  scale. When referred 
specifically to trade among Asian countries, the spaghetti bowl becomes the 
“noodle bowl.”  Note that these spaghetti/noodle bowl effects could apply 
not just to tariffs and/or rules of  origin, but also to all other arrangements 
between the members of  an RTA (the regulatory environment, intellectual 
property rights protection, etc.).
An associated word is “lasagnas,” which refers to a consolidation among RTAs 
such that the spaghetti/noodle bowl becomes less complex. An example of  
this is the Mexico–Central America agreement, which replaced bilateral 
agreements between Mexico and Central American countries.
Figure 1, compiled by the WTO Secretariat, shows the evolution and stock 
of  RTAs notified to the WTO up to late 2015. In all, there were 265 RTAs in 
force; in addition, as noted above, the Secretariat knew of  at least 70 RTAs 
that had not been notified. 
The cumulative total of  notifications of  RTAs in the period from 1948 to late 
2015 is over 600, of  which over 400 were notifications of  RTAs still in force. 
The reason why the number of  notifications exceeds the physical number 
of  RTAs in force is that, under WTO procedures, the goods and the services 
components of  RTAs are notified separately, as are accessions to existing RTAs. 
Total notifications include both notifications of  RTAs currently in force and 
past notifications of  RTAs that are now no longer active or in place, mainly 
reflecting both the evolution of  agreements as they are superseded by “deeper 
integration” agreements among the same members20 and the “lasagna” 
19  These are the ASAEN—Australia/New Zealand FTA, the Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a 
Closer Economic Partnership (ANZSCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPFTA) between 
Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore.
20 For example, bilateral agreements between the European Economic Communities (EEC) –the forerunner of  the 
European Union – and a number of  Mediterranean countries were later replaced by “deeper” agreements among 
the same parties to include, for instance, competition, investment and intellectual property.
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effect, sometimes as a result of  EU enlargement. Thus there is a spike in the 
deactivation of  RTAs in 2004 when 12 new members acceded to the European 
Union. Prior to accession, each new member had an RTA with at least one 
other new member and also with the European Union, all of  which were then 
replaced by membership of  the European Union. 
Figure 1: Evolution of regional trade agreements in the world, 1948-2015 
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In summary, in force in late 2015 were 137 RTAs in goods, 127 RTAs in goods 
and services and one RTA in services only (the latter being the European 
Economic Area, or EEA, with the 28 EU and four EFTA countries as its 
members). Three other points are worth noting: i) the prevalence of  RTAs is 
such that all WTO Members are now party to at least one RTA, with Mongolia, 
for a long time the only Member without RTA links, having recently signed 
an agreement with Japan; (ii) the vast majority of  the RTAs are bilateral, 
essentially because they are easier to negotiate; and iii) the “deeper” agreements 
are invariably between the more developed economies. Indeed, there are as 
yet few RTAs between developed countries and LDCs, an aspect that is dealt 
with in more detail below
Figure 1 also shows the growth in the number of  RTAs. Following some 40 
years of  relative calm after 1948, the number of  RTAs has grown almost 
exponentially since the early 1990s. This has made the trading system more 
complicated, probably reducing transparency and predictability, and has 
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introduced considerable discrimination among trading partners. These factors 
could contribute to making it more difficult for individual traders to arrive 
at decisions, thus possibly increasing contract-costs and prices. The obvious 
question, and the subject of  the next section, is “Why so many RTAs?”
The “Whys?” and “Why Nots?” of RTAs
Governments are not confused about the gains from trade; by and large, they 
agree on the possibility of  such gains. National administrations understand that 
a more liberal trade regime is likely to result in less bias in the transmission of  
international price signals, thus fostering more efficient resource allocation and 
improving a country’s production and consumption potential. The composition 
of  output is likely to shift towards internationally competitive sectors, increasing 
the exports, employment and wages in those sectors, and away from import-
competing activities, which will shed employment. Thus, while the price of, 
say, a t-shirt may decline – due to t-shirts now being sourced from competitive 
external producers – there could be noisy protests from the unemployed in the 
shrinking sectors. Although (and this is well established in economic theory) the 
“winners” could compensate for the “losers,” resulting in a net overall gain, 
this could require changes in social and fiscal policy that may be politically 
difficult to achieve. In short, if  economies are to reap the benefits of  a more 
liberal trading regime, there needs to be adjustment, and this can be painful. 
Governments seeking to liberalize their external trade regimes would often 
prefer to do so in the context of  comprehensive multilateral negotiations, such 
as the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda (DDA). This would strengthen – or 
at least not weaken – the non-discrimination, transparency and predictability 
characteristics of  the WTO-led multilateral trading system, which is widely 
regarded economically as the first-best option for achieving the gains from 
trade. Also, and very importantly, it would offer significant trade-offs that, from 
a political point of  view, would allow the export sectors in a country to “buy 
off” the import-competing producers (“yes we may be opening our markets to 
import competition, but our export opportunities will increase substantially, 
making us better off”). Note that this is a purely mercantilist argument (“exports 
are good, imports are bad”), whereas in fact it can be shown, as above, that 
liberalization can be its own reward.21 Unfortunately, or otherwise, the politics 
21 As a corollary, and from the consumer perspective (and we are all consumers), imports are good because they improve 
consumer choice, and exports are bad because they reduce domestic consumption possibilities, with their role then 
being to pay for imports.
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of  liberalization work in this manner – trade agreements are treaties and they 
need to be ratified!
The ideal is difficult to achieve.  The Uruguay Round was launched in 1986 
and was concluded successfully in 1994. Since then success has been much 
more difficult to find. The DDA was initiated in 2001, but to date progress 
has been extremely sluggish at best, with few results except for the notable 
exceptions of  the Trade Facilitation Agreement (which is not yet ratified), 
the RTA Transparency Mechanism (which is being provisionally applied) 
and decisions related to food security and export competition. The reasons 
are clear – the WTO has 162 Members (as of  end-November 2015), each 
with its own agenda and red-lines which can and do change over time. It is 
therefore extremely difficult to find consensus, which is the way the WTO 
makes decisions,22 especially since an agreement establishes obligations that are 
legally binding. Given this reality, and the fact that governments will continue 
to seek the benefits that trade can bring, they are likely to look elsewhere for 
partners. This also brings the advantage that they can extend their potential 
agreements into areas not covered by the multilateral trade negotiations, such 
as competition and investment.23 These factors were certainly influential in the 
decision to negotiate TPP, as they are in the ongoing negotiations of  TTIP. 
And indeed Figure 1 shows that there has been a bit of  an acceleration in the 
number of  RTAs notified and brought into force since 2008, when it became 
evident that the already slow progress on the DDA, which arguably had already 
contributed to the growth in the number of  RTAs, was going to falter even 
more, perhaps leading to the agreement’s demise.
There are many other reasons, both economic and/or political, for entering 
into a particular RTA. Important among these is better access to a large market 
than that provided under that country’s membership of  the WTO. This was 
certainly a consideration for New Zealand when it entered into China’s first 
country-to-country, bilateral RTA in October 2008.24 The agreement was 
procedurally important for China also, because New Zealand denoted China as 
a “market economy,” which is a status that provides somewhat more favorable 
treatment in the application of  the WTO’s trade remedy provisions.
22 There is provision for voting, but it has not been used.
23 At the outset of  the DDA, the negotiating mandate included competition, investment, government procurement 
and trade facilitation, known as the “Singapore issues” because they were first brought onto the WTO agenda at the 
1st WTO Ministerial Conference in December 1996. All but trade facilitation were subsequently dropped, not least 
because many developing countries were not comfortable with their inclusion and it was thought that this might be 
slowing progress on the DDA.
24 At that point China was already part of  the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), a partial scope RTA to which it 
acceded in 2002, and had goods and services FTAs with ASEAN (2005) and with Hong Kong, China and Macao, 
China (both 2003).
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Countries have sensitive sectors – ones they would like to protect – such 
as agriculture in many countries (both developed and developing), textiles 
and clothing, and steel (mainly in developed countries). This could facilitate 
negotiations with like-minded partners for RTAs, or at least those that are less 
likely to pressure them on the sensitive sectors. Thus, for example, EU bilateral 
RTAs are generally very light on agriculture (indeed, the European Union’s 
customs union with Turkey excludes agriculture), those of  Japan and Korea 
tend to avoid rice, and those of  the United States are careful to retain special 
provisions for clothing, usually through the retention of  high tariffs and rules 
of  origin that may in fact be “fiber forward” (the raw material needing to be 
grown in the exporting country). “Like-minded” can also apply, of  course, 
to those who seek partners to agreements that go beyond the normal WTO 
disciplines, such as the US–Australia RTA (2005), which includes provisions 
on competition, environment and labor and is WTO-plus on matters such as 
trade-related intellectual property rights.
RTAs are also used to lock in reforms. A telling example of  this is Chile, 
which since its first RTA (with Mexico in 1991) has used an RTA strategy to 
systematically lower its applied tariffs, with a view, inter alia, to improving 
domestic resource allocation. It also serves as an example of  using RTAs 
for learning by doing. When first setting out to enter into the trading system, a 
country’s traders need to learn how to do so, and this is perhaps best done 
by encouraging contracts with those with a similar culture, language, and 
so on. Such RTAs can be instrumental in informing how to negotiate and 
can subsequently lead to deeper RTAs, as was the case for both Chile and 
Mexico. A more recent example of  this is the Japan—Mongolia Economic 
Partnership Agreement, signed in February 2015. This agreement also serves as 
an example of  the “defensive” or, closely related, “bandwagon” and “domino” 
reasons behind RTAs. If  A negotiates an RTA with B, a close trading partner 
C is likely to be close behind in seeking RTAs with both A and B; thus the 
Chile–Korea Agreement was relatively closely followed by the Chile–Japan 
Agreement. More generally, when the United States joined the European 
Union in adopting “regionalism,” side by side with “multilateralism”, as a 
trade policy track (with US–Israel, US–Canada and then NAFTA), it became 
clearer, indeed indisputable, that RTAs were a permanent feature of  the trade 
landscape.  Others quickly sought to follow the trend – not least Japan and 
Korea, which had hitherto been adherents of  “multilateralism” only – and 
many were prompted to consider/request RTAs either with major traders or 
with each other as a defensive action.
Politics also plays an important role. In fact, trade policy is integral to the foreign 
policy of  many countries, with RTAs a possible element for strengthening 
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diplomatic ties. The Treaty of  Rome, establishing the EEC, was not without 
a certain political motive, with the idea in the background that “those who 
trade with each other do not go to war with each other.” Equally, the recent 
enlargements of  the European Union to include Central and Eastern European 
countries was motivated at least in part by the notion that integration into 
a democratic, market-oriented system would provide those countries with a 
stable platform for their reforms. Also, it is difficult to credit that the United 
States’ agreements with Israel and Jordan were motivated only by economic 
factors, nor indeed its agreement with Panama. There are many more such 
examples, probably including TPP.  In fact a look at Figure 1 shows that the 
surge in RTAs coincided roughly with the dissolution of  the USSR. Many of  
the newly emerged countries, and those previously in the sphere of  influence 
of  the former USSR, sought RTAs as a step or “building block” towards their 
fuller integration into the multilateral trading system. Indeed, as with any 
country entering into an RTA, they may have acquired valuable technical 
and negotiating skills, as well as important allies, for their role in the WTO 
system. Also, on a slightly cynical note, trade ministers are politicians and need 
to demonstrate achievements to retain their portfolios; the signing of  an RTA 
is a marvelous photo opportunity!
But RTAs have downsides. These include, as already noted, the beclouding of  
the trading environment with discrimination and complexity – the “spaghetti 
bowl” is real. Also important among the negative aspects of  RTAs is that they 
tend to divert trade – imports are sourced from preferential partners rather 
than from the world’s low-cost suppliers, resulting in losses in efficiency and 
to consumers. Moreover, RTAs have holes that reduce their benefits. It is, for 
example, very difficult (if  not impossible) to agree bilaterally, or even in a larger 
grouping, on effective measures to limit trade-distorting domestic support for 
agriculture; this can probably only be done in a multilateral setting. However, 
RTAs also can and do create trade – this is in fact their purpose – although 
this benefit can be reduced, inter alia, by exclusions from the coverage of  an 
RTA. The trade-off between trade creation and diversion is central to WTO 
provisions on RTAs, and its discussion leads in the next section.
An RTA entails costs for traders. The additional search costs have already 
been noted. Compliance with the rules of  origin, and the paper work involved, 
can also be expensive, sometimes to the point of  eliminating an RTA’s margin 
of  preference for the product. This can be exacerbated by the fact that the 
production process might need to be changed to meet the rules of  origin. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a margin of  preference of  up to six percentage 
points may at times not be enough to compensate for the additional costs; 
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traders may then choose to access the market using the “most favored nation” 
(MFN) tariff, applicable to imports from non-preferential sources.
RTAs can attract attention and resources of  even the largest national 
administrations away from the multilateral trading system. They then become a 
stumbling block to improvements in the acknowledged “first best” for the conduct 
of  trade. And this can happen in other ways. A country with preferential 
access to an important market for its main exports may block a multilateral 
tariff deal to prevent its preference margin being reduced; in effect, it would 
seek to limit competition.
As a final point in this section, RTAs can marginalize smaller trading nations, 
including LDCs. The fostering of  freer trade through RTAs may help accustom 
countries to competitive pressures and to sophisticated regulatory regimes, and 
thus may promote wider agreement on – i.e. be a building block towards – a 
stronger, more liberal multilateral trading system. But the smaller traders, 
and African LDCs in particular, are rarely partners to an RTA with major, 
competitive traders, which may place them at a disadvantage in the constantly 
changing trading environment. These countries invariably do have access to 
the preference schemes of  their partners, but these are unilateral and can be 
changed or withdrawn – there is more than one example of  foreign direct 
investment leaving a country as the latter’s preferences into a particular market 
(or markets) are altered.
RTAs now pervade the trading environment and, as noted, there are arguments 
both for and against their continued presence and growth. The question is 
urgent, therefore, as to how they are accommodated in the WTO, as the anchor 
and guardian and of  the multilateral trading system.
RTAs in the WTO
The WTO is an economic organization encased in law. The rights and 
obligations of  Members are designed to help them reap the gains from 
trade, but they are written in legally binding form, with a legal contract then 
underpinning economic intent. So too with RTAs: the economic concept 
of  net trade creation provides a possible rationale for the WTO to allow the 
discrimination of  RTAs as an exception to its cornerstone tenet of  non-
discrimination.
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Table 1 may help to explain the concept. Consider three separate cases:
1. Home produces a good at 35, Partner at 25, and the Rest of  the World 
(RoW) at 20. Home maintains a zero tariff on imports. Home will then 
import the product from RoW for the maximum gain for consumers – it 
is the optimal outcome.
2. Home has a tariff of  100%, raising the prices of  Partner’s and RoW’s 
products to 50 and 40, respectively. It buys the Home product; there is no 
trade. Then it enters into an RTA with Partner, such that there is a zero 
tariff on Partner’s product. It imports from Partner at 25, which is better 
than the Home price of  35; this is trade creation.
Table 1: Trade creation/diversion
Home Partner Rest of world
Price 35 25 20
Tariff of 100% 35 50 40
Tariff of 50% 35 37.5 30
3. Home has a tariff of  50%, raising the price of  the good from Partner 
and RoW to 37.5 and 30, respectively. Home imports from RoW at 30 
and it collects 10 in tariff revenue – the net cost to Home is actually 20. It 
then enters into an RTA with Partner. It switches (“diverts”) its source of  
imports from RoW to its RTA – imports now cost 25 rather than 30, but 
the tariff revenue of  10 is no longer collected, for a net cost of  5. Thus, 
trade diversion is costly.
The economic position that follows from this is that if  an RTA is net trade 
creating, the system as a whole will benefit. But this is what economists call a 
“comparative–static” result as nothing else has changed; the dynamics of  a 
situation, such as changing tastes, could alter the outcome. Which is to say 
that it is very difficult to know whether an RTA is or will be net trade creating, 
or otherwise.
The WTO’s disciplines on RTAs reflect this difficulty. Article XXIV of  the 
WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), complemented 
by its Understanding as agreed in the Uruguay Round, stipulates the legal 
framework for RTAs in trade in goods. Article V of  the WTO’s General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) does the same for RTAs in trade 
in services. The 1979 Enabling Clause provides for the mutual, preferential 
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reduction of  tariffs and non-tariff measures among developing countries.25 
These provisions represent the “permission” for WTO Members to enter into 
RTAs. But there are conditions. 
GATT Article XXIV requires, inter alia, that in forming an RTA, the duties 
and other restrictive regulations of  commerce, except those permitted under 
WTO rules, be eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the 
parties. GATS Article V requires substantial sectoral coverage and the absence 
or elimination of  substantially all discrimination. The Enabling Clause does 
not have such requirements.  Article XXIV also stipulates that the duties and 
other regulations of  commerce (note the absence of  the word “restrictive” in 
comparison to the earlier language) applied by the parties to an RTA shall not 
be higher or more restrictive with respect to third parties than those prior to 
the formation of  the RTA – the so-called “general incidence” clause, in the 
case of  customs unions.26 In the case of  the Enabling Clause, members to an 
RTA are admonished not to raise barriers to, or to create undue difficulties for, 
the trade of  other WTO Members. That is, RTAs are expected to be at least 
neutral with respect to their trade with third parties. Nor is there agreement 
in the WTO on important lacunae, such as preferential rules of  origin, which 
could bring uniformity to how such measures are to be evaluated.
The intention of  the above phrases is clear: an RTA should be to the benefit 
of  the system – it should be net trade creating. The problem is also clear: 
how is any of  this to be measured? These are normative matters that defy 
obvious quantification. And what is the difference between “other restrictive 
regulations” and “other regulations”? Some have suggested that 95% would 
be a “good” measure for “substantially all the trade,” but even at 100% there 
could be net diversion, for example, as a result of  preferential investment rules 
or WTO-plus trade in intellectual property requirements. The point is that 
conditions evolve – a non-restrictive regulation may be changed to become 
restrictive for non-preferential partners, as could be the case for the recognition 
of  professional standards. In short, it is very difficult for Members to assess 
whether an RTA complies with WTO rules. It is not surprising then that only 
one RTA has ever been found to be compliant, namely the customs union 
between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, which was established 
when Czechoslovakia became the two republics and which “disappeared” 
when both states acceded to the European Union in 2004. Nor does WTO 
25 Its full name is the 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation 
of  Developing Countries. The Enabling Clause also provides the necessary waiver from non-discrimination for GSP 
schemes; programmes such as AGOA require a separate waiver from the Members, and such a waiver is usually 
time-bound whereas the Enabling Clause is permanent.
26 The Understanding brought some clarity to this in the case of  tariffs, but it remains an awkward, point-in-time 
calculation.
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Dispute Settlement provide precedents. No RTA in its own right been has been 
subject to a legal complaint at the WTO;27 indeed, given the uncertainty about 
compliance, that would be almost like “people in glass houses throwing stones.”
Members have not been idle on the matter, being very aware that it is of  systemic 
importance to the WTO. The Committee on Regional Trade Agreements 
(CRTA) was established in 1996 to oversee RTAs, but no reports have been 
issued on the compliance of  an RTA. Besides the difficulty in determining 
compliance, no party will normally agree that its RTA is non-compliant, if  
only for fear of  being drawn into dispute settlement, with the result that the 
compliance exercise has essentially fallen by the wayside.28
In 2001 the clarification and improvement of  RTA disciplines was entrusted to 
negotiators in the DDA. However, agreement has escaped them in the matter 
of  rules, including guidance on the term “substantially”, coverage (whether, 
for example, all goods RTAs should include agriculture) and uniformity of  
rules or origin. Nevertheless, there has been considerable progress in the area 
of  transparency.
Members decided at an early stage of  the negotiations that they needed to 
know more about the facts and figures of  the RTAs in force. This could lead to 
a better appreciation of  the impact of  RTAs on the multilateral system, could 
bring understanding to elusive concepts such as “substantially,” and, under 
peer review, might lead to an improvement in the nature and structure of  
RTAs, to the benefit of  the system. This led, in December 2006, to the WTO 
General Council’s decision to apply, on a provisional basis, the Transparency 
Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements.29
The Mechanism provides for the early notification of  RTAs. They are 
subsequently considered by the WTO Membership on the basis of  a factual 
presentation prepared by the WTO Secretariat under its own responsibility but in 
close consultation with the parties involved.30 The factual presentations, minutes 
and questions and answers are published, but no report is issued. To date well 
over 200 factual presentations have been distributed, providing a wealth of  
verified data. This information feeds into an RTA database, mandated by the 
Mechanism, maintained by the Secretariat and made available to the public 
and, hence, for purposes of  research.
27 In two disputes RTAs have been an issue, essentially concerning whether they can be used as a legal defence for 
perceived discrepancies between some of  their provisions and existing WTO rules.
28 Prior to the CRTA, individual Working Parties examined RTAs.
29 See WTO document WT/L/671 (18 December 2006) for the text of  the decision. The Mechanism is also described 
in some detail on the WTO’s website at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/trans_mecha_e.htm.
30 The consideration in the CRTA if  the agreement is notified under GATT Article XXIV or under GATS Article V; if  
it is notified under the Enabling Clause, the discussion takes place in WTO’s Committee on Trade and Development.
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The consideration of  an RTA under the Mechanism does not include an 
assessment of  its consistency with WTO provisions, and it is precluded from 
being used for purposes of  dispute settlement. This is intentional, obviating 
a discussion of  normative issues and encouraging a frank exchange on the 
facts of  the RTA. 
The Mechanism has certainly improved transparency with respect to RTAs. 
However, there is no escaping the fact that the WTO’s legal provisions on 
RTAs remain very difficult – essentially impossible – to enforce.  Thus, it is 
up to Members to ensure that their RTAs meet the spirit of  the WTO’s legal 
provisions – to benefit, or at least complement, the system, supporting the 
WTO. 
RTAs: Do They Help or Hurt?
The question is seemingly of  some importance. After 14 years of  negotiations 
the DDA has yielded few results and may yet fail or be abandoned. This 
leaves many with the perception that the WTO has lost some credibility as 
the mainstay of  the multilateral trading system, with an agenda that may not 
reflect the realities of  the trading environment, particularly the very significant 
sway of  China and the maturing of  “new” technologies such as the Internet. 
The continued growth in the number of  RTAs, including the steps towards 
new mega-RTAs, adds to – and is perhaps influenced by – the notion of  a 
WTO on the wane, with the RTAs arguably more in tune with the trading 
needs of  their parties. 
A rebuttal could come in two intertwined parts:  i) the WTO is about a great 
deal more than just the DDA; and ii) it is not clear that RTAs have seriously 
undermined the WTO, although the jury might still be out on the possible 
new mega-RTAs, which after all are not yet in place.
The WTO remains a valuable global public good. The important day-to-
day work will continue in the WTO Committees that implement its various 
agreements such as that on agriculture, contributing to freer, more predictable 
trade flows.  So too will its significant work on transparency, including the trade 
policy reviews of  Member countries, the monitoring reports on protectionism 
that feed into the G20, and the discussion of  RTAs; these functions fruitfully 
inform both Members and the public. And the dispute settlement mechanism 
continues to provide sterling service in ruling on disagreements between 
Members in their use of  trade measures, fostering abidance by the rule-of-
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law between parties. The WTO also curbed protectionism31 and kept markets 
open during the recent financial crisis, thus helping to contain contagion and 
perhaps a global depression.  
Moreover, despite the DDA and intense RTA activity, the WTO remains an 
impressive negotiating forum for global trade rules, as evidenced by the recent 
Trade Facilitation Agreement. And, as noted, it is probably only in the WTO 
that disciplines in areas such as agricultural support could be agreed. Nor 
is it clearly the case that the WTO’s ability to negotiate on market access 
has been impaired by RTAs, where the gains and trade-offs might already 
have been made. For example, the Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA), which eliminates tariffs on a large number of  high-tech goods, has 
grown to 81 members, compared to fewer than 30 when it was first signed in 
December 1996, and covers some 97% of  trade in the products concerned, 
with the liberalization applied also on a non-discriminatory, MFN basis to 
non-members.
In a like manner, precisely during the time when RTAs were showing 
spectacular growth in numbers, the number of  WTO Members also grew 
rapidly. The WTO now has 162 Members, compared to the 128 members of  
the GATT, the WTO’s predecessor.  And, in fact, when the WTO was founded 
on January 1st, 1995, its 100 Members accepted a considerably higher level 
of  multilateral obligations than they had under the GATT. Those agreeing 
and acceding to the WTO clearly sought to ground their trade policies in a 
non-discriminatory, stable environment. By this interpretation, the WTO has 
remained a firm anchor of  the system.
The anchor could be firmer still if  there were multilateral trade agreements 
in areas like competition and investment, and if  progress could be made in 
services and preferential rules of  origin. For their part, RTA parties might 
think about steps such as cumulating origin across their various agreements 
– as in the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of  origin – and the 
mutual recognition of  standards; these could certainly promote deeper 
integration within the RTAs but, as always with discriminatory measures, the 
net benefit is uncertain.  Parties to RTAs might also consider extending their 
tariff preferences on a non-discriminatory basis in the case of  products where 
the MFN rates are already low, say at a “nuisance” level, thus both obviating 
the need for rules of  origin on these products and enhancing competition.
31 This point is not beyond debate. In their chapter in this volume, Simon Evenett and Johannes Fritz argue rather 
persuasively that there was a surge in protectionism early in the financial crisis, although not in the main through 
resort to “traditional” measures, such as tariffs and trade defence.
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The question remains as to whether the situation could be significantly changed 
by the emergence of  new mega-RTAs: TPP, TTIP and also the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) between the 10 members of  
ASEAN, Australia, China, India, Korea and New Zealand. One might envisage 
a situation in which TPP and TTIP share the same template for their RTAs, 
grant each other cumulation in origin, agree on the mutual recognition of  
standards and apply each other’s dispute settlement rulings. This would create, 
de facto, a new trade regime for some 50% of  world output, and would exclude 
major traders such as Brazil, China and India. In this context, RCEP might well 
be defensive. And while the political obstacles to the realization of  this thought 
experiment are substantial, it does give some idea of  the possible significance 
of  these potential mega-RTAs for the multilateral trading system. That said, 
the economic impact of  these agreements may be less than overwhelming, with 
zero MFN rates already in place – due to the Uruguay Round and ITA – on 
a wide range of  products (particularly manufactures) and most other rates 
low. There could be significant diversion in some areas, however, particularly 
agriculture in TPP, and perhaps regulations and investment.
Nor is this the system’s first experience with mega-RTAs, with the European 
Union and NAFTA already forming part of  the landscape. Both have often 
played positive leadership roles in the WTO, and indeed its founding hinged 
in part on critical work and compromises by the European Union and the 
United States. Similarly, the new mega-RTAs could be important in updating 
the WTO with their experience in investment agreements, for example – they 
could lead on setting the frameworks. In this regard, with the United States 
being central to both TPP and TTIP, its commitment to multilateralism will 
be critical – and the answer to that may be as much political and economic.
Conclusion
RTAs have certainly complicated the trading environment, but is not clear 
that they have undermined the WTO; they may have supported integration 
into the multilateral system. This system has provided significant benefits, 
including –and perhaps in particular – for the major traders. It is in their own 
interest to safeguard the integrity of  this global public good. Given the past 
record, hiccups and the DDA notwithstanding, they are likely to do just that. 
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CHAPTER 8
What Is the “Networked Economy”?
Nick Ashton-Hart
When most people think of  the Internet, they think of  what they use online 
– search engines, social media, streamed video and audio services, and email. 
That’s not a good definition for the digital economy, though – it’s too limited. 
The “business-to-consumer” (B2C) services like those we use everyday are 
only about 10% of  the economic value proposition of  services with a digital 
dimension. The other 90%1 is business-to-business services (B2B), such as 
“Cloud” and supply chain management systems and “industrial Internet”2 
applications. 
The Internet has made many services exportable in a way that was previously 
impossible. While outsourcing may be controversial, it is a good example of  this 
phenomenon, as networking technologies have made distance and geography 
irrelevant to the competitiveness of  payroll services, legal discovery services 
and customer relationship management, including, famously, call centers. This 
has contributed to making services the largest segment of  the world economy 
in GDP terms (Lanz and Maurer, 2015) and the largest employer even in 
developing countries since the turn of  this century, 20 years after it became 
true for OECD countries.3 
Beyond services, 75% of  the economic value of  the digital economy accrues 
to the benefit of  traditional bricks and mortar businesses of  all kinds 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2011a,b). Think for a moment about the economic 
consequences of  that fact, given that the size of  the digital economy – in direct 
1 There are various sources for this figure, but perhaps the most useful reference is the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development’s Information Economy Report 2015 (UNCTAD, 2015).
2 For a good overview that’s layman friendly, see Bruner (2013).
3 See the supporting datasets for the International Labour Organization’s Global Employment Trends 2014, at http://
www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/global-employment-trends/2014/WCMS_234879/lang--en/index.
htm. 
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and indirect terms – is estimated as being in the order of  3.4% of  GDP in 
developed economies alone (OECD, 2013: Table 2).
At the same time, the latest studies we have show that while flows of  non-
digital goods and services have actually declined relative to GDP, data flows 
have expanded 45-fold, with an estimated positive contribution to GDP of  
10% (McKinsey Global Institute, 2016).
Figure 1: After 20 years of rapid growth, traditional flows of goods, services and 
finance have declined relative to GDP
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Taken together, this macro picture suggests a definition for the Internet or the 
digital economy similar to that from the 2008 OECD Ministerial: “… the full 
range of  our economic, social and cultural activities supported by the Internet 
and related information and communications technologies” (OECD, 2008).
A key foundational objective of  “offline” trade policy is to progressively reduce 
tariffs and other barriers to trade between countries, with an ideal end objective 
of  “free” and fair, frictionless trade worldwide. The Internet is by nature 
friction- and barrier-free – it makes any company that uses it a global business 
from the moment it takes itself  online. That remarkable facility is at the heart 
of  why research has repeatedly found that for each 10% increase in broadband 
penetration, GDP rises by between 0.25% and 1.38% (ITU, 2012: 17).
You will notice considerable variability in these statistics; that’s because 
measuring the digital economy holistically is famously difficult. Perhaps the 
best approach from an economist’s perspective is that of  the OECD (2013: 
7), which divides the Gordian knot into three elements:
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1. The “direct impact”: the value added generated by Internet-related 
activities
2. The “dynamic impact”: net GDP growth generated by all activities related 
to Internet-related activities
3. The “indirect impact”: consumer surplus and welfare gains generated by 
Internet-related activities.
Rather than presenting an economic theory view of  the networked economy, 
this chapter will relate it to how networks are actually structured and explain 
how world trade rules relate to that “real world” paradigm. This presentation 
also corresponds more closely to the way trade rules are structured. It is hoped 
that this combination will aid both trade policy practitioners and those more 
familiar with the Internet in forging a common understanding. 
Finally, aside from everything else, the networked economy is important for all 
countries, not just for a few; moreover, it is at the heart of  economic activity. 
Despite that fact, countries are increasingly implementing measures that add 
friction in online trade – this chapter will explore several. Understanding 
these measures is a key and pressing challenge for trade policymakers.4 The 
chapter ends with some ideas of  policy options that can help trade and non-
trade specialists understand the subject better whilst exploring what additional 
trade rules may add value.
The Network and the Data It Carries: Two Different 
Things
To understand the Internet in a trade context is a challenge for many 
policymakers. This is partly because they are confronting a subject area that 
is new to them, but also because those who advocate for networked economy 
provisions in trade often don’t explain the fundamentals so that policymakers 
can relate the unfamiliar to the existing “bricks and mortar” trading system 
they know.
4 There have been many efforts to quantify the elements that prepare a country to take maximum advantage of  
networked technologies for economic benefit; perhaps one of  the more interesting is the Digital Evolution Index 
developed by the Fletcher School at Tufts University, with participation by many private- and public-sector 
stakeholders (see http://insights.mastercard.com/digitalevolution/). 
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The starting place is that the Internet from a trade perspective is really two 
different things: 
1. The network that makes communications between any connected devices 
possible (in this chapter, the “network as a platform”)
2. The data and associated services that use that network as a communications 
platform (or “everything else”). 
Where to draw the line between them is crucial, so let’s use the “digital holiday” 
scenario to illustrate that boundary.
Let’s say every person who uses the Internet took a “digital holiday” on the 
same day, and every single online application service provider (search engines, 
video services, email providers, etc.) did the same thing. The network itself  
would still continue exchanging addresses and related information. The next 
morning when people go online, everything would work as normal. 
The data that the network carries, then, are the applications and services 
that people use and the data that those applications and services create. The 
network is the hardware, interconnections and essential communications 
between them.5 
The Network 
The network is an interrelated web of  hardware and software that utilize 
common standards to ensure each component is interchangeable with others 
performing the same function. This concept – referred to as “interoperability”6 
by technical stakeholders – is important because it allows maximum flexibility 
in designing networks and related systems. It is a close functional cousin to the 
concept of  technology neutrality that is so fundamental to trade agreements. 
The grouping of  standards that make communications interconnection in the 
network possible are known as the “Internet protocol (IP) stack.” IP-based 
networks are designed to operate with maximum efficiency, and a continuous 
process of  evolution of  these standards responds to the need for greater 
performance, interoperability, resilience, trust and security over time. 
What we call the public Internet is actually a “network of  networks,” the large 
majority of  them privately owned and managed by corporations, whether for 
5 For the technically minded, the network as a platform corresponds to the lowest four layers of  the OSI model and the 
lowest three of  the TCP/IP (RFC 1122) model. 
6 For a user-friendly overview of  the Internet and the “network of  networks” that it is comprised of, the Internet Society’s 
“An Introduction to Internet Interconnection Concepts and Actors” (Internet Society, 2012) is recommended (see 
www.Internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/bp-interconnection.pdf).
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the use of  their employees or, in the case of  Internet service providers (ISPs), 
for the public to connect to the rest of  the Internet. 
Keeping things simple, there are three types of  entity that collectively make 
basic connectivity, and therefore the public Internet, possible:
• Internet service providers (ISPs): entities that provide connectivity for end-
users (ranging from single mobile devices to the largest corporations), of  
which most countries have from several to dozens
• Backbone providers: entities that connect ISPs to one another but that do 
not have end-users as customers; these entities are often responsible for 
making connections between countries and continents possible
• The processes and institutions that manage allocation of  unique identifiers, 
such as IP addressing and the domain name system (DNS). These are 
analogous to telephone numbers or postal addresses in that they allow any 
“node” (of  which your mobile phone is one, and your desktop PC or laptop 
is another) of  the network to be identified and reached from any other 
node, and ensure that worldwide every single address is used only once.
Each ISP or backbone provider must do two things aside from connecting to 
its customers:
• Connect to other ISPs so the exchange of  data between their respective 
customers is possible, and connect to backbone providers (either directly 
or indirectly) to allow international traffic exchange. Without these 
agreements (often known as “peering” or “interconnection” agreements), 
the Internet would cease to be a global platform and exist solely as ISP-
specific “islands” that would only allow users to connect to the other 
customers of  their own ISP.
• Acquire the various types of  technical addresses necessary for its equipment 
and that of  its customers to use to connect to others, and implement the 
related services (like DNS servers) that allow every single device on the 
public Internet to have a unique address and to allow its customers to be 
found and to find all others. 
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The result of  all this is that these networks (if  left to themselves and the web 
of  stakeholders who operate and maintain them) can:
• Automatically find the optimal (which is not necessarily the 
most direct) route between any two points at any given time.7 An 
important fact to remember is that the route between any two points may 
traverse third countries, and that route may pass through different third 
countries at different times of  the same day. This is especially common in 
border areas where two countries have dense populations in close proximity 
to a shared border.
• Create a communications connection between any two points in 
a way that optimizes performance in the networks through which 
that communication passes. This can result in a route being taken that 
is geographically complex to ensure the communication “performs” better.
• Ensure that anyone may extend the public Internet simply by 
connecting a device called a router8 to the “edge” of  the network and 
applying for a unique address for that router. Acquiring that address is 
often automatic, though public Internet addresses are ultimately assigned 
by regional Internet registries (RIRs)9 to ensure every single device on the 
public Internet has a unique address.
As you can see from these characteristics, the public Internet as a platform 
is inherently blind to geography in a way that the “offline” world is not. 
Goods trade, for example, would generally be biased against shipping via 
third countries to deliver a package sent from, and bound for, destinations in 
the same country to avoid the potential “friction” of  border measures such as 
customs, tax compliance and other formalities. 
7 Throughout this chapter illustrations refer to connections between two points (“point to point”), in order to make key 
points easy to follow. There certainly are communications where a single origin is connecting to multiple endpoints 
simultaneously and each of  these endpoints may be in different countries from one another. 
8 A router is a device that “talks” to other such devices to figure out how to forward requests from any device connected 
to it to any other part of  the network. The standards used ensure that this can happen automatically, and as the 
network topology changes in real time these changes are “learnt” by those devices that need to know about them. 
Pretty much every business and residence has a router, in the latter case generally provided by the Internet service 
provider.
9 These organisations are responsible for managing the key forms of  addressing on the Internet, which are akin to the 
various types of  addresses in the worldwide postal system in the functions they perform. All of  them are ultimately 
linked to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), managed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN). IANA and the RIRs work together (more information is available at http://www.
iana.org/numbers). 
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The Objectives of  Trade Agreements Related to the Network as a Platform
Looking at the network as a platform suggests several policy objectives to 
pursue in trade agreements:
• Avoid actions that impede or distort basic functions such as 
addressing and traffic routing. Where a country needs to prevent 
some communication from taking place, or prevent access to certain 
information that the network carries for whatever reason (such as to block 
child pornography), it must do so in a way that does not affect the operation 
of  the network that carries those communications. 
• Avoid actions that might impact upon “transit traffic.” As we have 
seen, traffic often – for very good reasons – transits a country for which 
it is neither the destination nor the source. This argues strongly for such 
transit traffic to remain untouched and unhindered – after all, failing to 
respect transit traffic of  others could lead to reciprocal lack of  respect for 
your own. 
• Avoid obligations that distort private-sector choices about how 
equipment or services integral to the functioning of  the network 
as a platform are made. Measures of  this type – often called “local 
hosting” obligations – can refer to elements of  the network as a platform 
(like submarine cables, routers or related equipment), but they are most 
often intended to influence where applications, data and related services are 
hosted. Obligations that distort investment choices that would otherwise 
seek to optimize performance and resilience in the network everyone uses 
as a platform should be avoided as a clearly trade-distorting measure. 
An example from the offline world is roads: we want roads to be well 
maintained and with enough lanes to handle peak traffic, and ideally to 
have multiple connections between locations so that when traffic congestion 
affects one road we have alternative routes to take. 
How Existing Trade Agreements Relate to the Network as a Platform
Thanks to the principle of  technology neutrality in trade agreements like the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the network as a platform 
has been subject to extensive coverage in WTO Members’ commitments as 
basic telecommunications services for decades. International commitments in 
this area are anchored to the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications 
Services.10 Part of  the problem is that this agreement is an annex of  GATS, 
10 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/12-tel_e.htm. 
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and GATS is a “positive list”11 agreement – meaning that the only obligations 
countries have are those they specifically commit to.12 
There are 108 WTO Member countries with commitments in 
telecommunications, though the commitments are worded differently13 so 
the only way to determine what common commitments there are is through 
laborious searching and comparing all of  the commonalities. What the Internet 
really needs is not a “positive list” approach to commitments but the opposite – 
a “negative list” approach coupled with the political will to agree upon robust 
framing of  the obligations themselves. 
The concepts in the WTO Agreement though are sound and have been taken 
forward by bilateral and regional free trade agreements in the intervening 
decades,14 the most comprehensive treatment being that of  the Trans Pacific 
Partnership finalized in 2015.15
Data Flows (or “Everything Else”)
When the term “data flows” or the “free flow of  data” is referenced in a trade 
context, what is meant is the exchange of  any and all information in electronic 
form unrelated to maintenance of  the network connectivity that makes those 
data exchanges possible.16 
Data flows, not surprisingly, are where everything becomes complicated as 
data can and do relate to any activity that can be conducted electronically at 
distance. 
In order to understand the flow of  data, one must start by understanding two 
key facts about the fundamentals of  IP-based networks: 
• Each and every communication is broken into little pieces called 
“packets” and sent to its destination independently, and then 
reassembled on reception; if  (and this often happens) a packet goes 
“missing” along the way, the receiver asks the sender to send it again
11 For those unfamiliar with some of  the trade terms used in this chapter a good glossary, provided by the Organization 
of  American States’ SICE project, may be found at http://www.sice.oas.org/dictionary/SV_e.asp. 
12 A layman-friendly description of  the flavor of  existing commitments may be found at https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_highlights_commit_exempt_e.htm#country. 
13 Commitments may be found by searching the WTO’s ‘i-Tip’ database at http://i-tip.wto.org/.
14 For a good history of  GATS and international services negotiations at the WTO and in regional trade agreements 
see Adlung and Mamdouh (2013). 
15 For the relevant provisions, see Chapter 13 of  the Trans-Pacific Partnership (inter alia, Articles 13.4.3 and 13.4.5.6) at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Telecommunications.pdf. 
16 Again for the technical, this essentially corresponds to the application layers of  both the OSI and TCP/IP models.
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• The result of  this “packetizing” of  data is that only the sender and 
receiver of  any online communication know what is being 
communicated.17 
These two facts are critical, as they show that data flows operate opposite to 
offline trade: offline transactions require a package bound for international 
destinations to clearly indicate what it contains and can be opened to verify that 
the contents are as stated. The Internet is the opposite and cannot fundamentally 
change; there are simply too many hundreds of  billions of  communications 
taking place simultaneously 24x7 to make the contents transparent. That 
would not only require a complete redesign of  the network, it would create 
such overhead throughout the transmission path of  every communication as 
to render the network either unusable or unaffordable, or both. 
Keeping this in mind, there are ways to break the monolith of  ‘data flows’ 
down in a rules-based trading context and below is a résumé of  the principles 
that should apply:
1. The principle of  technology neutrality of  trade agreements means that 
any online activity should be treated the same as its offline 
equivalent. This principle actually provides substantial coverage today as 
regards many economically significant activities online, from the purchase 
of  goods of  every variety via online storefronts to services of  many kinds. 
The data associated with these activities are therefore covered to the same 
extent as the activity that produces them, as they are integral to covered 
activities.
2. It naturally follows from the first principle that wholly Internet-based 
services should receive the benefit of  national treatment and 
market access commitments related to their offline equivalents. 
In practical application this has been disputed, or simply disregarded, 
when it is inconvenient for WTO Members in certain circumstances. For 
example, countries have alleged foreign search services to be purveyors 
of  pornography even where domestic equivalent services allow users to 
legally link to similar adult content (Elegant, 2009). Numerous other 
foreign Internet-based services, including social networks, blogging and 
photo sharing sites, have over time been blocked for varying lengths of  
time or severely restricted by government action while domestic versions 
17 This is a slight simplification – it is possible to “inspect” packets to divine information about what each contains to 
a certain degree, but doing this is technically burdensome and necessarily imperfect, and where a communication is 
encrypted (as an increasing number of  communications are) inspection is rendered useless.
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of  the same services are permitted to operate.18 There is also very little 
transparency about what material is removed from online services, when, 
for what purpose and at whose instruction. Even where companies would 
like to release details of  these requests, they are routinely legally prevented 
from so doing. Companies have increasingly begun unilaterally publishing 
information about this.19 In the trade context, voluntary measures that 
must accommodate unharmonized, nationally specific legal restrictions on 
disclosure do not produce the certainty or transparency that a rules-based 
international regime can. 
3. As a corollary to national treatment, competing equivalent lawful 
economic activities online should be treated the same by the 
network wherever any part of  an economic transaction is in 
another country. In national and regional debates this is often referred 
to as “network neutrality” and is hotly debated. Net neutrality is discussed 
in more detail below.
4. Any data not bound for, or coming from, the territory it is passing 
through shall not be subject to any impediment. This is a corollary 
to the rule on the network as a platform and for the same reasons. 
Existing Protection of  Data Flows
The level and scope of  existing coverage of  data flows per se is a subject of  
considerable debate. 
At least 60 countries have undertaken commitments on “data processing” and 
76 “on-line information and/or data processing” (Berry and Reisman, 2012) 
under the WTO agreements. Given the latitude that countries have in the 
wording of  their commitments, of  course there is considerable variation. More 
definitively, a moratorium on customs duties on “electronic transmissions” 
covers all WTO Members and while it is not permanent, it is renewed at each 
WTO Ministerial.
With respect to services themselves, where there is little functional difference 
between their online and offline versions the extensive market access 
and national treatment obligations should apply. Again, the wording of  
commitments may be read in different ways depending upon the interests of  
18 The OpenNet Initiative compiles information on the types of  blocking, monitoring, and filtering that countries 
engage in (see http://map.opennet.net/). A layman-friendly explanation of  the different types of  interference that 
exist is at https://opennet.net/about-filtering. 
19 Transparency reporting has greatly increased globally in the wake of  the Snowden disclosures; the Global Network 
Initiative is an example of  an Internet industry initiative to promote disclosure of  such requests (see http://www.
globalnetworkinitiative.org/). 
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the reader – or more to the point, the country the reader represents if  he or 
she is a trade negotiator.
Many books have been written about the extent to which existing CPC 
classifications cover the digital equivalents of  offline activities and the problems 
associated with the trading system’s dependence upon classifications last revised 
in 1991.20 Because commitments often refer to these classifications, given their 
generality it can make commitments even more subject to interpretation.
This does argue for straightforward commitments on data flows as a policy 
object and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is the most substantive step in 
this direction of  any trade agreement.21
ICT Hardware: The Common Thread
While it is the main purpose of  this chapter to explore the networked economy 
as a wider phenomenon rather than its specific impacts on the ICT sector, it 
is important to highlight that the Internet exists in physical form not just as 
cabling and wireless signals, but also in the physical ICT hardware that makes 
interconnection in the network as a platform possible. The data that platform 
carries are generated by people using the multitude of  network enabled devices, 
from cloud services’ server farms to your smartphone. 
Goods trade in these forms of  ICT-related hardware is economically significant 
– reaching US$4 trillion in 2014. One of  the crown jewels of  the WTO System 
relates to ICT hardware like this – the Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA) was concluded as a plurilateral agreement in 1996 that removed all 
tariffs on the products the agreement covers. 
The rapid advance of  technology increasingly made revision of  the agreement 
a priority (as the original agreement covered only items specifically listed, 
rather than product families), and this was finally agreed in December 2015 
at the 10th Nairobi WTO Ministerial. It is at least arguable that the ITA is 
the greatest achievement of  the WTO in normative terms after the WTO 
agreements themselves, and it is understood to be profoundly beneficial to 
developed and developing countries alike.22 It is estimated that the expansion 
20 The “current” classification list for services trade is online at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/mtn_
gns_w_120_e.doc.
21 See the Electronic Commerce Chapter of  the Trans-Pacific Partnership (inter alia Article 14.11) at https://ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Electronic-Commerce.pdf. 
22 There are many studies of  the application of  the ITA to developing countries, but a particularly good one is Ezell 
(2012). 
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alone may add $1 trillion in annual global trade benefits in covered goods and 
increase global GDP by $190 billion.23
Digital Issues and their Trade Dimensions
It has always been the case that public policy issues that arise in a non-trade 
context can have profound trade implications, and the networked economy is 
not exempt from this reality. Here are several of  the most topical.
Network Neutrality
“Network neutrality” has been debated for a decade in a few advanced 
economies, but is now being discussed by regulators in many countries as the 
Internet’s impact spreads. 
The debate about net neutrality is a struggle that is both economic and political 
and has enormous consequences in three respects: 
• Who gets to decide how the value generated by product and service 
providers is apportioned – application providers themselves, or ISPs?
• How much control should each part of  the value chain of  digital commerce 
have over the public Internet in each country?
• Who controls the power position of  each part of  that chain – shareholders 
and markets, or regulators?
Boiled down to the essentials – there are considerable nuances, especially in 
markets where competition between ISPs is impaired – the main question is 
this:
• If  network neutrality is obligatory, then ISPs must treat all applications 
or services the same as any other that is functionally similar. In other words, 
YouTube could not pay ISPs in order to make it perform better for the 
user than a startup video service. 
• If  network neutrality is not obligatory, then ISPs can charge service 
and application providers fees to prioritize paying services over their 
competitors.
An additional dimension to this question relates to peering and whether these 
agreements are entirely private or regulated by the same kinds of  rules.
23 See, inter alia, United States Trade Representative, Supporting Economic Growth at Home and Abroad by Eliminating 
Trade Barriers on Information Technology Products, July 2015, at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/
fact-sheets/2014/November/Supporting-Economic-Growth-Home-Abroad-Eliminating-Trade-Barriers-on-IT-
Products. 
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The trade policy community has yet to engage with this discussion much. 
Aside from the European Union (where a Regulation for the Union as a 
whole was finalized in 2015 but with important definitional elements left to 
the member states), net neutrality debates have focused on how they will apply 
within countries. 
These national debates miss the impacts these decisions have on the Internet 
as a globalized trading platform. Since the private sector owns and controls 
the international links between countries, net neutrality rules that impact 
international peering arrangements could have profound impacts. 
This is magnified by the fact that a few backbone providers handle the vast 
majority of  international Internet traffic. Many of  these so-called “Tier 1” 
(Zmijeuski, 2014) providers are actively lobbying on network neutrality in key 
economies.24 
In addition, there’s also the reality that all countries are not created equal with 
respect to the flow of  data. As a consequence, national decisions about net 
neutrality may well have consequences far beyond their borders.
Local Hosting Requirements
Local hosting obligations are widely discussed in the trade community, in part 
because they are easy to relate to offline trade. There are few measures more 
disruptive to the networked economy – that’s a broad statement, but justifiably 
so since we know that the largest beneficiary of  the networked economy is 
traditional businesses. 
We know that all commercial activity depends upon access to a wide variety 
of  products and services available at competitive prices as inputs. If  your 
competitor is allowed to choose the inputs he or she wants based solely upon 
price and suitability for the purpose at hand and you are not, you are at a 
disadvantage. This is just as true for inputs related to the Internet.
For example, let’s say you manufacture hats and sell them online as well as 
in shops. If  you’re obliged to host all records of  customers in your country 
on local servers, that will limit the services that you can choose to take credit 
cards for payment to those willing to follow your local data localization rules. 
If  you are from a smaller or developing country and you have burdensome 
data localization requirements, the major online marketplaces may not make 
their service available to you or your countrymen. If  that happens, you lose 
24 With respect to lobbying spend in the United States on its net neutrality decision, three of  the biggest backbone 
providers were active: Verizon and AT&T opposed, and Level3 was in favor (Furmas and Drutman, 2014). European-
headquartered Tier 1 providers are active participants in the net neutrality debate at the European Union as well.
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incredibly valuable opportunities for marketing and selling your goods to a 
global market of  buyers.
One of  the most authoritative studies of  data localization (Bauer et al., 2014) 
found that the impact of  rules being planned or implemented in several 
countries (Brazil, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Korea, and 
Vietnam) were expected to reduce GDP from 0.1% to 1.7% depending upon 
the country.
Given all this, you might ask: why are countries considering these rules in the 
first place? They are proposed to solve all manner of  ills, from protecting access 
to nationals’ personal information from foreign national security agencies, to 
providing greater protection of  personal information in commerce, to creating 
jobs by incentivizing the development of  more data hosting centers. Data 
localization is at best a poor instrument, and at worst entirely ineffective, in 
pursuit of  these policy objectives. In the first two cases, the perception that 
geography has anything to do with data access is a holdover from the analogue 
world. In reality it is the measures taken to protect data, and not the location 
where they are stored that matters.25 With respect to access by foreign powers’ 
national security services, these organizations are not known for respecting 
borders and localizing data may simply make it easier for the country creating 
these obligations to surveil its own citizens. Finally, there are few jobs in data 
centers – even very large ones are automated and require only a literal handful 
to run, and those are largely lower-wage jobs to manage the physical security 
of  the buildings.
In a trade context, presence requirements are generally specifically related to 
business presence (i.e. registration) and other “offline world” requirements. The 
most comprehensive local hosting provisions relating to the digital economy 
are to be found in the TPP – and they prevent TPP parties from creating 
these obligations:
“No Party shall require a covered person to use or locate computing 
facilities in that Party’s territory as a condition for conducting business 
in that territory.”26 
25 For those interested, the standard reference for best practices in securing information is the ISF’s Standard of  
Good Practice for Information Security; more information is available at https://www.securityforum.org/tool/the-
standard-of-good-practice-for-information-security/. 
26 See the Electronic Commerce Chapter of  the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Article 14.13.2) at https://ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Electronic-Commerce.pdf  and the Telecommunications Services Chapter (inter alia 
Articles 13.4.3 and 13.4.5.6) at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Telecommunications.pdf. 
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The Industrial Internet of  Things
The industrial Internet of  things (IIoT) is fascinating for many reasons, 
one being that it relates to solely machine-to-machine communications in 
manufacturing, agriculture and many other market segments. Since these are 
communications between machines about their activities, the IIoT is largely 
devoid of  personal information of  individuals. 
As an example of  the IIoT in application, imagine if  every machine associated 
with a car factory were networked and reporting on everything that it does. 
This would allow operators to know when any aspect of  manufacturing was 
deviating from design tolerances – or even if  a specific part being installed 
in a specific car was damaged during the installation process or couldn’t be 
installed because it deviated from design tolerances. Clearly, this would greatly 
increase both the value of  automation and also the quality of  finished goods.
Major manufacturers have banded together to create standards for how devices 
and processes can interoperate with one another. A report by Accenture 
suggests that the GDP value that the industrial Internet may unlock is in the 
trillions of  adjusted US dollars just for the G20 countries by 2020, and up to 
$14 trillion by 2030 (Purdy and Davarzani, 2015).
There are of  course profound trade dimensions to the industrial Internet, 
such as: 
• How can trade policy ensure that standards impacting such massive 
economic effects remain open and not subject to capture by a few powerful 
multinationals? The Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) process has been 
successful in ensuring that standards are not used in trade-distorting 
ways, but will evolutions of  that process be necessary to deal with the 
transformative impact of  IIoT standards?
• How will SMEs that are part of  global value chains be impacted by, for 
example, the much lower tolerance to deviation from design specifications 
that IIoT manufacturing and assembly processes will likely require of  
them?
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Data Protection and Privacy
Trade agreements provide for exceptions so that signatories may deviate from 
normal treaty obligations in order to deal with key policy priorities.27 The 
general exceptions of  GATS are the de facto standard by which data protection 
and privacy are handled in trade agreements – directly and by transposition 
into bilateral and regional trade agreements. That said, the increasing political 
importance of  data protection in key economies is straining continued reliance 
on exceptions-based privacy regimes. At a practical level, measures related to 
personal information are a key consideration since we know that data online 
routinely crosses borders. The simple act of  tracking visits to a website28 can 
reveal who that visitor is, at least to the level of  an IP address.29 This differs 
from the offline world where the commercial use of  personal information 
across borders is less routine and often far less detailed.30
It is also the case that measures taken to protect national security in the 
online environment can create barriers to efficient network operation and 
introduce legal uncertainty that is damaging to commerce.31 An early example 
of  this from the “pre-Snowden” period is the US Patriot Act.32 Provisions 
of  this act have resulted in reluctance by other countries to allow storage of  
their nationals’ data in the United States.33 The Snowden disclosures greatly 
aggravated this situation to the point where several heads of  state announced 
national plans to build submarine links to other continents specifically to 
avoid their traffic entering the United States’ territory.34 More recently, the 
US government is pursuing Microsoft in US courts to force it to hand over 
personal data of  a non-US-based customer that are held in Ireland simply 
because Microsoft is headquartered in the United States. This despite the fact 
that should the government prevail, it will instantly make all US-headquartered 
technology firms lose competitiveness to the tune of  billions in annual revenue 
27 Contained in Article XIV and available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.
htm#articleXIV 
28 Website usage tracking tools (“web analytics”) are used by many, if  not most, public websites as, amongst other uses, 
they help web designers understand how sites are used and when. 
29 As an example of  how fundamental the differences are in what constitutes “personally identifying information” (PII), 
IP addresses are considered PII in some countries but not in others.
30 While the volume of  literature on the subject is considerable, for those in the trade community we recommend the 
February 2013 WEF report “Unlocking the Value of  Personal Data: From Collection to Usage” available at http://
www.weforum.org/issues/rethinking-personal-data (WEF, 2013).
31 Cloud services are particularly susceptible to this; for an example of  the harms, see “Dutch government to ban 
U.S. providers over Patriot Act concerns,” Zdnet, September 19th, 2011 (at http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/dutch-
government-to-ban-u-s-providers-over-patriot-act-concerns/58342). This decision was subsequently reversed.
32 An accessible summary of  the Act and subsequent amendments may be found at Wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Section_summary_of_the_Patriot_Act,_Title_II. 
33 Perhaps the most well-known being Canada (Clement and Obar, 2013).
34 Just one of  the many examples is Brazil and the European Union (Emmott, 2014). 
What Is the “Networked Economy”?   149
and undermine international law.35 The case is of  such significance that the 
European Union itself  has filed an amicus brief  asking the US government 
to drop it. Microsoft has taken the extraordinary step of  designing a cloud 
service offering through Deutsche Telecom that both companies believe will 
withstand any attempt by US authorities to force Microsoft to hand over data 
held in those data centers – despite Microsoft being a US-headquartered 
company (Ribeiro, 2015). 
The US is far from alone – China is promulgating rules that would create 
obligations on foreign businesses related to personal information that have 
very clear trade impacts, arguing that to do otherwise risks Chinese nationals’ 
exposure to foreign secret services and privacy violations by foreign companies 
(McDougall, 2015).
The debate about privacy and trade generally focuses heavily on business-
to-consumer (B2C) services, as by their nature these generate and use large 
amounts of  personal information. Since we know that these services are only 
a small fraction of  the total economic value proposition even of  networked 
economy services, it is easy to argue that the debate we are having is deeply 
unbalanced. This is not to suggest that data privacy is not important – put 
simply, people count – but having a debate almost exclusively focused on that 
isn’t balanced or sensible.
The imminent widespread advent of  the “Internet of  things” (IoT), where 
devices as mundane as refrigerators and home fire alarms are connected to 
the Internet, will further complicate such concerns; there are additional issues 
with respect to product safety.36
These issues will continue to trouble trade negotiators, partly because they’re 
complex but also because many countries are in the throes of  national debates 
about interrelated questions that impact the networked economy, such as: 
• What is the balance between the privacy of  individuals in the networked 
environment and the commercial or government use of  information about 
them? 
• How does each country ensure that key information needed for regulators 
– such as that related to financial transactions and institutions – is protected 
and remains accessible to them when it leaves national boundaries?
• How can we create rules to protect users against online fraud and abuse and 
use of  public networks for criminal activity without undue consequences 
to fundamental freedoms – or commercial activity?
35 For an accessible resume of  the case, see Endler (2014). 
36 A good overview for the non-specialist may be found in Wiesman (2015). 
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• Where is the dividing line between national security issues and everyday 
commercial and end-user security?
Ideas for Future Work
It is certainly true that the WTO’s normative processes are currently under 
stress, as discussed in the Introduction to this book. That said, there are 
many things that WTO Members can do, short of  negotiations related to the 
networked economy, which would help them collectively understand the state 
of  their current economic dependence upon it and the competitive advantages 
(and disadvantages) they have. In order to have a successful negotiation, you 
need negotiators with sufficient knowledge of  the subject matter to be confident 
of  the choices they make as well as a shared base of  understanding of  the 
objects they’re discussing. 
Given that the capital of  the trade community is Geneva, the WTO community 
is a good forum to begin discussing issues in a low-risk way and the flexibility 
in the Electronic Commerce Work Programme means that any country can 
propose relevant discussions and make contributions – and if  the Membership 
as a whole doesn’t choose to take them up, those who are willing can always do 
that in smaller groups. After all, that’s how the Trade in Services Agreement 
(TISA) negotiations on services began.
Better Understanding of How ICT Services Act as a Multiplier, 
or Facilitator, of the Traditional Economy
Below are just a few areas where WTO Members could ask the Geneva-
based institutions with trade or statistical gathering activities to collaborate 
on reporting or symposia organization or both.
• There’s a great deal we don’t know about how traditional 
services leverage the digital environment to compete, innovate 
and export, and the role ICT services play in making this happen. 
To illustrate the stakes, European services overall account for 73% of  the 
Eurozone economy (ECB, 2011),37 while those related to ICT-specific 
services represent just over 3%. In a trading context understanding these 
interrelationships is not optional, it’s essential – for both developed and 
developing countries. 
37 Also see the online statistical interrogation tool at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/eaec/html/index.en.html.
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• Understanding how traditional non-services industries leverage 
the digital economy to compete and the trade rules that apply 
is another key subject that needs more research. Just one aspect 
of  this is how after-market services that leverage networked technologies 
impact the competitiveness of  manufactured goods. An example of  this 
is Volvo, the world’s largest manufacturer of  commercial diesel engines. 
Volvo offers a 100% uptime guarantee for their commercial vehicles made 
possible by networking technology reporting when parts need servicing 
before they fail.38 What trade rules apply in these circumstances – and 
what barriers too – and how can developing economies compete in the 
value chain of  products like these? 
• Analyzing the extent of  trade-related data flows and what they 
consist of. If  digitally connected commerce between businesses is ten 
times that between businesses and consumers, it is logical that much of  that 
data flowing across borders does not consist of  personal information. You 
would think that this a question about which we have a lot of  information, 
but sadly the opposite is true. Remedying this deficiency will require a 
concerted effort across public and private organizations, as much of  the 
base data needed for analysis are in private-sector hands.
Improving the quality of Statistical Information on Networked 
Economy Transactions
Measuring the economic impact of  the networked economy, as well 
as ICTs more generally, is notoriously difficult.39 It is equally true that 
acquiring better data is widely accepted as desirable and necessary – and 
the trade community should be at the forefront of  that effort given the trade 
impacts of  these technologies. As a first step, the WTO ought to convene 
the various public sector institutions – from UN agencies to multilateral 
and regional development banks – to see what data are being gathered and 
where they are; this would also help make clear what we need and do not yet 
collect. WTO Members should ask them to do this and encourage 
the other institutions to help. The UN has acknowledged that better 
information about the impact of  technology is a priority40 and the process 
38 See http://www.volvotrucks.com/trucks/uk-market/en-gb/parts_service/Genuine-Volvo-Service/service-
contracts/volvo-gold-contract/Pages/gold-contract.aspx. 
39 For an excellent tour d’horizon of  the issues with measurement accessible to non-specialists see OECD (2013).
40 There are many examples, but the most significant is to be found in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda for financing of  
the Sustainable Development Goals, where an entire chapter is dedicated to measures on how data and data analysis 
are integral to the achievement of  the SDGs (see the “Addis Ababa Action Agenda of  the Third International 
Conference on Financing for Development” (Addis Ababa Action Agenda), adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on July 27th, 2015, (A/RES/69/313, Section III, page 35, at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/313).  
152    Future of the Global Trade Order
of  defining the indicators that will be used to evaluate whether or not the 
Sustainable Development Goals are in fact being met are in the process of  
development. It is important that the trade dimension of  technology’s impacts 
are a part of  these indicators to ensure that the link between development and 
the economic impact of  technology on development are better understood. 
The trade community should take a leading role in ensuring that both these 
processes are informed by the community’s needs – doing so will pay dividends 
for decades to come.
Data Protection and Privacy in International Trade
Data protection and privacy issues are already a thorny subject in trade 
negotiations – the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership talks are 
evidence of  this.41 The reality is that the global nature of  data flows in the 
networked economy raises issues that will be the subject of  debate at the 
national level for some time, and laws made nationally in response will continue 
to evolve. Trade negotiators will be wary of  agreeing to binding international 
obligations where national discussions are not mature. 
A first step would be for a group of  interested WTO Members to 
convene a few meetings of  their data protection and trade officials 
to compare notes on how different countries’ legal systems handle 
personally identifying information. That conversation could also ask 
experts to consider how interoperable (or otherwise) different 
approaches are in a trading context.
An informal discussion like this regularly in Geneva would allow these charged 
issues to be discussed outside of  negotiations but still involve negotiators – 
removing political risk from an already fraught subject. It is hoped that over 
time, meetings could at least periodically include other stakeholders to build 
understanding. The provisions of  the TPP on privacy already call for its 
parties to engage in a dialogue like that suggested above,42 but why stop with 
TPP parties? Such a conversation amongst the combined TPP and TISA 
parties would seem sensible, as the two agreements have substantial overlap in 
participating countries and it is reasonable to suggest that the ultimate TISA 
agreement will have congruent, if  not very similar, provisions in this area.
41 There are literally thousands of  articles discussing different views on this subject.
42 See the Electronic Commerce Chapter of  the Trans-Pacific Partnership (inter alia Articles 14.15 and 14.8.5) at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Electronic-Commerce.pdf. 
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Creating Greater Certainty for the Network as a Platform
While it is true that issues with data and their use in sectoral trade applications 
can rapidly become very complex, that should not be true with the network 
as a platform.
A group of  WTO Members could make unilateral MFN commitments 
to some of  the principles articulated above without any “free riding” 
problem. A commitment that traffic that is only transiting a Member’s territory 
would not be subject to interruption or delay would make a political and 
practically important statement without a downside, since it is not practical 
to know what the contents of  transit traffic is in any case.43
Second, a group of  WTO Members could commit to making the 
moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions 
permanent on an MFN basis. This is now in enough bilateral and regional 
agreements44 that, for many countries, it would be difficult to derogate from 
in any case – and it would send a very strong signal, especially if  the group 
were large enough and cross-regional.
Creating Better Clarity on the Existing Commitments for Both the 
Platform and the Data that It Carries
There are existing commitments across a large proportion of  WTO Members 
on key aspects of  the networked economy, but no authoritative comparison 
of  how different commitments interoperate with one another. Surfacing this 
information in a neutral way that simply compares how commitments are 
worded and how congruent those are with others is essential information. 
The meaning would then be argued by some, but at least the argument would 
be taking place based upon a reasonable foundation. A group of  WTO 
Members should jointly ask the WTO Secretariat for such a report 
– if  the sensitivity were seen to be too great for this to be published as an 
official WTO Secretariat product, it could be commissioned as part of  the 
WTO Working Papers series.45
43 For textual inspiration, see the Telecommunications Chapter of  the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Articles 13.4.3 and 
13.4.6.5) at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Telecommunications.pdf. 
44 Including all TPP Parties; see the Electronic Commerce Chapter of  the Trans-Pacific Partnership (inter alia Articles 
14.15 and 14.8.5) at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Electronic-Commerce.pdf..
45 WTO Working Papers that presently exist are to be found at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/wpaps_e.
htm. 
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Exploring Issues like Network Neutrality in a Global Trading Context
As outlined above, the debate about network neutrality being confined 
to national (or inter-regional) dynamics is far from optimal. A dialogue 
between trade officials, backbone operators and ISPs, and other 
stakeholders in Geneva to explore the international dimensions 
would be valuable. It would expose very different views on the subject, but 
it would also help create a shared understanding of  the impacts of  different 
policy choices that are being made. It would also help expose any analysis that 
is needed to better understand the market landscape. These conversations 
could (and should) be held at least partly in public, and other Geneva-based 
institutions stakeholders invited to participate, given that the impacts of  these 
choices have profound implications beyond trade.
Discussing, and Creating, a Disclosure Process for Digital Information 
Blocking, Filtering and Removals
While undoubtedly controversial, countries are increasingly blocking and 
filtering content and monitoring what their citizens do online. These activities 
have an inherent risk – and in some cases the certainty – of  trade-distorting 
effects. A disclosure process that would ensure a basic minimum of  
information on when content online may be blocked by a Member 
would be of  great benefit. The WTO notifications process in other areas 
of  trade law has been very successful and future agreements that incorporate 
digital issues should build upon this legacy. 
The starting place is a conversation amongst willing WTO Members to 
compare experiences and practices. Far more studies on the economic impacts 
of  measures for blocking connectivity or reducing access to online resources 
are needed to complement the many that exist on how such measures can 
impact on freedom of  expression. 
In Conclusion
The networked economy presently only connects about half  of  humanity. We 
are only at the beginning of  its transformation of  society and our economies. 
Its inherent nature is frictionless by design to an extent that the “bricks and 
mortar” trade community can only dream of  for the traditional economy. 
If  for no other reason than that it is long past time for the international trade 
community to make a priority of  better understanding it as an economic 
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force. That will require leadership from WTO Members to bootstrap the 
conversation but, as the TISA talks and large regional trade agreements have 
begun to show, it can be done. All countries need this conversation, as trade 
agreements will inevitably incorporate more and more provisions related to the 
networked economy. Trade negotiators of  all countries – including those from 
developed countries – will need to understand its impacts and opportunities 
better to negotiate the future agreements that will bind them.
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The world economy is going through major economic and 
geopolitical shifts, fostering tensions in the global economic 
governance structure centered on the IMF, the World Bank and 
the WTO. The impacts of globalization are being questioned 
while disruptive technologies continue to change the economic 
landscape. This collection of papers focuses on one of the pillars 
of global governance: the multilateral trade system, anchored by 
the WTO.  
Membership of the WTO is now close to universal, with the 
accession of China in 2001 representing a landmark achievement. 
While the organization plays a major role in enhancing the 
transparency of trade policies and enforcing the rules of the game 
that have been agreed by Members, it has not been successful 
at negotiating new rules. The private sector is frustrated 
with the WTO, as are civil society groups seeking to address 
issues of interest to them. There is a general perception that 
WTO disciplines and modus operandi are outdated and have 
not kept pace with globalization. Governments have increasingly 
turned to preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that are better 
attuned to the changing dynamics of international trade and 
investment flows.
The papers in this volume focus on some of the major critical issues 
that confront the WTO Membership. They review developments 
in trade policy and technology and regulation. They make clear 
that PTAs are at best a partial solution to the global governance 
gap. Regulation of the “Internet of things,” e-commerce, cross-
border services, digital trade and data flows will become ever 
more important. Global rules of the game are required. The same 
is true for old fashioned protectionism. The future of the WTO is 
an important topic for the health and expansion of global trade in 
the 21st century.
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